The Case For European Missile Defense
Mr. Peter Brookes

Speech before the American Foreign Policy Council’s
conference on “Missile Defenses and American Security”

March 10, 2008

After seemingly endless rounds of talks with their Polish and Czech counterparts about fielding missile defense systems in Europe, the United States may have made some progress in recent weeks. Of course, the devil is in the details in any final agreement. But with Iran continuing to enrich uranium and moving forward with its efforts to develop a space launch vehicle, the possibility of loose nukes in Pakistan, and the spate of ballistic missile tests by Russia, China, and Iran, among others, over the past year, progress toward deployment is undoubtedly good news. Concluding a deal this year will serve to bolster transatlantic security, and to protect the United States and Europe from the growing threat of long range ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads they may carry.

But this deal will not go unopposed. Public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic is shaky. Member countries are not fully on board. And the Russians will continue their vociferous opposition, including under the reign of new Russian president Dmitri Medvedev.

The Kremlin has not been shy about expressing its opinion that a European missile defense system would be a serious threat to Russian interests. Indeed, days before the Washington Warsaw deal in principle was announced by Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski a month or so ago, almost as if his government was anticipating a breakthrough in the talks, a top Russian general said, "Russia may restructure its military presence in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad," which borders both Poland and Lithuania, in response to missile defense plans for eastern Europe. This and other threats by the Russians, which may or may not be hollow, are sure to rattle nerves in the region. In fact, they already have.

Despite the Kremlin's growling, the Bush administration sees the deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and in Czech Republic, also known as the “third site,” as critical to blunting the growing worldwide ballistic missile threat, protecting the homeland and defending its European allies. But it is a race against the clock.

The recent U.S. national intelligence estimate (NIE) on the supposedly dormant state of Iran's nuclear weapons program notwithstanding, the American intelligence community believes Iran could have an intercontinental missile capability by the year 2015. Now, that is in the next decade, but it really isn't that far away. At the same time, there has been some walking back on the NIE based on recent congressional testimony by the DNI, so it is not clear what we really know at this point. These estimates on missiles or nukes, of course, do not take into account the possibility of a Manhattan Project like effort by Iran, which could decrease the time needed to reach initial operating capability for either the missile or the nuclear program. Nor do these dates take into account outside assistance, such as from North Korea, which might accelerate either or both programs.

This represents a problem. According to the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, if the green light were given today by all concerned to break ground on the eastern European missile defense sites, the earliest the system could be fully operational would be about 2013.

Indeed, the ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation trend in general is not positive. Ten years ago there were only six nuclear weapon states. Today there are nine. Twenty five years ago, nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, twenty-seven do. Concerns about Iran's programs only exacerbate this trend, especially in the Arab Middle East, where countries are seeking to balance Iran's rise.

Of course, none of these arguments are likely to convince the Russians of the need for missile defenses in Eastern Europe. But all of this political jousting over missile defense is having an effect on the security debate in Europe, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as within NATO.

In Poland, domestic public opinion is not entirely convinced about the need for missile defense. The Poles question the threat emanating from Iran, and do not want to be dragged into a dust-up between Washington and Teheran, should that come about. Not surprisingly, the Polish national security establishment, worried about taking a ration of Russian wrath without appropriate compensation, wants to extract all it can from the United States for the placement of ten interceptors on Polish soil. Although positive about closer defense ties with Washington and, by extension, NATO, Warsaw has not been subtle about wanting deal sweeteners in exchange for hosting the missiles. The Poles have expressed interest in the PAC III and THAAD systems, defense modernization assistance, and more intelligence sharing, among other issues. Poland is already the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Europe, but it has lingering concerns about the commitment of the NATO alliance to its defense, should Russia want to play rough. This is not surprising, considering the Polish experience with its British and French allies in a run-up to World War II.

The X-band midcourse radar to be located in the in Czech Republic’s Brdy military district, west of Prague, is not without controversy either. While the ruling government supports the missile defense radar, concerns exist among the Czech people, especially about the system's environmental and health effects. Czech opposition parties are calling for a national referendum on the issue and for the European Union and NATO to play a larger role in European missile defense plans.

NATO has generally considered talks among Washington, Warsaw, and Prague to be bilateral issues and has chosen not to interfere. In general, it has expressed support for missile defense in Europe, especially against short and medium range missiles. NATO’s Secretary General stated after the November North Atlantic Council meeting that “there is absolutely a shared threat perception between the allies. Allies all agree that there is a threat from ballistic missiles.” While there will be no shortage of issues to discuss, such as Afghanistan and Kosovo, the NATO summit in Bucharest this spring therefore could be a key meeting for missile defense as well. But while NATO is actively studying short and medium range missile defense programs for Europe, France, and Germany have expressed concern about the deployment of assets “in theater” that are not controlled by NATO.

The European parliament has also asked for a say on missile defense. Europeans fear that missile defense will provoke Moscow on other thorny issues, such as Europe's energy security or the question of Kosovo's independence from Serbia, which the Kremlin opposes, and on future NATO expansion into its “near abroad.”

Meanwhile, the Russian anxiety about the eastern European missile shield is more likely about the placement of a system in what it perceives as its old stomping grounds, rather than any real strategic concerns. The supposed threat from missile defense could also provide a convenient excuse for the $200 billion Russian defense buildup that is now taking place following years of abject neglect of the once-mighty Red Army.

Not even taking into account the sea- and air legs of its strategic nuclear triad, the Kremlin should realize that the currently configured system in Eastern Europe could not deal with a massive Russian nuclear assault on the United States. Yet it is likely the Kremlin will try to leverage public sentiment in Eastern Europe and NATO countries to get impressionable democratically elected governments to back down on missile defense. Moscow will also try to make missile defense a wedge issue to divide Europe, undermine NATO, and weaken transatlantic relations, all while carving out a sphere of political and military influence for itself.

Worst of all, Russia might deepen its nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond building and fueling Iran's Bushehr reactor as a bargaining chip against missile defense. It appears that the Russians will do all they can to prevent the deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe, maybe all of Europe. And although hope may spring eternal, it is unlikely an increasingly confident Kremlin is going to change its position, no matter how transparent the U.S. is about missile defense.

In recent years, the United States decided that leaving itself deliberately vulnerable to any weapons system or state, as it did during the Cold War, was foolish. Rightfully so; deliberate vulnerability can lead to perceptions of weakness, inviting provocation or aggression from another nation or transnational actor. In addition, being perceived as weak and vulnerable can lead a potential adversary to use threats, intimidation, blackmail, or coercion to achieve its objectives.

In a day when North Korea is a nuclear weapons state and Iran is still very likely on the path to becoming one, the chance that these weapons will be used against peaceful nations is a troubling but very real possibility. Every state has an undeniable right to self-defense. And it only makes sense that all reasonable, necessary steps are taken to protect one's national security. It is even more logical as the capabilities emerge to do so, as witnessed by nearly thirty successful missile defense tests to date by the United States alone. As these tests have shown, hitting a bullet with a bullet in the atmosphere or even in space is, in fact, possible.

But even though rogue states like North Korea and Iran are good examples of the need for missile defense today, developing and deploying such capabilities is not about the missile or weapons of mass destruction threat from a single country, or even several. Rather, missile defense is about protection from these weapons no matter where the threat comes from, now or in the future.

There are other advantages to fielding a missile defense system in Europe for the United States, too. Hosting a transatlantic missile defense system will deepen and further unify the security relationship between European NATO members, especially Poland and the Czech Republic and the United States, enhancing our mutual security against external threats from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. And, despite the range of concerns about missile defense, it should be emphasized that missile defense is a defensive, not offensive, weapon. Indeed, the dominant design of the missile defense interceptor warhead does not even contain an explosive charge. Rather, traveling at fifteen thousand miles per hour, it destroys the enemy missile by sheer force of collision.

Therefore, the idea that missile defense is an offensive system, as many have suggested, is patently false. In a way, missile defense is like an umbrella: it is only needed if it rains. This means that missile defense threatens no one. It only undermines the capability of one country to threaten or attack another with its ballistic missiles. The idea that the deployment of missile defense in Europe will provoke an attack against Poland and Czech Republic or any country that hosts them, including the United Kingdom or Denmark, which have missile defense radars, is a canard meant to encourage passivity. Defensive systems do not provoke attack. It is vulnerability or weakness that invites attack, not resolve and strength.

The United States and others have made it clear to Russia that missile defense does not threaten Russian security. Talks have emphasized that missile defense is part of an expanding effort in Europe to counter the growing ballistic missile threat, wherever it may come from. Of course, Russia should not expect to have a veto over American or European security, nor should that right be surrendered by the United States or Europe. Indeed, Moscow will be better to turn with its protests towards Teheran and Pyongyang, capitals that are driving the need for missile defense because of their growing offensive capabilities.

Mutually assured destruction or massive retaliation should not be the only strategic policy options we have. Missile defenses will improve America's security and that of Europe against the growing challenge of ballistic missiles and their unconventional payloads. It is high time the Americans, the Poles, and the Czechs strike a final deal for deployment, enhancing both transatlantic ties and our common security.