


# DEFENSE DOSSIER



*DECEMBER 2011*

*ISSUE 1*

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- *NEW START'S DANGEROUS LEGACY*
- *THE MYTH OF U.S.-RUSSIAN MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION*
- *WEATHERING THE BUDGETARY STORM*

**American Foreign  
Policy Council**

# DEFENSE DOSSIER

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DECEMBER 2011

ISSUE 1

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**American Foreign  
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**LETTER FROM THE EDITORS**

Welcome to the *Defense Dossier*, the new e-journal of the American Foreign Policy Council. With this publication, we are delighted to be able to expand and strengthen our analysis of the national security threats confronting the United States. All editions of the *Defense Dossier* are available for digital download via the AFPC website ([www.afpc.org](http://www.afpc.org)). Future issues will cover topics such as Iranian cyberwarfare activities, China's military modernization program, and the dangers of electromagnetic pulse (EMP), among many others.

However, in this, our inaugural issue, we focus on the state of the American policy debate regarding ballistic missile defense. Specifically, we explore the perils and pitfalls of the New START treaty signed by Moscow and Washington last year; the impediments to real progress on missile defense cooperation with the Kremlin; and the current debate over the U.S. defense budget as it relates to American strategic capabilities and anti-missile initiatives. The articles are drawn from the presentations featured at AFPC's 2011 Capitol Hill conference on "Missile Defenses and American Security," which took place on November 16, 2011.

Sincerely,

Ilan Berman  
Chief Editor

Rich Harrison  
Managing Editor

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## THE RISKS OF THE RESET

*By Congressman Michael Turner*

In February of this year, the New START treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation entered into force. When the Administration was selling this treaty to the Senate, a great many promises were made about its benefits—both directly from the provisions of the treaty itself, and also surrounding the role that the treaty would play in the “reset” with Russia. It is exceedingly clear, however, that the White House has inflated the benefits of the treaty, and minimized its destabilizing potential.

### What we got for New START

At one of the first hearings on New START, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “a ratified New START Treaty would also continue our progress toward broader U.S.-Russian cooperation, which is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.” So, a key reason for the ratification of the New START treaty was that it would help to get Russia to support the United States in dealing with Iran’s illegal nuclear weapons program.

But has the Administration been able to cash-in on the reserve of U.S.-Russian cooperation accumulated by the ratification and entry-into-force of the New START treaty? The answer is “no.” On the same day that Russia’s foreign minister and the deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council

were holding meetings and press conferences together in Moscow, we learn that Russia has dismissed calls for new UN sanctions on Iran stemming from the IAEA report.

Where is Russia’s cooperation on Iran’s illegal nuclear weapons program that the Secretary of State promised? Of course, this is just another example of the Administration’s continued miscalculations when it comes to both Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The United States would have been better off had the Administration heeded the advice of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who once wrote:

“When arms-control agreements are valued mainly for the international good will they are expected to generate, and only secondarily for their effects on arms, then our political leaders will always be under pressure to reach agreements by making concessions on arms...”

### Deleterious effects

What has been the New START treaty’s impact on our arms? On June 1, 2011, the State Department released a fact sheet titled “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms” that details the

*Congressman Michael Turner (R-OH-3) is Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.*

information provided in the initial February 5, 2011 exchange of data.

What this fact sheet made clear was that Russia, as of entry-into-force of the treaty, was already well below the deployed delivery vehicle and deployed warhead central limits, whereas the U.S. will have to make sizeable reductions in both categories.

As we know, this was not a surprise to the Administration. In June of 2009, Dr. Keith Payne, a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that:

“Russian strategic systems have not been designed for long service lives and the number of deployed Russian strategic ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers will drop dramatically with or without a new arms control agreement... In short, the Russians would like to make lemonade out of the lemon of their aging launchers by getting reductions in real U.S. systems without eliminating anything that they would not withdraw in any event.”

However, what is quite surprising is that the October 20, 2011 fact sheet released by the State Department shows that, since entry-into-force of the treaty, *Russia has actually increased its deployed delivery vehicles and deployed warheads*. Moreover, it has done so at precisely the same time that the United States has been making reductions in those categories.

The Administration, for its part, insists the paramount objective was to get “inspectors’ boots on the ground.” Senator Kit Bond, then

Ranking Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, conclusively made the case that, on the question of arms control verification, the New START treaty is deeply defective and not worth the price we were paying. In remarks to the Senate, Sen. Bond stated:

“There is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably verify the treaty’s 1,550 limit on deployed warheads... Despite Russia’s poor compliance record, the administration has decided that we will rely primarily on good Russian cooperation to verify New START’s key 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. This brings to mind the famous adage: fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”

In terms of the “poor compliance record,” Sen. Bond was referring to Russia’s long-standing practice of cheating on arms control treaties, about which he said:

“According to the official State Department reports on arms control compliance, published by this administration and the previous administration, the Russians have previously violated, or are still violating, important provisions of most of the key arms control treaties to which they have been a party, including the original START, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and Open Skies.”

To be clear, the State Department has never been willing to declare that Russia is cheating.

If Sen. Bond was correct in his admonitions about verification and compliance—and the facts are clear in this regard—we should worry about what we will know and what we won't about Russia's modernized strategic nuclear systems at the end of the New START treaty as compared to today.

### **An uneven trade**

In return for giving the Russians these concessions, the Obama administration not only failed to gain anything, but agreed to give up more: agreeing to count, and thus limit, certain conventional prompt global strike options and wholesale concessions on missile defense.

In missile defense, the Administration plainly abandoned our Polish and Czech allies on the Third Site system in September of 2009, as it was negotiating the New START treaty with Russia. At the time, it maintained that abandonment of the Third Site system was not a *quid pro quo*. It was right; we abandoned two allies, and a key national missile defense capability, and in exchange we got nothing but the hope of better relations with Russia.

The Administration has also agreed to provisions in the New START treaty—including the preamble and the unilateral statements—that create uncertainty as it proceeds with the Administration's own missile defense plan: the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Additionally, the Administration continues to negotiate with Russia concerning missile defense "cooperation," notwithstanding that fact that it is clear that, as far as the Russian

Federation is concerned, the only way to cooperate on missile defense is for the U.S. not to deploy it.

Ongoing discussions on this subject are occurring between Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher and her Russian counterparts. But Congress has no substantive information concerning their scope or substance. We do know from newspaper accounts that:

- Ms. Tauscher continues to negotiate a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement with the Russian Federation. Congress has not been able to see the draft text of this agreement that was shared with Russia.
- The Administration is said to be offering written assurances to the Russians regarding missile defense, which, again, Congress has not seen.
- Likewise, it appears the Administration may pressure NATO to make a written assurance to Russia on missile defense; of course, written political guarantees are how NATO makes policy. Such a guarantee could even take the form of agreeing to amend the NATO-Russia Council charter. These steps would plainly be intended to avoid the U.S. Senate, where further restrictions on missile defense would promptly die.
- The Russian Federation is demanding access to telemetric information, and the Obama administration not only has not taken that off-the-table, but appears willing to allow the Russians to send observers to our missile defense tests.

We cannot afford to compromise our missile defenses to Russian demands. In fact, in this year's NDAA, the House made it clear that it opposes sharing sensitive U.S. missile defense technology with the Russians. Further, we oppose any division of geographical responsibility for European missile defense or a division in the chain of command for missile defense operations.

We will also oppose any effort by the Administration to provide to Russia information on the burnout velocity, also known as VBO, of SM-3 missile interceptors. Such an offer may have been made by State Department officials. The House Armed Services Committee will vigorously resist such compromise of U.S. missile defense systems capabilities. The Administration should make it clear that it also opposes making any of these concessions to the Russians in the name of missile defense "cooperation."

### **Neglecting nuclear modernization**

Other problems also exist. Russia and the People's Republic of China are both aggressively modernizing their nuclear forces. Iran is at the precipice of a nuclear weapons capability, which could trigger a cascade of proliferation. Yet, the United States has not undertaken a comprehensive nuclear forces modernization program. That was the focal point of much of the debate during the New START treaty.

Last December, President Obama and the Senate agreed to robust funding for nuclear modernization efforts. In letters to the Senate, the President agreed to modernize the strategic triad of delivery systems and accelerate key infrastructure projects at NNSA labs and plants.

The President came through on this pledge in his budget request, and then the House supported full funding for NNSA in the FY12 Budget Act and the FY12 National Defense

*The October 20, 2011 fact sheet released by the State Department shows that, since entry-into-force of the treaty, Russia has actually increased its deployed delivery vehicles and deployed warheads.*

Authorization Act. But now that commitment is falling apart; the FY12 Energy and Water appropriations bills would cut NNSA funding by up to 10% from the budget request. The modernization plan may actually stop before it gets started.

What makes this particularly egregious for FY12 is that Secretary Gates agreed to transfer over *\$8 billion* in top-line budget authority from DOD to NNSA over the next several years to support nuclear modernization.

As the leadership of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees work to finalize the discretionary security appropriations allocations, it is necessary to ensure that those who made commitments during New START to fund the modernization program now follow through. There is real concern that these commitments made to win ratification of New START in the end may not be kept. We are already seeing major reductions in nuclear modernization funding from the agreed-upon levels. And we already

have seen an indication of the Administration's lack of commitment to its own modernization plan.

It is clear that New START's reduction and modernization are a package deal, and as such, if they're not both implemented, neither should be. Secretary Gates had it exactly right when he said, slightly less than

two months before his retirement, that "This modernization program... played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement." Continued advocacy is needed to ensure that the treaty nuclear force reductions encapsulated in the New START treaty be linked to the funding and implementation of modernization. ■

## NEW START'S DANGEROUS LEGACY

*By Mark Schneider*

During the ratification of the New START treaty last fall, the Obama administration made a number of erroneous claims regarding the agreement. It is now abundantly clear that—contrary to White House assertions—New START does not require Russia to make any reductions in deployed nuclear warheads or delivery systems beyond the numbers that existed before the treaty's entry into force. Indeed, the agreement is giving every indication of having the opposite effect, spurring new dynamism in Russia's modernization of its strategic capabilities.

### **Robust Russian modernization**

During the ratification of New START, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov tellingly stated that Russia was currently *below* the New START limits, but vowed that “We will meet every parameter established by the treaty before 2028, while the warhead limits will be met by 2018.” Russia's first New START data declaration confirmed that its deployed force numbers were below both the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles (1,537 and 521, respectively). But there are clear signs that Moscow is now working to close the gap.

Following New START's ratification, Russia

announced a three-fold increase in nuclear missile production, to be completed by 2013. Russian press reports indicate plans to deploy 200-300 mainly MIRVed SS-27/RS-24 ICBMs. Russia says its new *Bulava 30* SLBM will be operational in 2012, and that it plans eight new *Borey* class submarines to carry them. It is reportedly developing a fifth generation submarine capable of carrying both ballistic and cruise missiles. And this year, Russia tested and reportedly made operational an improved SS-N-23/*Sineva* SLBM with up to 12 warheads. Another program to modernize the *Sineva* is also underway. In September 2011, Russia unsuccessfully tested an upgraded SS-27/RS-24 with more throw-weight, new warheads and a new MIRV dispensing bus to carry six warheads and missile defense counter-measures. Russia is also in the early stages of the development of a new bomber and is deploying a new bomber-launched 5000-kilometer range nuclear cruise missile. But perhaps the most significant threat development of the past year was Russia's announcement of the deployment (by 2018) of a new heavy ICBM, reportedly capable of carrying 10-15 warheads.

Other strategic modernization efforts are also underway, ranging from new warheads on variants of the SS-27 ICBM to significant planned upgrades of the country's ICBM

*Dr. Mark Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, he served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy relating to strategic arms control, missile defense and nuclear deterrence.*

force. Over the next half-decade Russia is also developing new nuclear warheads, apparently with the help of low yield nuclear testing.

Russia has more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined, and New START has many substantive loopholes that may be exploited by Russia to increase the number of its strategic nuclear forces. These include the loopholes created by the elimination of prohibitions under the original START treaty on long-range air-launched and surface ship-launched nuclear ballistic missiles and the exclusion of rail mobile ICBMs from Treaty limits. Dozens of prohibitions included in Article V of the original START Treaty were omitted from New START, and actions which would have been prohibited by the original START are permitted under the new treaty.

Moscow is actively exploiting this state of affairs. Russia's first New START data update showed it had *increased* its forces by 29 warheads, to a level *above* the New START limit of 1550. The treaty appears actually to have been followed by an increase in Russian forces, not a reduction of them. And the Obama Administration labels this a success.

Russian forces (launchers) will probably decline further in number over the next five years, as legacy systems are retired. However, the number of Russian warheads may stay near or above New START levels as Russia increases the number of warheads on its launchers. Even the ITAR-Tass news agency

admits that “[t]he total number of [Russian] deployed warheads... could exceed the 1,550 limit by a few hundred because per bomber only one warhead is counted regardless of how many it actually carries.”

### American stagnation

Nor is Russia's build-up being remedied by American investments. The Obama Administration claims it is sustaining and modernizing a “robust” nuclear deterrent. But, and in stark contrast to Russia's real modernization activities, its program amounts to a 20 year moratorium on any significant modernization of U.S. strategic forces. U.S.

*Russia has more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined, and New START has many substantive loopholes that may be exploited by Russia to increase the number of its strategic nuclear forces.*

delivery systems will be 35 to 70 years-old in 2030, when the first *Trident* replacement submarine arrives. The earliest possible date for a follow-on to the *Minuteman* ICBM is 2030, but there is no funding for it in the budget. A replacement for the *Trident* SLBM is delayed until 2042. While the Obama administration pays

lip service to deterrence, including extending deterrence to our allies, the stark reality is that effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent will decline over the next twenty years due to aging—and to improvements in Russian and Chinese defenses.

By now, there is no doubt that the Obama administration has chosen to prioritize movement toward the goal of “nuclear zero” over the preservation of U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities. The resultant weakening of U.S. nuclear deterrence

capabilities is not a question of “if,” but of how quickly it will happen.

What will the strategic balance be in 2030? Former Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph has concluded that a long-standing bipartisan standard for the U.S. nuclear forces has been, “second to none,” but that under Obama we have become “Second to One.” He writes: “Further unilateral steps in this direction will only aggravate the fears of allies and undermine stability in our relationship to Russia.” Russia will have a modernized Triad, probably more strategic nuclear warheads than the U.S. and a 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. And, as Ambassador Joseph notes, “Russia can produce about 2,000 new warheads each year, whereas the United States can produce just 50 to 80 under the best conditions.”

Unless the administration and Congress change the current direction, our nuclear deterrent will continue to decline in effectiveness. At best, we will have our current forces, reduced by New START and possibly by further unilateral cuts, a single new missile submarine and a small number of new cruise missiles. More ominously, an asymmetry in U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons reliability may develop due to Russia’s apparent low yield nuclear testing.

We do not want to find out if missile rattling Russian leaders mean what they say. Unlike the U.S., Russia has a nuclear doctrine that emphasizes the combat use of nuclear

weapons and correspondingly Russia reportedly deploys a wide variety of tactical nuclear weapons that can destroy targets on the battlefield, in the air, in aerospace, and on the surface or subsurface of the sea. In contrast, we have only one type of tactical nuclear weapon: a bomb. Russia is now reported to have precision low yield (sub-kiloton) ballistic missile warheads and low collateral damage weapons. We do not. Hence, Russia has a disturbing number of attack options while we have no prompt and/or proportionate response capability.

As Dr. Keith Payne, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has observed: “Given the great variation possible in the requirements for credible deterrence, the most obviously important US force structure characteristic for deterrence is not the size of our forces, per se, but their flexibility and resilience—*flexibility* meaning US possession of a spectrum of possible threat options suitable for a wide range of opponents and contingencies, and *resilience* meaning the capability to adapt deterrence to changes in threats and contexts, including rapid and unanticipated changes.”

This deterrent flexibility and resilience is precisely what we continue to give up unilaterally, and what Russia (and China) are building up as they expand their nuclear forces. In this context, there is no doubt that the Obama Administration has chosen an extremely dangerous path for the sake of arms control. ■

## THE MYTH OF U.S. – RUSSIAN MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

By Richard Weitz

Although most everyone would welcome greater cooperation between Moscow and Washington on missile defense, decades of frustrating experience should have taught us that this is precisely the wrong issue to make the centerpiece of the Russian-American “reset.”

For almost two decades, Russia has engaged in a variety of joint BMD projects with the United States, as well as the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. None have achieved sustained success. Rather than waste additional time and goodwill on the endeavor, we need to think more creatively about deepening bilateral collaboration regarding other issues, which might include promoting regional security in Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as developing our neglected bilateral economic relationship.

### Divergent objectives

Both sides have periodically expressed hope that the passage of time will improve interaction on the missile defense issue—but with very different objectives in mind. On the U.S. side, there is an expectation that at some

point Russia will finally realize that U.S. missile defense plans are not aimed at their deterrent. In contrast, the Russian side has repeatedly voiced the hope that some *deus ex machina* will derail the U.S. missile defense program. These have ranged from the wish that a new U.S. presidential administration will renounce the program altogether to the expectation that Russian threats and scaremongering will frighten Europeans into resisting deployments for fear of ruining their relations with Moscow, to the current aspiration that U.S. budgetary pressures will weaken funding for these programs. But missile defense now enjoys bipartisan support in Washington, NATO allies have rallied around new U.S. BMD plans, and the U.S. missile defense budget amounts to only some \$10 billion a year out of a \$600 billion yearly DoD budget.

The chances of securing a missile defense agreement, moreover, are likely to decrease in coming years for additional reasons. First, the Obama administration has only deferred, not cancelled, the deployment of the more advanced missile defenses in Europe. These are scheduled to arrive in Europe within the

*Dr. Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His research areas include regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign, defense, and homeland security policies.*

Second, it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish between tactical and strategic missile defense systems as the technology evolves to allow for networked sensors and integrated multi-layered defenses. This will make Americans ever more reluctant to agree to limit the functionality of non-strategic BMD systems in ways that inhibit the ability to leverage progress in one element to benefit the U.S. BMD architecture as a whole. This also will make the Russians increasingly reluctant to cooperate on “tactical” or “theater” missile defenses that could more plausibly contribute to American strategic national missile defenses.

### **Problems abound**

More generally, several recurring obstacles have repeatedly disrupted Russian-U.S. attempts to sustain joint BMD initiatives in the past. These impediments will likely hamper current efforts as well.

First, multilateral missile defense initiatives are inherently difficult. Participants must craft an arrangement that would permit a timely launch decision in an environment when even a few minutes’ delay could prove fatal. The diverging technical standards and operational procedures of U.S. and Russian BMD systems compound this problem. Whereas Russian officials demand that any European missile defense system be jointly run, with Russia

having the same rights and roles as other participants, U.S. representatives have made clear they could never rely on a BMD system that required timely Russian authorization for its use.

In addition, there are genuine limits to the extent to which the United States is willing to share information about its BMD programs or to jointly run BMD systems with Russia. U.S. policymakers legitimately worry that some of this information might be diverted to states of proliferation concern, which might then exploit this intelligence to develop more effective countermeasures. They also fear that, precisely at the point when the United States needs to use any systems they jointly control with Russia, Moscow will try to block usage for fear of provoking the targeted state (or some other reason).

Another problem is that Russia and the United States have different BMD deployment timetables. Russian officials want the United States and Russia to agree on a shared understanding of potential missile threats. Only if Russia and the United States jointly perceive a genuine missile threat, according to Moscow, would they consider whether to undertake a joint response, which initially would prioritize political and economic measures to avert them. Only if these non-military policies failed would Russia then join with the United States in supporting military measures, which could include deploying jointly controlled BMD systems.

In contrast, U.S. officials already believe they confront an emerging Iranian missile threat—and that, given the time it takes to develop and deploy missile defenses, they need to begin erecting them now. According to Pentagon planners, NATO needs to deploy BMD interceptors by 2015, when Iran is expected to present a credible missile threat to Europe. Compounding the problem is the fact that adhering to agreed threat assessments and a jointly agreed-upon response would give Russia a de facto right to veto U.S. BMD deployment plans. Indeed, the past decade has shown that Russia and the West often differ dramatically in their assessments of an emerging missile threat from Iran. In the absence of a shared threat perception, missile defense could well become a hostage to this divergence.

Russia's lack of BMD research and development in recent years, meanwhile, presents two kinds of problems. First, Russia does not have much to offer the United States in return for BMD collaboration, whether in the form of joint BMD research & development or in proposals to create a joint missile defense architecture. And lacking positive contributions to offer, Russia can rely only on the negative policy of threatening to disrupt U.S. BMD efforts if Moscow's preferences are not adequately taken into account.

*For almost two decades, Russia has engaged in a variety of joint BMD projects with the United States, as well as the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. None have achieved sustained success.*

Second, Russia's limited (and decreasing) cadre of experts who can understand the physical properties of missile defense is a further impediment to bilateral BMD collaboration. The absence of specialists able to confirm that U.S. missile defenses are not aimed at Russia, and would lack the capacity to intercept Russian ICBMs even if they tried to do so, means that Russian perceptions of U.S. BMD activities are dominated by prejudices, political dynamics, and other factors not conducive to cooperation. It also explains why, even when Russian leaders at the top agree to such cooperation, many of these agreements in principle never seem to be implemented.

Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian policymakers genuinely share U.S. threat perceptions about Iran. Although most Russians doubtless would not welcome Tehran's acquisition of nuclear-armed long-range missiles, officials in Moscow also seem less convinced than many of their U.S. counterparts that the Iranian government could develop an effective nuclear missile arsenal in the next decade.

The joint missile threat assessments the Russian government recently concluded with NATO and the United States revealed much overlap among the participating technical experts, but some fundamental differences between the policy strategists. For example,

while Western representatives generally see Iran as an emerging threat, many Russians still insist that Tehran remains a proliferation challenge that can be managed through non-BMD means such as diplomacy and limited international sanctions.

### **Legacy of distrust**

For reasons of pride and history, Russians often refuse to believe that U.S. policymakers have become more concerned about Iran's minimal strategic potential than Russia's robust nuclear forces. They therefore presume that Pentagon planners seek BMD capabilities that can negate Russia's strategic deterrent under the guise of protecting the United States and its allies from Iran—despite ample American claims to the contrary.

This view will prove difficult to overcome. For the past two decades, successive U.S. and Russian administrations have declared their commitment to Russian-American cooperative missile defense. To that end, they have tried different approaches and projects, but to no avail.

Influential actors in both countries believe that the other side does not want genuine cooperation, and is only playing for time.

American policymakers think that their Russian counterparts are trying to delay (and ideally derail) U.S. BMD programs by making unreasonable and impractical demands for cooperation. For their part, Russian officials suspect the American side of making insincere public declarations in order to dampen opposition in Moscow to BMD deployment—as well as to assuage Europeans unwilling to risk a major confrontation with Russia over the issue.

Rather than continue this fruitless quest for extensive Russian-U.S. BMD collaboration, Washington and Moscow would do better to cooperate on less divisive issues, such as the managing the instability in Central Asia and Afghanistan. If they develop habits of collaboration regarding these other security issues, then, perhaps in several generations, they might be able to take the bold leap towards constructing a joint missile defense system in which their very survival might rest in one another's hands. Today, however, the conditions necessary for that to happen are still a long way off. ■

## WEATHERING THE BUDGETARY STORM

*By Peter Huessy*

For many months, the conventional wisdom has been that the United States can significantly cut its defense spending without harming U.S. security. Those on the political left have argued that there are no threats that require large budgets, while those on the right maintain that large budgets create incentives for the U.S. to seek conflict to justify such expenditures.

Ironically, since FY 2009, nearly \$1 trillion has been already cut from current and planned defense budgets, (not including overseas contingency operations) even as additional cuts totaling upward of \$600 billion dollars are being contemplated now that sequestration may go into effect. Unfortunately, these deliberations are taking place without an organizing security plan—one that identifies real, concrete threats to the nation and matches resources with requirements.

### **Cycle of attrition**

This spring, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced \$100 billion in net efficiency cuts over the five year defense plan. Then in April, the Administration announced a further \$400 billion in cuts. Subsequently, in August, as part of the debt ceiling deal, security spending was cut \$450 billion, of which at least \$330 billion would be from core defense function, implicitly

adopting the administration's April proposals. Now, the country faces the prospects of another \$600 billion cut over the next decade, as the "Super Committee" could not conclude a deal to avoid further defense cuts.

These reductions come on top of the \$330 billion cut in major acquisitions announced in 2009, and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the cost of the wars declining rapidly from \$158 billion in 2010-11 to a projected \$118 billion in 2011-12 (with an additional \$500-700 billion in savings anticipated over the next decade).

In short, defense spending will be \$1.98 trillion less—and could be \$2.18 trillion less—than its anticipated level just two years ago. Defense, in other words, is already contributing mightily to deficit reduction.

Defense requirements, however, do not stand still. Operations and maintenance costs continue to rise, as do personnel and health care costs. And investments in the future—in the form of research and development—cannot, by definition, "rest on past laurels."

First, the "new" caps on defense spending for FY2012-13 in the August debt deal are \$70 billion below what defense planners anticipated U.S. security needs would require just in January 2011. Second, defense costs are in many places increasing. The wear and

*Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council.*

tear on equipment is huge and buying replacements costs money; the cost of operations is also very expensive—bringing in a barrel of oil to sustain U.S. forces in Afghanistan reaches \$400, by some calculations.

Third, the average age of USAF airplanes is 28 years. At current buy rates, we will replace the service in 49 years. By comparison, at the height of the “hollow army” which the Reagan administration's build-up reversed, the average age of USAF planes was 8 years.

Projections are that procurement and R&D investment accounts over the next five years will come in at least \$147 billion (or 14 percent) less than anticipated. By comparison, the procurement holiday of the post Cold War period (1989-1998) saw a \$75 billion decline in procurement (-53 percent) and R&D expenditures (-14 percent).

Can we get by with less funding? The answer is more complicated than some analysis suggests. While critics claim we spend more on procurement but got less “bang for the buck” due to over-charges by industry, the facts tell a different story. While we did make key investments over the past decade—namely, the new C-17 airlifter and the F-22 air superiority fighter—production on those projects was terminated early. Moreover, production lines for no fewer than six aircraft (the C-17, F-22, Combat, Search and Rescue, the next generation bomber, the Airborne Laser and the Presidential helicopter) were terminated as well. Three other lines had their funding cut or stretched out including the TSAT, C-27 and F-35. Particularly egregious was the decision to outsource production of the C-27, in its entirety, to Italy.

So we spent lots on R&D but never got to production.

In short, less defense spending may very well buy less security.

### Missile defense on the chopping block?

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the United States confronts cardinal dangers from both rogue and terror-sponsoring states. And central to their quest for power is the development and deployment of ballistic missiles. This is one of the central threats of our time.

In July 2006, the author Robert Kaplan explained it this way:

*The biggest strategic problem today isn't past notions of big-power miscalculation but new rogue regimes whose ideology means they 'cannot be gratified through negotiations.' Absent any in-place protection against the missiles described here, 'defense' means either an Israel-type counteroffensive, nuclear retaliation or--open-ended diplomacy, cease-fires and negotiation. None of these suffice. Widely available tables showing the proliferation of missiles listed by nation boggle the mind. Put simply, in terms of post-launch, we are behind the curve.*

And yet, some in Congress have proposed to cut the missile defense budget by as much as seventy percent. Doing so would affect our radars and sensors, and our layered and global interceptors. Portions of no fewer than twenty programs would be put at risk, especially the phased-adaptive deployment of interceptors in Europe to defend against Iran, and just when the U.S. has succeeded in securing the cooperation of NATO

(specifically Turkey, Romania, Spain and the Netherlands) in this venture.

If significant cuts materialize, three critical future missile defense priorities are in serious danger. The first is the deployment of space-based sensors such as the Post Boost Tracking and Surveillance System (PTSS). This program (and others like it) provides a critical complement to terrestrial defenses, supplying the necessary vision to see missile threats and guide missile defenders to their intended targets quickly in early flight where decoys and counter measures are a factor. It also potentially frees us of having to rely on secure basing agreements to deploy radars where needed.

Second, the U.S. homeland needs to be better protected from long range missiles. This function is currently being fulfilled by the Ground-Based Intercept (GBI) system deployed in Alaska and California. But those deployments will need to be augmented and modernized in the years ahead, especially through work on a two-stage GBI.

Third, the United States currently has very limited protection from shorter or medium range missiles launched from our maritime environment, especially in an EMP mode. This was a major threat identified by the 1998 Congressionally- mandated Commission on Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States, but it has yet to be seriously addressed.

Critics of missile defense defend their call for major cuts in missile defense because they claim the U.S. should not "militarize space." They also claim that the U.S. seeks to deploy "shields" (missile defenses) as a pretext to then deploy "swords" (offensive capabilities) to better wage war. Thus, while we moved from zero deployments of interceptors in 2000 to over 1,000 by the end of the decade, further deployments—especially those designed to defend the continental United States—politically may become more and more difficult, despite greater threats.

Those threats are gathering strength. The UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has now revealed major Iranian efforts to establish the technological base for building nuclear warheads, putting the lie to the infamous 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate which claimed Iran's work on nuclear weapons had come to an end. Iran reportedly is also working to make small nuclear warheads, giving their existing rockets greater range. As a result, the Islamic Republic will soon have the power to hold at nuclear risk large swathes of the Middle East and Europe, with devastating effects for U.S. and global security.

Iran's nuclear advances, moreover, could prompt a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. Already, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states, as well as Egypt and Jordan, are showing telltale signs of making investments in nuclear technology—

*In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the United States confronts cardinal dangers from both rogue and terror-sponsoring states. And central to their quest for power is the development and deployment of ballistic missiles. This is one of the central threats of our time.*

programs that are likely being built to serve as strategic counterweights to a nuclear Iran. The end result could be, in the near future, a multi-nuclear Middle East, and a strategic environment that is profoundly challenging for American interests.

Further afield, other rogue states—from Pakistan to North Korea—have already demonstrated at least rudimentary nuclear capabilities, and through them begun to menace their respective regions. Russia and China, meanwhile, have each embarked upon serious, sustained modernization efforts relating to their strategic arsenals, with the goal of competing with—and defeating—the United States.

Electromagnetic pulse likewise remains a real (and heretofore unanswered) challenge. According to the Congressionally-mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack (colloquially known as the EMP Commission), a single detonated nuclear

warhead some 70-100 kilometers above the eastern seaboard of the United States could shut down the U.S. electrical grid from Boston to Atlanta for years, and result in the death of millions of Americans.

Missile defense can help provide an answer to these challenges, and for nominal cost. Missile defense is currently some two percent of the base defense budget, and 25/100th of one percent of the Federal budget. Yet even this meager proportion is declining; at current levels of spending, missile defense would fall at the end of the decade to less than 17/100th of one percent of all Federal spending. This creates a dangerous gap between threats and responses. While missile threats are increasing worldwide, defense has been significantly reduced already—and poised to constrict even more dramatically. In this environment, preserving and strengthening missile defense programs is the least we can do to ensure that we continue "to provide for the common defense," as mandated by the Founding Fathers. ■

Ilan Berman *Chief Editor*

Rich Harrison *Managing Editor, Graphic Design and Layout*

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EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinions expressed in the *Defense Dossier* (ISSN 2165-1841) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the American Foreign Policy Council.

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