Foreign Policy Alert, No. 23, September 9, 1996
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C.

Moscow Placed Loopholes in Chemical Weapons Convention;
Treaty Won't Ban Two Classes of Binary Nerve Agents

Summary. A Russian chemical weapons scientist warned that the Chemical Weapons Convention does not ban two binary weapons systems currently in Russia's arsenal, because Moscow inserted loopholes in the treaty to permit the new weapons' production and deployment. According to the scientist, leaders of Russia's CW program have deceived not only the West, but Russia's elected civilian leaders as well. The Clinton administration ignored advice to close the loopholes prior to sending the CWC to the Senate for ratification.

An insider's concern. Vil Mirzayanov, who served 26 years developing chemical weapons for the Soviet Union and Russian Federation and was imprisoned in 1992 and 1994 for exposing secret ongoing clandestine production of nerve agents, outlined his concerns in the May 25, 1994 Wall Street Journal. After finding refuge in the U.S. with the sponsorship of pro-CWC organizations, the embattled scientist reversed his opposition to the treaty--but he stands by all his criticisms and concerns. They include:

• "I personally witnessed the internal Russian discussions that preceded the signing of the chemical weapons treaty. Based on my experiences, the treaty as it stands will help, not hinder, Russia's production of deadly chemical weapons."

• "As the public talks toward banning chemical weapons progressed, the more intense became Russia's secret development and testing of binary weapons."

• Two new classes of binary weapons emerged: One based on a compound called "Substance 33," and one based on "Substance A-232" code-named "Novichok."

• Substance A-232, similar to one code-named Substance A-230, "provides an opportunity for the military establishment to disguise production of components of binary weapons as common agricultural chemicals; because the West does not know the formula, its inspectors cannot identify the compounds."

• The Soviet/Russian team negotiating the CWC was directed by Generals Anatoly Kuntsevich, Igor Yevstafiev and Aleksandr Fokin; Deputy Minister of the Chemical Industry Sergei Golubkov and research director Viktor Petrunin--all of whom won the Lenin Prize for developing binary weapons: "With the new binary weapons ready for production, the team succeeded in inserting loopholes into the convention that allowed Russia to proceed with the secret program."

• One of the loopholes "is that the list of prohibited poisons does not include . . . Substance A-230, Substance A-232, Substance 33," or other weapons of mass destruction. "If a weapon is not listed, then it cannot legally be banned, to say nothing of being controlled. The chemical generals are banking on this technicality."

• "Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 have been produced in the city of Novocheboksarsk. . . . But our generals have told the U.S. that is turning out another substance known as VX. . . . military officials went through the painstaking process of altering technical documentation issued by the Novocheboksarsk plant concerning Substance 33, claiming that the toxin was actually VX. It made no sense to me at the time. Now it does. Not only have the chemical weapons authorities attempted to deceive the U.S., but they have tried to deceive Russia's elected political leaders as well."