Foreign Policy Alert, No. 3, June 27, 1995
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C.
Foreign Policy Alert, No. 3, June 27, 1995
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C.
Summary. Republican proposals to reorganize the foreign policy bureaucracy overlook the most essential component: personnel. As long as competent professionals--particularly those who stand up for U.S. interests against the party line--are forced out of government service or resign in frustration, it matters little whether the USIA and the USAID are merged into the State Department. Justice for a wronged foreign service officer who stood for principle will highlight an endemic problem and will help frame solutions.
State Department heroes. Now is the time to restore the good names of real State Department heroes. One of them is John Hemenway, a career foreign service officer who was forcibly retired in 1969. Posted to Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Department, Hemenway had been formally commended and decorated with a medal for his diplomatic services to his country.
While Hemenway served as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow under Ambassador Llewllyn Thompson for the difficult two years after the 1960 U-2 episode, a young American handed in his passport and renounced his citizenship. Later, when the man returned to the Embassy to get his passport back, Hemenway suggested that he be required to apply for an immigration visa and get on the waiting list, just like any other non-citizen alien. Thompson's ultimate decision changed history: he forgave the man's "mistake" and returned his passport so he could go home. The man was Lee Harvey Oswald.
Hemenway found other of his views and analyses to be unwelcome. He and some colleagues predicted Nikita Khrushchev's ouster two years in advance. Yet before the information could be reported to Washington, Thompson cabled: "I know of no competent Soviet expert who doubts that as a result of this [Party] Congress, Khrushchev is stronger than ever." Fearful of being labeled "not competent," Hemenway's senior colleagues never informed Thompson of their contrary views. They all became ambassadors.
Hemenway began to kill his own career by investigating the official Soviet policy of religious persecution, particularly against Catholics and Jews. The Soviets accused him of recruiting spies.
He ultimately became chief of the Berlin Section and a custodian of plans to test Soviet intentions in Berlin, where it was feared they might try to trigger World War III. His firm line was not appreciated in a department where the prevailing winds wanted to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state and ensure that the Soviet Union was guaranteed a zone of influence in Europe.
Changing its personnel rules, the State Department wielded retroactive provisions to oust Hemenway in mid-career. Hemenway fought back for three years, instituting and winning the first grievance hearing in State Department history. The Department threw up roadblock after roadblock: over-classifying and withholding documents Hemenway needed for his defense, pressuring Department colleagues who were to serve as witnesses, and firing the hearing chairman to break up the proceedings. Hemenway ultimately won.
The Department was instructed by its own committee to reinstate him, apologize in writing for his mistreatment, expunge his record of allegations planted in his personnel file, and restore his pension.
Congress passed the Foreign Service Act of 1980 to incorporate procedures designed to correct "forever" the abuses against Hemenway, thereby guaranteeing due process to current FSOs. However, the act had a serious deficiency--it neglected to take into account grievance hearings adjudicated before 1980. Only Hemenway's case was not settled
Although he had won his grievance hearing, the State Department simply chose not to implement the recommendations of the hearing committee. A technical amendment to the 1996 State Department authorization bill requiring State to abide by the findings of John Hemenway's historic grievance hearing would not only be just--it would be a notable first step toward remedying a serious personnel problem in U.S. foreign policy making.
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