Foreign Policy Alert, No. 5, July 25, 1995
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C.

Russia's new military doctrine and U.S. ballistic missile defense

Hard-liners' stress on strategic missiles depends on strict interpretation of ABM Treaty

Summary. To compensate for its reductions in conventional weapons, troop strengths, and instruments of power projection, and to retain a superpower status, the Russian Federation has decided to lean more heavily on its strategic nuclear arsenal. It is expending substantial resources to modernize its strategic nuclear arsenal, particularly its mobile and silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs. U.S. ballistic missile defenses risk negating the value of such weapons--and thus the military doctrine. Elements of the Russian leadership are pressuring the U.S. to abandon such defenses in exchange for Moscow's ratification of START II.

Russia's military "doctrine" stresses nuclear weapons . . .

President Yeltsin signed the Defense Ministry's new military "doctrine" in November 1993, after the armed forces came to his aid during his fight with parliament. The classified program is designed to guide the reconstruction of the military to reflect changed global objectives and the country's economically weakened state since the Soviet collapse. The "doctrine," drawn up with little civilian input, reverses the "Gorbachev doctrine" of civilian preeminence over the military and renounces the Soviet "no first use" nuclear pledge. Former arms control negotiator Col. James H. Slagle USAF writes in Parameters (Spring 1994) that in addition to "near abroad" questions, the new "doctrine":

• Reverts from a defensive position to an offensive 'preemptive strike' capability.
• Reverts from a position of no nuclear use to a position that envisions the possible escalatory use of nuclear weapons.
• Places increased emphasis on strategic non-nuclear deterrent forces, including SLBMs, ICBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.
• Places new emphasis on the need for military technology advancements in C4I, . . . long-range smart weapons, and increased mobililty, especially in air and space.

Modernized strategic nuclear weapons systems and other weapons of mass destruction are among the least expensive and most powerful means of ensuring Russia's superpower status in its turbulent time of transition. The CIA reported in 1993 that Russia is building new silo-based and mobile ICBMs, a new generation SLBM, and a new ballistic missile submarine, and DIA Director James Clapper testified to the Senate in 1994 and 1995 that strategic modernization was "well-funded" and "continuing."

. . . therefore, U.S. ballistic missile defense must be defeated

Therefore, many Russian leaders, particularly hard-line elements associated with the military and sitting in parliament, are trying to blackmail the United States by conditioning their ratification of START II on Washington's effective abandonment of any significant ballistic missile defense. These include ultranationalists and other revanchists supportive of making greater use of nuclear threats against the U.S.

The Clinton administration and the Senate seem desperate to see START II ratified. The hard-line elements in Russia's leadership and Defense Ministry seem equally desperate to prevent the U.S. from building a ballistic missile defense system, even a theater system that could shoot down strategic missiles. A U.S. ballistic missile defense would undermine the Russian hard-liners' military "doctrine."