On the very day Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States would lead a renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace effort, Iran boasted that it had test-fired a surface-to-air missile.

A day later, Iran began loading fuel rods into its Bushehr nuclear reactor, marking further progress on its quest for nuclear weapons.

A day after that, Iran's leaders unveiled the nation's first home-built unmanned, or "drone," bomber, with a range of more than 600 miles and which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said could serve as a "messenger of death" to hostile outside forces.

These developments illustrate a big problem with the U.S. peace effort - it will divert U.S. time and attention from the far more pressing challenge of containing Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions, which threaten our allies, our role in the region, and our ongoing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots.

The furor accompanying the recent dissemination of classified military files by WikiLeaks has focused some much-needed attention on the damaging role Pakistan plays in the Afghan theater. As the WikiLeaks documents highlight in damning detail, Islamabad's close - and ongoing - cooperation with the Taliban has made it a key accessory to the worsening insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition on the war on terror's first front.

But what can actually be done about Islamabad's double-dealing? Disengagement, after all, is simply not an option. By dint of its strategic geography, Pakistan is a key player in Afghanistan, and its constructive involvement is essential to ensuring lasting stability there - especially following the planned July 2011 U.S. withdrawal. Pakistan is also a nuclear power, and the specter of Islamists gaining control of its burgeoning atomic arsenal is a nightmare scenario the West has sought to forestall through increased diplomatic engagement and foreign aid.

For years, Pakistan has played on these fears to get a pass on its domestic conduct and keep American dollars flowing. But this does not mean the United States lacks the ability to steer Pakistan toward a more constructive course. To the contrary, a number of opportunities exist for Washington to influence Islamabad's stance on terrorism and radical Islam.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the U.S.-India partnership is losing momentum under President Barack Obama’s stewardship.  Fortifying the alliance was bound to be a secondary priority for any administration faced with a recession, a flagging war effort in Afghanistan, political stalemate in Iraq, stalled Middle East peace efforts, defiant pariah regimes in Iran and North Korea, and strategic tensions with China. Still, allowing the partnership to falter appears to have come easier to a president who never quite displayed George W. Bush’s zeal for the Indian-American relationship. To be sure, problems also exist on the Indian side. New Delhi has itself fallen into a form of post-honeymoon malaise, as the phase of grand political gestures gives way to tough technical negotiations. However, rather than mitigate the downside of this difficult period, the Obama administration is pursuing an agenda that further complicates it and, in doing so, risks some of the tremendous gains made in U.S.-India relations over the past decade.

If the Kremlin stays true to its word, Russia on Saturday will begin loading nuclear fuel into Iran's Bushehr reactor. Once it does, it will usher in a new stage in the deepening crisis over Iran's nuclear program.

The 1,000-megawatt plutonium reactor, located near the southern Iranian port city of the same name, has been the public face of the Iranian regime's nuclear program since Tehran and Moscow concluded the agreement to build it, despite American objections, in early 1995. Construction was completed in 2004, but Bushehr has laid dormant for years, ostensibly because of disputes over financing between Russia and Iran, but really because of Moscow's recognition of Washington's worries about Iran's nuclear program.

What do you call an ally that tries to kill you? That's the question most Americans are asking in the wake of last month's dissemination by Internet clearinghouse WikiLeaks of some 92,000 classified U.S. military documents relating to the war in Afghanistan. The files provide a sobering portrait of the true state of play on the War on Terror's first front. Far and away the most damaging disclosures, however, are those relating to the pernicious role being played by Pakistan, long regarded as a critical American ally in South Asia, in supporting and sustaining the anti-Western insurgency there.

That a Pakistani-born U.S. national was responsible for the latest attempted terrorist attack on U.S. soil should come as little surprise. Pakistan has stood, almost unchallenged, at the epicenter of global terrorism for the post-9/11 era. Individuals or groups based in Pakistan have been involved in the majority of planned attacks on Western nations since 2001 and the country has played a critical role in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Finally, nuclear-armed Pakistan maintains a network of Islamist militant groups focused on targeting India and is now host to a ferocious Islamist insurrection of its own; an insurgency that is now more deadly than those in either Iraq or Afghanistan. In short, no discussion of counterterrorism is complete without an examination of Pakistan and its role in Western terror attacks, the Afghan War, and its own attempts to combat domestic terrorism.

Long-time observers of American politics know that in order to truly put your finger on the pulse of the nation, you have to watch Wall Street. Savvy Iran-watchers will tell you that to do the same in the Islamic republic, you need to keep your eye on the bazaar.

Iran's sprawling marketplaces are more than simply centers of commerce. They are home to a powerful class of merchants who historically have served as key power brokers in the country's labyrinthine political system. Indeed, as the renowned historian Walter Laqueur astutely pointed out in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the shah's loss of support among the country's shopkeepers and merchants was an important part of why Ruhollah Khomeini's clerical takeover ultimately succeeded. Simply put, Iran's businessmen no longer felt invested in the old, secular status quo. The rest, as they say, is history.

For years now, Sakineh Ashtiani has been incarcerated in an Iranian prison, sentenced to death by stoning for the "crime" of adultery. Until earlier this month, the case of the 43-year-old mother of two was known only to the select few who have been following her sad fate at the hands of the Islamic Republic. Today, however, her name has become a rallying cry to end the mullahs' suppression of human—and particularly women's—rights.

A widow living in the northern Iranian city of Tabriz, Mrs. Ashtiani was jailed in 2005 for adultery. She was convicted the following year of having "illicit relationships" with two men following the death of her husband, and received 100 lashes, the punishment Islam stipulates for sexual relations outside of marriage. Mrs. Ashtiani's ordeal did not end there. Her case was reopened in 2007, and new, graver charges of adultery while in wedlock were added. She was convicted once again, and this time sentenced to death by public stoning.

How stable is Saudi Arabia? Not very, according to at least one member of the Kingdom's ruling class. Last month Prince Turki bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, a prominent dissident now in exile in Cairo, issued an open letter to his fellow royals, urging them to abandon their desert fiefdom for greener pastures. According to the prince, the current social compact between the House of Saud and its subjects had become untenable, with the government no longer able to "impose" its writ on the people and growing grassroots discontent at the royals "interfering in people's private life and restricting their liberties." His advice? That King Abdullah and his coterie flee the Kingdom before they are overthrown--and before their opponents "cut off our heads in streets."

Does Washington care about freedom in Iran? On the surface, it seems like a silly question. Ever since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini swept to power in 1979, Washington policymakers of all political stripes have been holding out hope that a kinder, gentler regime would emerge in Tehran. Republican and Democratic administrations alike have expressed their support for freedom within the Islamic Republic, and both sides of the political aisle have condemned the regime's repressive domestic practices. Yet, concrete proof of the U.S. commitment to pluralism in Iran is hard to come by. The strategies by which the United States can assist Iran's opposition remain poorly understood and even less effectively implemented. This is unfortunate, since with the proper vision and political will, the United States can harness economic, diplomatic, and informational strategies to significantly affect the unfolding struggle for Iran's soul.