Europe’s Iran stance is a strategic error that hurts its US alliance
Wiser leaders would stop picking fights with Washington over a war they can’t influence and that ultimately advances their own security
Wiser leaders would stop picking fights with Washington over a war they can’t influence and that ultimately advances their own security
The three South Caucasus states are responding to the same geopolitical shock with radically different resources, constraints, and choices.
Are we headed toward a new war with Iran? The possibility looks increasingly likely.
President Donald Trump has now set out a June deadline for the end of the war, and the White House expects Moscow and Kyiv to reach some sort of settlement. The operative question is whether Russia’s economic calculus can truly be changed by then.
In February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Budapest to herald a “new golden age” of relations, signing a major civilian nuclear deal and pledging a “financial protective shield” for Hungary. This visit followed President Trump’s “complete and total” endorsement of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who currently trails challenger Péter Magyar in the polls ahead of the April 12 election. Critics warn that making bilateral relations contingent on individual leaders turns long-term alliances into fragile transactional affairs. Furthermore, Orbán’s continued energy dependence on Russia and his security ties to China present a significant paradox for the administration’s broader “Great Power” strategy.
After years of military involvement in the Syrian theater, America is understandably eager to turn the page. But doing so prematurely risks abandoning a known and capable counterterrorism partner for a still-untested arrangement. That is hardly a recipe for lasting stability.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has produced a paradox for US strategy: it has significantly reduced Russia’s strategic long-term power while hardening Moscow into a more dangerous, risk-tolerant adversary for the United States and its allies and partners in Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The challenge for policymakers is to lock in the strategic setbacks Russia has incurred—geopolitical, economic, demographic, and technological—while managing escalation risks and preparing for a prolonged confrontation in the Russian neighborhood.
The January 2026 internet blackout in Iran, following protests that erupted on December 28, has exposed the deep failures of the National Information Network (NIN).
China doesn’t need to invade America to control its farmland. It just needs to buy it. Through state-backed conglomerates, shell companies and global acquisitions, Beijing is doing just that, gaining fiduciary leverage over farmland across our nation and threatening America’s long-term food security. It is clear that more must be done to prevent the Chinese Communist Party, our foremost global competitor, from weakening America’s agricultural independence from within.
A deal with Iran at this moment may prolong the unnatural life of the mullah’s regime.
Iranians negotiate like they’re in the bazaar,” a Middle East scholar once wrote. “Westerners negotiate like they’re shopping at Macy’s.”
A change in Russia’s government is more likely to take place than conventional wisdom allows.
The strategic logic underpinning Israel's outreach to Somaliland, in other words, is compelling. It simultaneously provides the country with a strategic foothold opposite Yemen, greater proximity to the ongoing threat posed by the Houthis, a deeper stake in Red Sea security, and the potential to become a much bigger player in African politics. For those reasons, Israel's newest partnership is well positioned to endure.
The Organization of Turkic States has expanded beyond its cultural foundations to address regional challenges through green finance, digital innovation, and artificial intelligence initiatives. Led by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the OTS established the Turkic Green Finance Council and proposed collaborative AI networks, responding to economic pressures from sanctions and oil price fluctuations.
The Organization of Turkic States has evolved its approach toward Tajikistan, shifting from explicit support for Kyrgyzstan during border conflicts to more inclusive language. Early OTS statements emphasized brotherly solidarity with Kyrgyzstan while implicitly attributing blame to Tajikistan, prompting sharp criticism from Dushanbe. Following diplomatic progress culminating in the March 2025 Kyrgyz-Tajik border treaty, OTS rhetoric shifted significantly.
Today’s internet blackout in Iran, in other words, is merely the most visible manifestation of an accelerating information arms race. Iran’s radical regime is racing to consolidate digital control over its captive population. If it succeeds in doing so, Iran’s brave protesters will find themselves truly cut off from the outside world.
Despite many US inducements, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has turned away from normalization with Israel and broader US alignment in the Middle East.
Canadian and European political leaders of various stripes seem to be tripping over themselves to articulate a sensible position on the escalating conflict between NATO allies over Greenland, a Danish colonial possession until 1953 that is now an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, and a territory the United States now seeks. However, this collective incoherence does nothing to reduce tensions, much less help overcome the danger we all face. As a Canadian, I propose an outside-the-box compromise solution that puts Canada First.
Big changes are afoot in Eurasia. Over the past several months, the region has undergone a series of tectonic shifts, as countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus have recalibrated their respective foreign policies and expanded ties with the West. [...] What's different today is that Eurasian states appear to have a different direction in mind. The U.S. should help them pursue it.
To make sense of how Gamsakhurdia engaged with Georgian Christian mysticism, I organize his sources into two analytical categories—what I term the “Gelati current” and the “prophetic current.” These are, crucially, not divisions that Gamsakhurdia himself articulated, but rather, groupings that help illuminate the different functions these sources served in his thinking.