A recent week of meetings in Vietnam with Communist Party leaders, government officials, and other influential figures reveals how Hanoi views today’s economic and geopolitical challenges, as well as how Washington might reassure the country about its commitment to a deeper U.S.-Vietnam relationship after months of unhelpful friction between the two.
On October 10, 2025, the CIS heads of state summit was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Multiple packages of documents were signed, targeting trade, crime, and most importantly, security. Security challenges from Afghanistan, including extremism and border conflicts, have continued since the Taliban takeover, and these recent agreements make up another component of Central Asia’s lengthy efforts to reduce the recurring concerns that can potentially spill over into their territories.
Big changes are afoot in the South Caucasus. Back in August, in a move that passed largely unnoticed in the American press, the Trump administration pulled off a major diplomatic coup when it brought together Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to ink a joint declaration formally ending decades of hostility between the two regional rivals.
A regime stalwart who has long carried Putin’s water (and boosted his neo-imperial agenda), Lavrov has been conspicuously absent in recent days from a number of high-profile functions. The Foreign Minister, usually a fixture, failed to attend a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council on November 5th – purportedly “by agreement” (presumably with Putin). He was also cut out of Russia’s delegation to the upcoming G20 meeting in South Africa later this month, with a much more junior official, Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, tapped to lead the Russian team instead.
For decades, the Kremlin has sought to intimidate foreign powers by threatening to use nuclear weapons. In the current Ukraine war, nuclear threats have been a key way by which Russia’s government has sought to restrain Western aid to Kyiv. The efficacy of Moscow’s nuclear brinksmanship, however, seems to be waning.
These days in Europe, there is a near-unanimous consensus about the threat posed by Russia and the need to continue to support Ukraine against Moscow’s aggression. But Europe’s steadfastness could be undermined by a different factor—a sustained and growing dependence on Russian energy among a number of its members.
Sixty-eight years ago, the Soviet Union shocked the world by launching Sputnik 1 and igniting the space race. Today, new Sputnik moments loom on the horizon, and the stakes are far higher. The country that emerges as a preeminent space power will guarantee its own economic and national security, and shape the “rules of the road” that govern the international community for decades to come. Who will that be?
The plan relies on a future international force to dislodge the terror group, a scenario deemed highly unlikely. By failing to remove Hamas, the ceasefire merely sets the stage for the next inevitable war.
After two years, the war in Gaza appears to be over. Following the Trump administration's active mediation last week, a tenuous ceasefire deal was struck over the weekend, and Israel's hostages have returned home. Of course, only time will tell whether this agreement will truly hold. Even so, it's not too early to draw some preliminary lessons from the conflict that just ended.
The question is no longer whether SpaceX can deliver payloads into orbit; it is whether America’s present, profound dependence on this company could be politically weaponized in the future. The simmering summer-long feud between President Trump and Musk, which largely stemmed from the latter’s objections to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and which saw access to SpaceX used as a key bargaining chip, suggests that the answer to this question is “yes.”
Is the Gaza war truly over? On October 8, President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had come to terms on a deal to cease hostilities and exchange hostages, something that had been largely unthinkable just weeks prior.
As the economic problems grow, Putin’s government has increased its efforts to distract its population from the extent of the financial and political disaster it has brought upon them. This is evident in the holiday atmosphere that fills its capital city, featuring pop-up gardens, light shows, fountains, and theme parks. Street festivals are the most common form of such celebrations, with over 10,000 events held in Moscow this summer alone.
President Trump is now talking tougher on Ukraine, but the White House clearly still holds out hope that negotiating a just peace between Moscow and Kyiv might be possible. To do that, however, the United States will need to fully grasp how Russia is targeting Ukraine’s future. And it will need to make a return of these innocents a core demand of its approach toward the Kremlin.
At first blush, the world seems universally outraged over Israel’s strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar – with Washington expressing unhappiness, Western leaders threatening retaliation, Arab nations convening in Doha, and the UN’s Human Rights Commission holding an “urgent debate.” But looks may be deceiving.
Many wealthy Chinese cherish the elegance and artistry of rosewood (hongmu) furniture. Famous for its rich burgundy color, its intricate Ming and Qing dynasty-style carvings, and its shockingly high price tag—a single bed can fetch $1 million—hongmu is distinctly Chinese.
Beijing is gradually linking South America together with its massive investments in infrastructure—right under Washington’s nose.
Just a few months ago, U.S.-India relations were on an upswing. But that was then, and this is now. Ties between Washington and New Delhi have deteriorated dramatically since, for both political and economic reasons.
In Russia’s view, the Western world has a big problem: It doesn’t like Russians. The reason, in the Kremlin’s telling, is not Russia’s devastation of Ukraine or its nuclear threats. Instead, the culprit is “the propaganda of Russophobia, unleashed by the West.”
Iran’s political opposition is in no position to challenge the regime. That doesn’t mean popular dissent has gone away.