American Foreign Policy Council

Iran Democracy Monitor: No. 78

September 14, 2008 Ilan I. Berman
Related Categories: Democracy and Governance; International Economics and Trade; Terrorism; Iran; Iraq; Middle East

A SPOILER IN IRAQ
Is Iran still a threat in Iraq? The answer, according to a new study by the Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, is an unequivocal “yes.” “The greatest threat to stability in Iraq is violence by Iranian-backed militias, known as Special Groups,” writes analyst Marisa Cochrane. And, even though the recent offensive by Coalition forces and the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears to have beaten back these forces, the resulting breathing room is likely to be only temporary. “Iranian-backed Special Groups are quite capable of regenerating their networks and adapting new tactics to a changed operating environment,” Cochrane notes. “The operations in Basra, Baghdad, and Maysan in the spring and early summer of 2008 diverted their plans and debilitated their network, forcing their leadership to Iran or into hiding. However, given their motives, determination, and past patterns of activity, JAM [Mahdi Army] and Special Groups fighters will certainly return from Iran and attempt to rebuild their networks.” (Iraq Report, August 29, 2008)

SWITCHING HORSES IN GAZA?
When it unexpectedly won parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority in January 2006, Hamas became the object of the Iranian regime’s affection, with officials in Tehran viewing the radical Sunni movement as a new vehicle for expanded influence in West Bank and Gaza Strip. The result was an upsurge in cash and political support for the Islamist group, which has sustained Hamas amid dwindling economic aid to the Palestinians from Europe and the United States. Now, however, Iranian officials increasingly appear to be backing a different horse in the Palestinian Authority’s fractious politics. According to Arabic sources, Tehran has thrown its political weight behind its other proxy in the Palestinian Territories – the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror group – in an effort to undermine the recent ceasefire struck between Hamas and Israel.

This does not mean that Iran has cut all of its ties to Hamas, however. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has told a domestic news agency that support for the Palestinian people was a religious and national duty, and that his government would continue its political and financial support for Hamas until the “collapse of Israel.” (Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2008; Tel Aviv Ha’aretz, September 13, 2008)

MORE SIGNS OF ECONOMIC MALAISE
There appears to be no end in sight for the Islamic Republic’s economic woes. The Iranian regime’s recent plan to lop zeroes off the Iranian rial (detailed in Iran Democracy Monitor No. 77) has done nothing to slow the country’s soaring inflation. Iran’s reformist Etemad newspaper, citing official central bank statistics, reports that inflation within the Islamic Republic now stands at nearly 28 percent, with staples such as meat, beans and rice seeing the highest rise in prices. Iran’s working poor appear to be the hardest hit; based upon central bank statistics, the expenditures on food for low labor income families have doubled in the past year. (Agence France Presse, September 7, 2008)

A TIGHTER REIN ON HEZBOLLAH
There are changes afoot in Iran’s relationship with its principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. According to Israeli intelligence officials, the Shi’ite militia’s performance in what is being called the “Second Lebanon War” – its month-long war with Israel in the summer of 2006 – has prompted the Iranian leadership to expand its control over the organization’s political direction and decision-making. "There is real Iranian command now over Hizbullah," a top Israeli military official has confirmed. "This doesn't mean that [Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan] Nasrallah is a puppet, but it does mean that whenever he pops his head out of his bunker he sees an Iranian official standing over him." (Jerusalem Post, September 7, 2008)

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