IRAN INTIMIDATES REPORTERS
The Islamic Republic is stepping up its efforts to silence critical reporting on its policies. Recently, Iranian intelligence officials have pressured a number of Iranian journalists working outside the country for various news outlets to curb their reporting about Iran or else risk retaliation against their reputations, families, and finances. Most prominently, Ali Asgar Ramezanpour, an Iranian reporter working in London, has been labeled a “spy” by Iranian media outlets, and members of his family have been both interrogated and intimidated. The main goal of the effort against Ramezanpour and other Iranian journalists, experts say, is “to transfer the censorship and repression that prevails inside the country to free media that are based outside.” (Radio Free Europe, January 15, 2013)
A FRESH ESTIMATE FOR IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION
Just how far is Iran’s regime from crossing the nuclear Rubicon? Over the years, estimates of Iran’s distance from being a nuclear power have tended to vary greatly. But according to a new study from a group of respected nonproliferation experts, Iran’s could attain “critical” nuclear capability less than a year-and-a-half from now—potentially sooner than Western sanctions would be able to bring the regime’s atomic ambitions to heel. "Based on the current trajectory of Iran's nuclear program, we estimate that Iran could reach critical capability in mid-2014," concludes the study, entitled U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East. In response, the study recommends the U.S. adopt a policy of “maximum sanctions pressure” – including greater targeting of Iran’s international trade and investment, its foreign exchange rates, and overall economic stability – and greater efforts to disrupt Iran’s nuclear-related procurement patterns, as well as an overt declaration from President Obama that the U.S. will “use military force to destroy Iran's nuclear program if Iran takes additional decisive steps toward producing a bomb." (Project on U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy, January 2013; Reuters, January 14, 2013)
IRAN FEEDS AFRICA’S WARS
For several years, a group of independent arms-trafficking researchers has been tracking the source of unknown ammunition that has been discovered in areas of conflict in Africa. Contrary to their original assumptions, the ammo turns out not to have been produced by African rebel groups but by an Iranian conglomerate, the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group. Using covert networks, the researchers say, Iran has been able to traffic the ammunition to the governments of Guinea, Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Sudan, and has allowed the ammunition to be used as “an instrument of violence in some of Africa’s ugliest wars.” Iran’s motives are likely both commercial and geopolitical in nature, with the Islamic Republic gaining much-needed revenue as well as prestige for its involvement in Africa’s wars. (New York Times, January 11, 2013)
SANCTIONS HIT IRANIAN AIR TRAVEL
Iran’s airlines are increasingly feeling the pinch of Western sanctions. In early January, the majority of Iran’s air carriers were forced to cancel most flights from Tehran, Kish, Mashhad and other airports after the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORC), which supplies aviation fuel for commercial air travel, instituted a new, stricter payment policy for its product. Iran’s airlines had been buying fuel on credit, and now cumulatively owe on the order of $170 million, according to Seyyed Abdolreza Mousavi, the head of Iran’s Airlines Association. As a result, NIORC has instituted a cash-on-delivery policy for aviation fuel—bringing air travel in Iran to a virtual standstill. Iran Air is the only airline that is reported not to have been affected by the shift in policy. (Tehran MEHR, January 7, 2013; Radio Farda, January 8, 2013)
IRAN IN THE LEVANT: BACK TO THE “BAD OLD DAYS”?
U.S. officials are warning of possible stepped-up irregular activity by Iran in the Levant. According to the State Department, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards now pose a growing threat to both diplomats and religious leaders in the Middle East. IRGC operatives located in West Beirut and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley are believed to be planning on kidnapping foreign diplomats and possible Sunni and Christian leaders, with the aim of influencing events in Lebanon and Syria.
Such tactics would signal a return to the “bad old days” of the 1980s and 1990s, when Iranian and Iranian-supported irregulars carried out kidnappings and terrorist attacks throughout the region, one State Department official has said. This time, however, the activity would be carried out with a specific goal in mind—providing support to the beleaguered regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, and to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia. (Washington Free Beacon, January 11, 2013)