TARGETING RUSSIA'S SHADOW FLEET
Since the start of its war on Ukraine in February of 2022, there have been a growing number of reports about the activities of Russia's "shadow fleet." This contingent of aging, obscurely-owned tankers transports sanctioned crude oil while concealing the identities of individual ships through frequent changes in "flags" (that is, countries of nationality) and through the manipulation of tracking systems. The fleet, experts say, has grown rapidly since the Group of Seven (G7) imposed a $60-per-barrel oil price cap in December of 2022. By late 2023, an estimated 17% of the global oil tanker fleet was involved in transporting sanctioned oil, with over 80% of Russian crude shipped via these vessels.
Belatedly, Europe is moving to curtail this illicit trade. The EU is reportedly now considering blacklisting dozens of these tankers, while Nordic and Baltic nations are exploring legal routes to carry out the physical seizure of Russia-linked ships. Two potential avenues for prosecution include targeting vessels that pose environmental risks and those that endanger undersea infrastructure. Further, some nations are discussing new national laws requiring tankers to use approved insurers. In response to these initiatives, Russia has threatened retaliation, stating it will consider any seizure as an attack. (Politico, February 10, 2025; Politico, February 11, 2025)
ESTONIA ISSUES A CALL TO ARMS...
At the recent Munich Security Forum, the head of Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service urged European intelligence agencies to take an aggressive approach and employ "active measures" against adversaries, Russia in particular. In his remarks before the conference, Kaupo Rosin stressed the need for intelligence agencies to actively disrupt threats using non-military means. Rosin dismissed the term "hybrid" to describe Russian tactics, arguing that attacks, cyber operations, and assassinations should be recognized as direct national threats. He emphasized the importance of strong legal deterrents, citing Estonia's laws that punish even minor acts linked to hostile intelligence services. Finally, he called for broader governmental support in expanding the mandate of continental intelligence agencies, so these services can better cope with Russian aggression. (ERR News, February 17, 2025)
...AND A MARITIME WARNING
According to Johan-Elias Seljamaa, the Deputy Commander of Estonia's navy, the Baltic state's maritime forces are prepared to intervene against vessels threatening Baltic Sea infrastructure, and to do so "even in international waters." The announcement follows multiple incidents of damage to power cables, telecom infrastructure, and gas pipelines in the area - most of them caused by civilian ships dragging their anchors along the seabed. In response, Estonia has increased naval patrols in the Gulf of Finland and, to deter future incidents, has deployed three navy vessels in the Sea. (Reuters, February 13, 2025)
[EDITORS' NOTE: While Moscow has officially denied any involvement in the breaches, Russia is nonetheless casting " large shadow over maritime security in the Baltics – both because of the extensive “shadow fleet" of tankers that it has mobilized to conduct illicit oil trade, and because speculation abounds that the vessels of allied nations, like China, are being utilized to sow chaos in European waters.]
THE PLIGHT OF PUTIN'S CENTRAL ASIAN SOLDIERS
There are now upward of fifty Central Asians who have become prisoners of war after fighting on the Russian side and being captured by Ukraine. These prisoners now face an uncertain future; although prisoner swaps between Moscow and Kyiv have resumed, Ukrainian officials note that Russia prioritizes "its own citizens, especially from the European part of the country, Moscow, and St. Petersburg." Further complicating matters for the detainees, some hold dual citizenship – effectively making them a third country's problem. Meanwhile, those countries have previously warned their citizens against participating in the war and are unlikely to intervene on their behalf.
The stories are sad ones. Many were deployed to the most intense battles in the conflict, like those in Bakhmut and Avdiyivka, often with little training or equipment. Some claim that they were coerced into service, while others signed contracts because they were expecting non-combat roles. Further reports indicate that some of the Central Asian soldiers were tricked or pressured into joining the Russian military. (RFE/RL, February 19, 2025)