Russia Policy Monitor No. 2681

June 17, 2025 Ilan I. Berman, Eleanor Pugh

Related Categories: Russia

MEDVEDEV'S WAR SPOILS
Once a marginal figure, former President Dmitri Medvedev has gained in notoriety and wealth since Russia;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February of 2022. Medvedev, now the deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, has reemerged since the start of the war as a hawkish pro-war social media personality, widely known for his brinksman-like rhetoric vis-à-vis Ukraine and the West. He has also become a wealthy man, accumulating $850 million through some 15 foundations linked to him.

Once known for being a mild-mannered liberal reform figure, Medvedev began a pro-war social media presence just weeks after the start of Russia's war. His new Telegram channel quickly made the former President, previously dismissed as politically irrelevant, Russia's most popular internet personality by the end of 2022. These gains in influence have continued: Medvedev's trust rating skyrocketed from 23 percent in late 2021 to 45.7 percent on June 1, 2025 – higher than any Russian political figure apart from President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

The money has poured in as well. Since the full-scale invasion began, 15 foundations with ties to Medvedev received more than $130 billion rubles ($1.39 billion) – a massive increase from their previous inflow of 28 billion rubles ($424 million) between 2015 and 2021. The foundations have allegedly served their stated purpose of providing equipment and financial support to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. However, they have also channeled money into real estate projects from St. Petersburg to the Black Sea with ties to Medvedev – a phenomenon that came under greater scrutiny after the late activist Aleksei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation investigated Medvedev's extensive covert network of assets. The foundations' donors remain private, and only two of them currently have websites. (RFE/RL, June 10, 2025)

RUSSIA TARGETS EVEN PRO-GOVERNMENT NEWS
Over the past three-plus years of war, Russia's already-unfree media environment has tightened still further — to the point that now even pro-Kremlin outlets aren't safe from censure by authorities. On June 5th, police raided the Yekaterinberg office of pro-government news outlet Ura.Ru, confiscating documents and equipment and arresting two journalists. Denis Allayarov, the head of Ura.ru's Sverdlovsk bureau, was arrested at his residence. Authorities allegedly intend to charge him and request pretrial restrictions. Crime reporter Sergey Bodrov was also taken into custody, with police forces searching his residence. Bodrov stated that he is accused of purchasing information from a law enforcement officer. A security guard stated that police escorted a third unidentified woman from the building, although it is not known whether she was detained.

Two Russian news organizations suggested that the searches could be related to the March arrest of an ex-police officer who confessed to selling Ura.Ru confidential information from the Interior Ministry. A source stated that the journalists could face charges pertaining to Article 272.1 of Russia's criminal code, which involves the unlawful handling and use of official information. However, other news organizations have posited that the arrests stem from Ura.Ru taking funding in 2022 from the Doctor's Alliance, an organization that previously worked with Aleksei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (Meduza, June 5, 2025)

A FAMILIAR SORT OF REPRESSION
Since February 2022, the role of repression in Russian politics has drastically increased. Writing for The Insider, Olga Romanova argues that – like the cheap plastic Stalin statue at Moscow's Taganskaya metro station – today's repression echoes that of the Stalinist era. While today, the objects of repression have shifted from figures like Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin to targets like the late activist Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, election watchdog Golos, and the independent news outled Meduza, the pattern remains familiar. Likewise, unapproved practices have changed from anti-Soviet agitation and "glorification of bourgeois lifestyles" to disseminating gay propaganda and "discrediting the military," but the overall motif remains recognizable. And the FSB, the successor to the Soviet-era KGB, is the enforcer of conformity.

Since the start of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, she notes, convictions for treason have increased by a factor of 10. Likewise, since early 2024, the number of accused terrorists has doubled – largely due to the addition of Ukrainians to their rolls. Segments of society targeted for prosecution have expanded beyond academics and journalists to encompass taxi drivers, teachers, and retail workers. But ethnic minorities, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and activist teenagers are particularly at risk. Offenses that come to the attention of authorities can be as small as making a single anti-war comment on social media. And a significant portion of convictions involve entrapment, with FSB agents posing as Ukrainians or anti-war Russians and seeking to elicit incriminating statements online. (The Insider, June 5, 2025)