These days in Europe, there is a near-unanimous consensus about the threat posed by Russia and the need to continue to support Ukraine against Moscow’s aggression. But Europe’s steadfastness could be undermined by a different factor—a sustained and growing dependence on Russian energy among a number of its members. Indeed, as a new analysis by Reuters lays out, seven European states (France, the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, Croatia, Portugal, and Hungary) actually increased their imports of Russian energy over the past year.
The data is striking. In the Netherlands, dependence on Russian energy has surged by some 72 percent, to €498 million ($580 million) since 2024. In France, it rose by 40 percent, reaching €2.2 billion ($2.56 billion). In Croatia and Romania, it has increased by 55 percent and 57 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, Portugal’s imports of Russian energy have truly skyrocketed, jumping by 167 percent between 2024 and 2025.
What accounts for this rise? When it comes to Hungary, the answer is obvious. Since he assumed the premiership in 2010, Viktor Orban has distinguished himself as an erstwhile ally of the Kremlin. He has, among other things, rhetorically backed Russia’s war against Ukraine, sought to undermine alliance consensus within NATO, and tried to block European sanctions on Moscow. Hungary, in other words, has made clear where it stands politically—and buying a greater share of Russian energy is entirely consistent with this policy.
But none of the other countries mentioned by Reuters enjoys such close ties to Russia. To the contrary, many of them (in particular, France) are leading the charge to isolate and punish the Kremlin. As such, their recent consumption patterns are both puzzling and alarming.
They are also atypical. While Europe has long been reliant on Russia for energy—something that previously allowed Moscow to leverage energy as a weapon in its dealings with the continent—a great deal has changed since 2022. As a whole, the European Union has decreased its energy imports from Russia by roughly 90 percent since 2021.
But the decoupling isn’t total. So far this year, Europe has imported more than €11 billion (nearly $13 billion) of Russian energy. In the process, it has assisted—even if only modestly—in perpetuating Russia’s extensive (and wildly expensive) war effort.
That’s assuredly not the objective of officials in Brussels. But the continent is moving far too slowly to distance itself from Russian energy. For instance, the EU plan to ban Russian liquified natural gas doesn’t kick in until 2027 at the earliest—meaning Europe’s energy purchases will continue to fund Russia’s war effort for nearly another year-and-a-half, at the very least.
All of this makes the job of defending Ukraine that much harder. President Trump made this clear in his speech before the UN General Assembly last month. “Europe has to step it up,” Trump said. “They can’t be doing what they’re doing. They’re buying oil and gas from Russia while they’re fighting Russia.” That paradox helps explain why the White House remains skeptical of Europe’s strategy toward Ukraine, and of the continent’s long-term commitment to sustaining its fight.
Dispelling this ambiguity should be the EU’s first order of business. The continent is currently considering a series of steps to bolster its support for Kyiv. One such proposal involves using the approximately €176 billion of confiscated Russian assets currently warehoused in the EU as a “reparations loan,” to be repaid only after Russia covers war damages. That’s certainly a novel idea. But the most effective way Europe can show its support for Ukraine might also be the simplest: to finally turn off Russia’s tap to the continent altogether.