Just how widespread is domestic support for Russia's war on Ukraine, really? Conventional wisdom has long held that the war of choice launched by the regime of President Vladimir Putin in February of 2022 is backed by most Russians. European officials have long interpreted polling results and Putin's consistently high popularity ratings as proof that the war is popular at home. They have responded accordingly, with measures such as travel restrictions that have curtailed the ability of ordinary Russians to access the Eurozone.
Perhaps Putin's war of choice was indeed once a widely-accepted enterprise. But there are now clear signs that domestic support for Russia's "special military operation" against Ukraine is softening, as its material, human and reputational costs continue to mount.
Thus, in the most recent poll carried out by Moscow's Levada Center, just 25 percent of respondents supported a continuation of hostilities rather than a negotiated settlement – the lowest number since the start of Russia's war of aggression nearly four years ago. At the same time, two-thirds of Russians polled (66%) backed the idea of commencing peace negotiations now to end what has become a grinding, protracted conflict.
Of course, the usual caveats apply. Assessing public sentiment in Russia has become increasingly difficult in recent years, as the increasingly authoritarian nature of Putin's regime has cast a pall over pollsters and respondents alike. No one is immune from this trend, and even presumably independent institutions like Levada must operate within the Russian government's (largely unwritten) parameters or face outright closure. Even so, the mid-December nationwide poll of some 1,600 respondents is telling – precisely because it reflects opinion that's widespread enough to be undeniable and because, to be published in the first place, the results invariably reflect the sentiments of at least some in Putin's inner circle.
That doesn't mean Russia's government itself is losing legitimacy, however. Support for the country's armed forces remains high (some 73% overall), Levada found, in spite of the Russian military's brutal battlefield tactics and its wanton destruction in Ukraine. Putin remains personally popular as well; the same poll found that a majority of Russians (52%) still approved of the Russian President's conduct in Ukraine, despite the conflict's uncertain course. What it does signify, however, is that more and more Russians are recognizing the costs of the Kremlin's military misadventure are outweighing any possible benefits that might accrue to them from it.
To be sure, Russia isn't a democracy in which public opinion can move the needle on elite decisionmaking. Even so, declining enthusiasm for the conflict among ordinary Russians undoubtedly spells trouble for Putin, who has increasingly bound the legitimacy of his rule to renewed imperial greatness. At the end of the day, all politics are local, which means even the Kremlin might not be able to indefinitely pursue a conflict that is increasingly seen as illegitimate at home.
That's where Western pressure comes in. If European and American resolve is perceived to be flagging, it will only serve to add fuel to Russia's war machine – and mitigate any moderating effect that souring domestic opinion might have on Moscow's calculus. On the other hand, redoubled pressure against the Kremlin on the part of Europe and the United States can be expected to have the opposite effect, emphasizing for the Russian public that their government's current military adventurism carries concrete costs – and in the process further softening the base of support Russia's leadership depends on for its continued legitimacy.