America's newest military campaign in the Middle East is now in its second week. Since its launch on February 28th, Operation Epic Fury has fundamentally shaken the Iranian regime, and in the process laid the groundwork for a new regional order. While a lot is still unknown about the future course of the conflict, its opening days have provided some much-needed signs of where the war itself – and broader U.S. policy – might be headed.
The U.S.-Israeli attack plan is methodical. The media and pundits have raised lots of questions about the strategic aims of Operation Epic Fury. Contradictory statements from President Trump himself have done little to clarify things. Behind the scenes, however, the war plan seems both coherent and compelling.
It began on February 28th with a strategic surprise, when Israeli airstrikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top regime military and intelligence officials, thereby effectively decapitating the country's chain of command. It has continued with a joint Israeli and American air campaign focused on eliminating the Iranian regime's offensive capabilities, chief among them its ballistic missile arsenal and stockpile of drones. The effectiveness of this effort can be seen in the dwindling number of missiles the Iranian regime is now capable of shooting at the U.S., Israel and its neighbors.
Thereafter, expect U.S. and Israeli military action to focus on Iran's defensive capabilities, including elements of its defense industrial base that need to be eliminated to prevent the regime from reconstituting its missile and drone stockpiles in the short- to medium-term. After that, Washington and Jerusalem will likely concentrate more intently on steps designed to bring about regime collapse, with the hope that by then there will be a mass grassroots mobilization of the sort the President called for in his February 28th address.
The endgame is still unclear. For the moment, Jerusalem and Washington appear to be on the same strategic page. But that's not necessarily an indefinite condition. The Trump administration has made clear it would be willing to countenance a reconstituted version of the current regime remaining in power, so long as it has inputinto its leadership and Iran's new rulers make a meaningful compromise on issues like nuclear development. So far, the regime's remaining officials aren't budging, and the country's newly-selected Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is far from the sort of pragmatist that's likely to do such a deal with Washington.
Still, the possibility can't be ruled out. And if the Iranian regime does in fact come to terms with the Trump administration, Israel will have no choice but to wind down its military campaign – and do so abruptly. That's why we are seeing Israel continuing to target regime officials and key political bodies as a way of trying to steer, to the extent it can, the evolution of events in Iran.
The region now wants a weaker Iran. In the opening stages of the conflict, Iran wasted no time expanding the conflict as much as possible, targeting its neighbors in the Gulf (and even countries further beyond). The strategy was designed to put pressure on American allies, so they in turn would lean on the White House to scale back its campaign. That approach didn't work as intended. Quite the opposite, in fact. Iran's neighbors have been reminded of something they knew all too well: that the Islamic Republic is a dangerous and unpredictable actor.
At least some of Iran's officials have belatedly realized they made a critical error, which is why over the weekend Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized and sought to reassure regional officials that they were not, in fact, regime targets. (The Revolutionary Guards, though, have continued to carry out such strikes – showcasing just how marginal the president truly is in the Iranian political system).
But even if Pezeshkian's counsel is ultimately heeded, the damage has already been done. Some of Iran's regional partners (like Qatar) are beginning to distance themselves from the Islamic Republic, while other countries (like the UAE) are shifting from being passive observers to becoming active participants in the conflict. This trend is likely to continue the longer the war drags on, which means Washington will likely hear about it from regional partners if it seeks to wind down the war without adequately containing and defanging Tehran.
The war is a test of the "axis." In recent years, there have been growing signs of anominous strategic convergence between China, Russia and Iran (as well as countries like Venezuela and North Korea) in terms of military coordination, political priorities and economic strategy – all aimed at chipping away at the U.S.-led global order. But just how durable is this alignment? In last summer's "twelve day war," Moscow and Beijing were conspicuously absent. Neither did anything of substance to defend Tehran or shore up its regional position, either during or after that Israeli-American campaign.
Last year's conflict didn't threaten regime change, however. The current one does. Which is why we are seeing greater signs of life from the "axis" now. China has emerged as a vocal opponent of the current U.S.-Israeli offensive, and dispatched a new regional envoy to attempt to mediate the conflict. Moscow has done more, including providing intelligence to assist Iran's military in targeting U.S. assets in the region. For the moment, however, the overall help rendered to Tehran appears marginal.
Still, the stakes for the Kremlin and the PRC are high. If the Iranian regime gets taken off the board – either as a result of grassroots overthrow or because a more pragmatic cadre of leaders decides to cut a deal with the Trump administration – the impact will be significant for both. Russia will lose an important force multiplier in the Middle East at precisely the time that its regional footprint is already diminished as a result of the recent fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. China, meanwhile, will potentially forfeit a significant source of regional oil, forcing it to scramble for substitutions to maintain stability of supply. So watch for Russia and China to assist the Islamic Republic as much as possible, short of wading into the conflict directly themselves.
Coming days will assuredly provide more insights. But what we have seen already makes clear that the stakes are extraordinarily high – and that, for all of the President's pronouncements, the end isn't yet in sight.