In the conversation about Iran’s future, it’s the dog that isn’t barking. More than two months into the US conflict with the Islamic Republic, Operation Epic Fury didn’t deliver the regime change in Tehran that many initially anticipated. While there are growing signs that the country has transitioned into something that, despite theocratic window-dressing, closely resembles a military dictatorship, it’s also apparent that Washington hasn’t achieved a fundamental change in its behavior—at least not yet.
All eyes are now understandably on the sporadic diplomatic contacts between Washington and Tehran, as well as the punishing economic effects of the US blockade, which is already reshaping Iran’s oil sector. But the internal political balance in Iran may prove even more decisive, as it will help determine whether the regime’s remaining leadership can maintain its grip on power.
Doing so is clearly preoccupying the new powers-that-be in Tehran. A recent meeting of the country’s Supreme National Security Council reportedly highlighted deepening anxiety among regime security agencies about the potential for renewed domestic unrest driven by economic hardship and political disaffection. In response, the Iranian regime has moved aggressively to reinforce its control through a number of parallel measures.
Iran’s Internet Lockdown
Over the past decade, Iran’s rulers have become acutely aware that connectivity is the lifeblood of the country’s opposition, enabling it to coordinate actions, spread information, and share its messages with the outside world. That’s why the Iranian regime completely shut down the internet in early January, in the early days of the latest round of protests, and why it has maintained an extensive nationwide communications blackout in the weeks since.
This disconnection, moreover, could become the “new normal.” US experts warn that the Islamic Republic might never restore full connectivity to the country, but instead transition to a managed system that involves “whitelists” for approved regime spokespeople and limited connectivity for local businesses—effectively institutionalizing a closed digital environment.
The Iranian Regime’s Mobilization of Children
At the height of the US-Israeli aerial campaign, and in anticipation of a potential US ground offensive, the Islamic Republic began to recruit kids as young as 12 for military and security duties. Back in March, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander announced on state television that the clerical army was seeking to recruit boys and girls “aged 12 and over” to serve as “volunteer fighters” and “defend the homeland.”
More recently, with a tenuous ceasefire now in place, Iran has begun using minors for another purpose: crowd control and intimidation. A new report from Al Hurra notes that the IRGC and its feared Basij domestic militia are deploying “armed children aged between 10 and 17” for an “intelligence-related” mission. These children are tasked with “spying on Iranians, monitoring them, and arresting citizens on charges of espionage or collaboration with the United States and Israel.”
The IRGC’s Foreign Militias
Simultaneously, the IRGC has begun deploying foreign militias inside the country to provide added protection against a potential uprising. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, drawn from Afghan Shia recruits, and the Zainebiyoun Brigade, composed of Pakistani Shia militants, along with several Iraqi factions, have reportedly been imported into Iran and assigned internal security responsibilities across geographically distinct zones of the country.
The move is telling. It reflects the IRGC’s assessment of its own current, weakened position. With significant losses to personnel and infrastructure, and with Iranian military morale reportedly deteriorating, the regime appears to have concluded that its domestic security apparatus alone cannot be relied upon to contain potential internal unrest.
All of these measures might buy the country’s remaining leaders precious time. But they simply cannot restore the Islamic Republic’s lost legitimacy. A regime reduced to arming children, importing foreign fighters, and walling off its people from the outside world isn’t ruling. Rather, it is managing the occupation of its own country.
About the Author: Ilan Berman
Ilan Berman is senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Departments of State and Defense. Mr. Berman is a member of the Associated Faculty at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, as well as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics.