What would it look like if someone copied the tactics of Russian propaganda and turned them against Russian interests?
A mysterious set of social accounts focused on West Africa has been doing just that. Since the middle of last year, the accounts have been seeking to undermine ruling juntas in Africa’s Sahel region — regimes that came to power through coups, pivoted sharply against France and the U.S., and then forged strong relationships with Moscow.
The accounts, mainly in French and appearing on X, Facebook and TikTok, attack junta leaders as violent and incompetent, denounce Russia, and make favorable references to the European Union, France and the U.S. Their tactics are a mirror image of how Russian propagandists operate.
The accounts, which do not identify their owners, use AI to create false versions of local news reports. Just as Russia makes fake versions of Western news sites, the accounts put fake headlines on counterfeit versions of Russian sites. The accounts link to and recommend each other — a tactic Russia also uses to make its accounts look popular and raise their rankings in search engines.
France has previously run clandestine social media accounts in Africa, and the new ones align with French geopolitical interests. The content coincides as well with the interests of other Western nations, and of democratic countries in the region that have been under propaganda attack from the coup states. Asked about the new sites, a French foreign ministry spokesperson declined to comment.
The accounts bear such names as La Dépêche Africaine (“African Dispatch”), Scoop Africa, InfoCivik Togo and Lomé Poadcast, according to an investigation in March by Radio France Internationale and France24.
False content identified by the investigation included a supposed report by Burkina Faso television, generated by AI, saying the country was sending troops to fight for Iran; a fake screengrab from the Russian Sputnik News agency saying that Russians were being urged to leave Mali because of an imminent jihadist threat; and a doctored Burkina Faso television clip that said the country was selling an electrical power plant to Russia.
Other posts from the accounts, beyond those in the French investigation, have mocked the head of Niger’s junta and claimed that Russian intelligence considers Mali junta chief Assimi Goïta “an introverted and paranoid individual.” Posts also said Burkina Faso had agreed to send two-thirds of its gold production to a Moscow bank, and that the Russian army had opened a recruiting office in Burkina Faso. The latter two reports were accompanied by purported video from the Russian television network RT and a screengrab from the Sputnik website, but neither story appeared to exist on the actual sites of the two Russian outlets.
Another post claimed to show a Burkina Faso recruit being forced onto a battlefield in Ukraine with a mine strapped to his chest.
The mystery sites focus particularly on Burkina Faso, which has been an important asset to Russian propaganda. The country is a regional center for African Initiative, nominally an independent Russian news agency aimed at Africa but also an organization spreading Russian influence with public and covert operations. Russian propaganda has also worked to build a cult of personality throughout the Global South for Burkina Faso’s leader, Ibrahim Traore.
If France is behind the new accounts, the covert effort would align with the increasingly aggressive public side of French information operations. In 2025, the country’s foreign ministry established French Response, an often-snarky account on X that slugs it out with critics of France.
In a schadenfreude moment for France last November, as Russian forces struggled against anti-government forces in Mali, French Response juxtaposed a 2021 Russian video promising to save Mali from French imperialism with a video of a Russian official asserting in 2025 that Moscow “is not responsible for the internal situation of that country.” French Response said, “It was clear from the beginning that the Russians would not protect the Malians. Today, reality proves it.”
The account has also taken aim at U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. right-wing influencers.
The new covert ecosystem raises questions about ethics and effectiveness. While Western nations, including the U.S., have deployed false internet accounts on multiple occasions, large-scale use of deceit to fight deceit threatens the overall information environment. A world where democratic and malign actors all routinely create anonymous, deceptive products could erase the distinction between the two camps in the eyes of readers.
While clandestine sites and false narratives may occasionally have their uses, there is no lack of information about bad actors that is both damaging and true. Governments and nonprofits can use this material effectively, in full public view. This, however, requires them to understand the need for assertive information campaigns that are compelling in content and high in volume.
Unless they recognize this, they risk falling so far behind in the information war that Russia-like tactics may seem like the only way to get back in the game.