Some seven months into the Trump administration’s war on Iran, it has become fashionable for much of the media to depict the conflict as a stalemate – one in which the Trump administration is drifting inexorably toward compromise with Iran’s new, military-dominated regime.
That may indeed be the case. In his speech before the UN General Assembly in late September, President Trump suggested that the U.S. and Iran might conclude a deal shortly after the U.S. midterm elections in November. Preliminary talks are already said to be underway, if only indirectly for the moment.
But the timing of any compromise between Washington and Tehran matters a great deal, because Iran’s present leverage over global energy and commercial flows isn’t, in fact, a permanent condition. To the contrary, while the Iran war didn’t create the new momentum toward connectivity now visible in global markets, it has clearly accelerated it. Across multiple regions, there is new attention being paid to key connectivity projects that are designed, at least in part, to address the vulnerabilities exposed by the Iran war.
The most immediate examples can be seen in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s weaponization of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of world energy and about 11% of all maritime commerce previously transited, forced Gulf producers and shipping companies to rapidly improvise new routes and workarounds.
In the United Arab Emirates, authorities leaned on their existing bypass pipeline from Habshan to Fujairah; by June, its use (coupled with alternative shipping arrangements) allowed the UAE to expand its exports to 4.3 million barrels per day, or about 85% of prewar levels.
By necessity, however, the UAE’s Hormuz-bypass infrastructure plans have expanded as well. The Emirates are now also building a second West-East pipeline, which is projected to be complete by 2027 (and was 50% finished as of May). When it is, the new pipeline will roughly double the UAE’s crude export capacity through Fujairah. That will give Abu Dhabi the ability to route the overwhelming majority of its oil production – targeted at 5 million barrels per day in 2027 – via an outlet that is located outside the Strait of Hormuz.
Similarly, the Hormuz bottleneck prompted Saudi Arabia to activate its own bypass plans. In March, the Kingdom ramped up flows through its East-West pipeline, which stretches from Abqaiq in the country’s Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. By the end of that month, the 1,200-kilometer route was operating at its full capacity of 7 million barrels daily, and funneling close to 90 percent of Saudi oil exports to the Red Sea.
Then there is the Trans-Caspian, where plans for connectivity have quickened markedly against the backdrop of the Iran war as well as the other conflict flanking the region: the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
In late May, Armenia and the United States reached agreement on a new framework laying the groundwork for implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). That route, connecting Azerbaijan and Armenia, was agreed to at a White House summit in August 2025, and is an integral part of the peace dividend between Yerevan and Baku. It remains a central part of the unfolding peace process now underway between the two countries.
Meanwhile, the broader Middle Corridor to which TRIPP is designed to connect has attracted serious new financing. In June, the World Bank approved a $372 million Georgian project to upgrade rail freight capacity and key road segments along the route. That deal followed on the heels of a February World Bank financial guaranteedesigned to unlock $1.41 billion for improvements to Kazakhstan’s section of the Corridor.
The potential is enormous. According to the World Bank, with sufficient investment and infrastructure, the Trans-Caspian route could transform into a much larger pathway for trade, potentially quadrupling shipping volumes and cutting transit times by two-thirds by 2040.
Farther afield, movement is visible as well. The past half-year has seen meaningful progress in the long-gestating India-Middle East Economic Corridor, which is envisioned as a trade and infrastructure network linking India to Europe through the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Med. Specifically, India and the UAE operationalized a key part of the corridor’s digital infrastructure during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Abu Dhabi in May. The scheme is intended to digitally link Indian and Emirati customs and port authorities, thereby smoothing the way for future expanded commerce. Italy, meanwhile, has stepped up its efforts to become the corridor’s principal European gateway, forging new connections with New Delhi on maritime transport and port collaboration.
To be sure, all of these solutions won’t come online overnight – or even in the immediate future. But the unmistakable quickening of regional projects in the Persian Gulf and beyond means Iran’s strategic position will only worsen over time, as the international community builds both redundancy and capacity.
For a Washington seeking leverage over the regime in Tehran, that is decidedly good news.