



American Foreign Policy Council

---

*Trip Report*

# Ukraine Delegation

June 27 - July 5, 2025





# Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Key Takeaways	2
Ukraine Delegation Trip Report	
4	Summary
13	Conclusion
AFPC Delegates	14
Kyiv Meeting List	15
Dnipro Meeting List	18
Odesa and Warsaw Meeting Lists	19



## INTRODUCTION

*From June 27 - July 5, 2025, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) supported a high-level delegation to Ukraine. The bipartisan group—including senior experts from the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—traveled to Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, and Warsaw. Herman Pirchner, AFPC President, led the 9-person delegation. The delegation, organized and staffed by AFPC Vice President for External Relations Annie Swingen, met with Ukrainian government officials, military leaders, civil society representatives, and international partners (a full list of delegation meetings is available at the end of this report). The discussions were wide ranging, but mostly focused on the current state of Ukraine’s war effort, the country’s evolving national identity, and the outlook for continued Western support. What follows is a summary of the delegation’s key findings.*

E. Wayne Merry  
*Author*

Chloe E. Smith  
*Design and Layout*



## KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **Ukraine's Resilience Amid Escalating Siege** - Now in its fourth year of all-out war, Ukraine remains defiant in the face of an unrelenting Russian assault. The tone among Ukrainian officials has shifted from early-war optimism to hardened realism—but not defeatism. Across Kyiv, Dnipro, and Odesa, the delegation encountered a powerful sense of national identity and commitment to independence. Still, many warned that continued resistance is only possible with sustained U.S. support. There is growing fear that, without it, Ukraine could eventually collapse under the weight of Russia's scale and brutality.
- **Innovation vs. Industrial Scale in Modern Warfare** - Ukrainian forces have fundamentally reshaped battlefield dynamics through rapid innovation, particularly in drone warfare. What began as reconnaissance platforms are now used for targeted strikes and aerial combat. These bottom-up developments, driven by soldiers and engineers responding directly to frontline needs, have outpaced traditional military doctrine. But Russia has learned quickly—drawing on Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese support—and is replicating these tools at a scale Ukraine can't match. Tactical ingenuity remains Ukraine's strength, but it's increasingly threatened by sheer industrial volume.
- **Critical Need for Sustained U.S. Military Support** - Across meetings, Ukrainian officials expressed deep appreciation for American support—but also urgent concern. A temporary halt in U.S. military aid just before the delegation's arrival served as a stark reminder of how dependent Ukraine remains on U.S. weapons, intelligence, and logistics. Many underscored that European aid, while vital, cannot substitute for the scale, speed, or strategic value of American assistance. Without it, Ukraine's ability to hold territory, defend civilians, and maintain morale could unravel in the face of Russia's continued escalation.
- **National Identity Deepened by War** - Rather than fracture Ukraine, Russia's invasion has helped consolidate a robust national identity across regions and generations. Even in areas once considered more sympathetic to Russia—like eastern Dnipro or southern Odesa—Ukrainian identity is now a unifying force. Ukrainian officials and citizens alike rejected the idea of subordination to a “Greater Russia” and underscored the civic values, gender equality, and transatlantic orientation that set their country apart from Putin's regime. The war has not only changed the map—it has reshaped what it means to be Ukrainian.
- **Strategic Implications of Odesa and Naval Drone Warfare** - Odesa is more than a symbol of cultural heritage—it's a critical node in Ukraine's military strategy. The city, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, has become a base for sea drone innovation that



## KEY TAKEAWAYS CONTINUED

has transformed the Black Sea into a contested space. Despite having no formal navy, Ukraine has constrained Russian naval operations and forced the Kremlin to adapt to a new era of asymmetric maritime warfare. The implications for the U.S. and its allies are clear: future conflicts will be shaped by low-cost, high-impact technologies deployed creatively across domains.



# UKRAINE MAINTAINS ITSELF UNDER SIEGE: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL REPORT

## SUMMARY

Despite years of Russian siege, Ukraine remains an independent nation and determined to remain so. Ukrainians are more realistic in their thinking than was true in the early years of Russia's full-scale invasion, but their dedication to national independence is very strong; while Moscow's expectations of reducing Ukraine to subordinate status are unrealistic.

Ukraine is now in its fourth year of resistance to Russia's full-scale invasion launched in February 2022. The American Foreign Policy Council has conducted a fact-finding visit almost every year since Russia initiated its armed conflict against Ukraine in 2014. This year's trip took place June 29 through July 4 under the leadership of AFPC President Herman Pirchner. Our delegation for 2025 was unusual in its composition as it was centered on a bipartisan group of three experts from the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as its former Staff Director. In six very full days of meetings with a broad range of Ukrainians in three of the four largest cities of this vast country (Kyiv, Dnipro and Odesa), we witnessed the enduring strength of Ukrainian national identity and commitment to its independence,

although we saw considerable doubt about adequate support from Europe and America, raising real doubts about Ukraine's long-term ability to withstand the scale and ruthlessness of Russia's effort to eliminate Ukraine as a sovereign state and to incorporate it within Putin's Greater Russia.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is by tradition the leading vehicle for debate on international issues in the United States Congress, while employment on the SFRC staff is one of the most prestigious and influential foreign affairs jobs in Washington. Our delegation therefore was perhaps the best informed professional group which AFPC has escorted to Ukraine among our multiple fact-finding trips to that country. The four experts were Joseph Biegun, a Senior Policy Analyst to Ranking Member James Risch (R-ID); Tyler Brace, a Senior Professional Staff Member advising Ranking Member James Risch (R-ID); Daniel Gottfried, a Senior Legislative and Policy Analyst under Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH); and Thomas Melia, the Deputy Staff Director for the Democratic Staff from October 2023 through February 2025 and previously an adviser to Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD). Each of these participants brought to our delegation unusual expertise about



*AFPC delegates pose for a photo with Bishop Mykhail Anischenko, Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Ukraine, following a substantive meeting on Russia's continued weaponization of religion in its war against Ukraine.*

Ukraine and Russia and the Congress. Each obviously will do his own specialized reporting, limiting the topics and detail contained in this more general report for a public readership.

A full list of our meetings is attached, but this summary report respects the confidentiality of our many interlocutors and focuses on main and often recurrent themes rather than seeking to repeat what would amount to repeating literally dozens of conversations.

Our delegation devoted four days to meetings in Kyiv, which is not only the national capital but also reflective of the vital central region of Ukraine. This was followed by a day in Dnipro, the fourth largest city in the country and very much a front-line wartime urban area in eastern

Ukraine and a frequent target for Russian air raids. We completed our visit with a day in the Black Sea coastal city Odesa, a vital port for Ukraine's external trade and a base for its continuing military efforts to challenge Russia's occupation of Crimea and use of the Black Sea. These three cities are frequent targets for Russian rockets, cruise missiles and drones, but all remain vibrant urban economies. Despite the intensity of Russian siege warfare since early 2022, Kyiv, Dnipro and Odesa are very much modern and productive European urban economies. Our delegation was not endangered but we did have occasions to visit bomb shelters when alerts were sounded. In the hours before our train from Warsaw arrived in Kyiv, the capital experienced its most extensive aerial bombardment thus far in the war. All three cities suffered





significant air attacks during our week in their country, but by chance not when we were there.

A key theme of this trip was Ukrainian appreciation to the American people for the assistance they have provided to Ukraine in recent years. However, we heard deep concern about the halt in supply of military aid announced by the Pentagon just before our arrival – some of which was reportedly turned back in flight. Most interlocutors felt there is no adequate substitute for US aid and that European assistance — albeit vital to Ukraine — simply cannot replace American support given the scale of Russian output of modern weaponry. Indeed, many believed that Ukraine's very existence may depend on the United States in an armed conflict which could continue

for many years and perhaps a generation. No one thought the war is near either its military or diplomatic resolution, as no one believed the Putin regime is in any way prepared to accept a genuine peace agreement. Indeed, our contacts take Putin very seriously in his ambitions to eliminate Ukraine as a sovereign state and even as a nation separate from Russia. Therefore, many Ukrainians look to American support as literally existential.

A recurrent theme was Ukrainian outrage at Russian efforts to kidnap Ukrainian children for incorporation into Russia's population, both to counter Russia's weak demographics and to provide a new generation of youth for its armed forces. Given that Russia has suffered over a million battlefield casualties thus far in this war, the Kremlin sees Ukrainian



*Leaders of private Ukrainian weapons manufactures engaging with Tyler Brace, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*



children as a source of replenishment in a force structure which regards the lives of Russian soldiers as routinely expendable. Ukraine presents a striking contrast as a democracy which treats its soldiers with honor and respect, and who are well aware that their Russian counterparts are often recruited from prisons and even from North Korea. In contrast, Ukrainian commanders at all levels are expected to preserve the lives of their men to the extent practicable.

This conflict is by no means local or even regional as, among other things, it is redefining the very nature of the modern battlefield, with major implications for the United States. Ukrainian military and technical ingenuity has transformed modern war in ways which will affect all

militaries, especially in the deployment and usage of military technologies, especially drones. In the early months of fighting after the February 2022 invasion, combat was dominated by traditional tactics involving battle tanks, artillery, mines and munitions, and hence gave an advantage to Russia with its immense stockpiles of traditional weaponry. Ukrainians in the trenches and laboratories revolutionized their resistance to Russian superiorities of manpower, firepower and armor with new technologies and tactics which have become some of the most cutting edge in the world.

Initially, drones were employed largely for surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting, but quickly became adapted for air strikes, bombardment and aerial



*AFPC delegates pose for a photo with Serhii Boyev, First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine.*





*Meeting with Olena Kondratiuk, Deputy Speaker of Ukraine's Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada.*

combat. The innovation and initiatives on the Ukrainian side have very much been generated bottom-up, with designers responding to the experience and needs of their colleagues and kin on the battlefield. The Russian military is now not far behind, we were told, but has advanced largely by learning from Ukrainian initiatives and from Iranian designs, and then employing the advantages of scale possessed by Russian industry, supplemented by Iranian and North Korean suppliers plus Chinese mass production of components. Thus, while Ukrainian forces do currently enjoy advantages in technology and tactics, they may not for long. Ukrainian forces cannot match Russia in scale of deployment and output, especially when supplemented by Iran, North Korea and China.

A recent development which illustrates Ukraine's dilemma is the introduction on a mass scale of fiber-optic cable to guide drones in ways which cannot be jammed by traditional techniques. Photos we saw show fields literally filled with fiber-optic cable used and discarded by Russian forces, demonstrating their willingness to waste this modern technology in much the same way they waste traditional equipment such as tanks and artillery and the blood and lives of soldiers. It is important to understand the contrast, and that Ukraine cannot match Russia in the expenditure of men and material. Ukraine certainly has demonstrated innovation and ingenuity, but Russia practices the classic Leninist truism that quantity has a quality all its own. Several of our military contacts emphasized that the Pentagon has much



*AFPC delegates pose for a photo with Oleksandr Lytvynenko, National Defense and Security Council Secretary, after discussing strategic priorities and cooperation with the United States.*

to learn, as the Chinese are paying close attention to the innovations on the Ukrainian battlefield.

The Ukrainian Army is reformatting much of its main order of battle, transforming brigades into corps structures. This transformation is underway while in active deployment, something akin to rebuilding an aircraft while in flight. This reform also reflects the age structure of Ukraine's ground forces, which are comparatively old by Western standards. The process depends on volunteers, a contrast to many Russian units which depend on conscripts from prisons. However, Ukrainian units are often nearing exhaustion due to inadequate replacements and insufficient time for recuperation. Indeed, the term

"exhaustion" came up in a number of discussions of the military balance. A point of emphasis was the value of American intelligence aid, which had been briefly paused by Washington.

Ukraine benefits from the International Legion Group of foreign volunteers which supplement Ukrainian regular forces. These forces reflect Ukraine's appeal to combat veterans from a number of countries, and harnesses their ability to perform special battlefield tasks, often behind Russian lines. These units embrace the rapid changes in military technology as well as a motivation to respond to Russian aggression, in some cases with volunteers from ethnic minorities inside Russia itself. Europeans in the Legion





tend to see their own countries' militaries as obsolete in tactics versus the Russians they have confronted. The Americans involved evidently have no contact with their own government, nor do they seek any.

Ukraine's most pressing military need is for more and better control of the air. While Ukrainian forces have been able to interdict the vast majority of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles used by Russian forces against Ukrainian units and cities, the number getting through is large and growing; this is the critical problem that highlights the impending exhaustion of numbers of interceptors available to Ukraine. Russian air raids are often not aimed against targets of particular military value but are employed in large numbers in swarm tactics to overwhelm limited Ukrainian defenses. These attack tactics are altered regularly to erode public morale and support for Ukraine's independence. This again is an area where the scale of Russian output is beyond Ukraine's ability to match. Over time, air raids can achieve some of what Russian units on the battlefield cannot. (After the return of the delegation to Washington, the White House announced that the President has ordered a resumption of delivery of defensive weapons to Ukraine and that he had not been responsible for the Pentagon's earlier pause.)

One very apparent factor in maintaining Ukraine's resolve and momentum is the prominent role of women in both military

and related civilian activities. Time and again in our meetings, the leading role of women was obvious. Strikingly, many of these women brought to their tasks an American education, so that Ukraine today is perhaps more trans-Atlantic in its young talent than are many European societies. While a comparison from the outside is difficult to make, Ukraine is unlikely to accept Russification in no small measure because it is a more advanced society in gender terms. While Russian women may not find inspiration in Putin's agenda of conquest, their counterparts in Ukraine are overwhelmingly motivated to defend their country against him. Not surprisingly, women serve widely in medical treatment of battlefield casualties. Indeed, a 1,000-bed trauma facility we visited is as impressive and up-to-date as any we have seen in the U.S.

We heard conflicting views of Russian policy objectives, but the dominant view is that Putin's regime is serious about its declared maximalist position that Ukraine is neither a legitimate state nor a true nation outside of Greater Russia. However, the Russian war — going back to 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas before the full-scale invasion of 2022 — has greatly increased the Ukrainian sense of national identity and unity, something reinforced by a series of dramatic military successes (such as the recent attacks on Russian strategic bomber bases in the far north and east of the country). One view expressed at a senior government level is that time is



*Dnipro Mayor Borys Filatov leads AFPC delegates on a tour of the Dnipro Museum of History during their visit to the city. The group paused at a memorial wall honoring fallen Ukrainian soldiers from the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.*

on Ukraine's side as Ukrainian society has stronger identity and greater resilience than does Putin's Russia. However, several senior commentators took a fundamentally pessimistic view due to the numerical imbalance in military forces and the perceived weakness of support for Ukraine in Europe and America. Views on the potential for a true ceasefire in the months ahead varied sharply, as did views about the desirability of a ceasefire for Ukraine versus its utility for Russia to rebuild its forces in preparation for a new offensive. Some saw the conflict as multi-generational, in which a ceasefire could be no more than tactical.

A recurrent theme of our discussions was

the continuing problem of corruption in the state sector. Despite the creation of major anti-corruption institutions this problem remains and is linked with conflicting political agendas. As has been the case in previous delegation visits, we heard pledges that corruption does not affect the integrity of American military assistance but is a lingering problem from the Soviet era and the rapid growth of a market economy since independence. Still, a large majority of the population reportedly perceives corruption as a major problem.

Ukrainian constitutional law prohibits national elections so long as martial law is in force. This allows Moscow to assert



that, with Putin’s “reelection”, Russia is a more legitimate democracy than is Ukraine under President Zelensky. However, almost all our interlocutors rejected this view and supported a continued delay of elections. Nevertheless, many accepted the logic of preparing for a post-martial-law period to assure both Ukrainian voters and foreign governments of the legitimacy of Ukrainian democracy. With eight million Ukrainians living in its diaspora and another million potential voters in military service, the mechanics of preparing for new post-war national elections is difficult but perhaps not unworkable in a nation with the vibrant civil society which has marked Ukraine since independence.

We were struck by our visit to the largest Jewish community in Ukraine in the eastern part of the country, centered on Dnipro (with about fifty thousand members), while western Ukraine is effectively empty of its former Jewish community. We were forcefully told that Russian accusations of anti-Semitism in today’s Ukraine are false, and life for Ukraine’s Jews is quite benign, including voluntary service in Ukraine’s army in the current war. The very modern Jewish center in Dnipro is over twenty stories high and spans a full city block, with a range of programs to maintain contacts with partner communities in America and Israel.

We were told that the foreign perception that eastern Ukraine is broadly pro-

Russian is simply not the case, although Dnipro’s location makes it very much a “front-line” city and region, subject to frequent air raids. Dnipro retains a broad and strong sense of Ukrainian identity, with the current war contributing to a more resilient commitment to the national identity than existed before the conflict.

Odesa has been a frequent target for Russian bombardment as both a vital port for exports of Ukraine’s critical agricultural output and of its manufacturing exports. Odesa has also served as a base for Ukrainian attacks on Russian naval facilities on occupied Crimea and has effectively prevented Russian Navy operations in much of the Black Sea, creating the irony that a country without a navy has prevented a country with one from operating on one of its key littoral seas. However, Russian operations do compel Ukraine to employ facilities along the coast of the Danube to maintain essential external trade. Odesa is also a development and operations center for sea drones, one of the key transformations of naval warfare with global implications for the United States.

Odesa was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2023 in a futile effort to discourage Russia from bombarding this famous center of architecture and performing arts. Unfortunately, Odesa suffers almost daily air raids that are clearly intended to damage Ukrainian culture as well as the infrastructure of a major port and its population. A city of extraordinary



physical beauty, Odesa is now marred by the hundreds of drone and missile attacks over the past three-plus years. The result has been a sharp decline in tourism but a significant increase in refugees from other parts of Ukraine.

## CONCLUSION

During previous AFPC delegation visits to wartime Ukraine, we noted a prevalent optimism, reflected in frequent declarations of impending “victory” over Russia and expectations of rapid entry for Ukraine into the European Union and NATO. This year, in contrast, realism sometimes bordering on pessimism was noteworthy. However, almost all interlocutors remained committed to the struggle for, and the maintenance of, Ukrainian independence. Putin’s agenda for Ukraine remains entirely unacceptable to everyone we met. Whether Ukraine’s independence can exist within the borders of the previous post-Soviet Ukrainian state is another matter. The very fact that few people spoke of a return of the Donbas or Crimea to Ukrainian sovereignty may indicate a broad acceptance that their country can maintain its identity but perhaps not within its prior territory. We witnessed an understanding that Ukraine alone cannot prevail against Russia (with its Iranian, North Korean and Chinese supporters). European and American support is understood to be essential, but how much of each will be forthcoming remains unclear.





## AFPC DELEGATES

*\* Served as delegation leader*

**\* Herman Pirchner, Jr.**, *President, American Foreign Policy Council*

**Joseph Biegun**, *Senior Policy Analyst, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

**Tyler Brace**, *Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

**Victoria Ford Jetton**, *Special Programs Coordinator, American Foreign Policy Council*

**Daniel Gottfried**, *Senior Legislative and Policy Analyst, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

**Mykola Hryckowian**, *Director, Washington Office, Center for US-Ukrainian Relations*

**Thomas O. Melia**, *Deputy Staff Director, Democratic Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2023-2025)*

**E. Wayne Merry**, *Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia, American Foreign Policy Council*

**Calnen (“Annie”) Swingen**, *Vice President for External Relations, American Foreign Policy Council*



## KYIV MEETING LIST

**Bishop Mykhail Anischenko**, *Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Ukraine*

**Mariana Betsa**, *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs*

**Serhii Boyev**, *First Deputy Minister of Defense*

**Catarina Buchatskiy**, *Director of Analytics, Snake Island Institute*

**Kyrylo Budanov**, *Director, Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR)*

**Yevhen Cherniev**, *Deputy Head, National Security Committee, Ukrainian Rada*

**Oleksiy Danilov**, *Former Secretary, National Security and Defense Council*

**John Gingkel**, *Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy Kyiv*

**Olena Halushka**, *Board Member, ANTAC*

**Mykhailo Honchar**, *President, Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”*

**Maryna Hrytsenko**, *Executive Director, Snake Island Institute*

**Yurii Hudymenko**, *Advisory Council, Ministry of Defense*

**Hanna Hopko**, *Chair, National Interests Advocacy Network (ANTS)*

**Andy Hunder**, *President, AmCham Ukraine*

**Daria Kaleniuk**, *Executive Director, ANTAC*

**Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze**, *Chair, Rada European Integration Committee*

**Olga Kosharna**, *Energy Expert*

**Olena Kondratiuk**, *Deputy Speaker, Ukrainian Rada*



## KYIV MEETING LIST CONTINUED

**Kostiantyn Lisovyi**, *Co-founder, Fincord-Polytech; Fmr. Deputy Head of Foreign Intelligence*

**Oleksandr Lytvynenko**, *Secretary, National Security and Defense Council*

**Oleg Magaletskyy**, *Founder, Free Nations of Postrussia Forum*

**Oleksandra Matviichuk**, *Human Rights Lawyer; Head, Center for Civil Liberties; Nobel Laureate*

**Oleksiy Melnyk**, *Co-director, Razumkov Center*

**Yuriy Nikolov**, *Anti-corruption journalist*

**Lesia Ohryzko**, *Director, Sahaidachnyy Security Center*

**Volodymyr Ohryzko**, *Former Minister of Foreign Affairs*

**Oksana Osadcha**, *Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration*

**Olena Pavlenko**, *President and Co-Founder, Dixi Group*

**Victor Pavlushchik**, *Head, National Agency for Corruption Prevention*

**Liuba Shypovych**, *Co-founder, Dignitas Ukraine*

**Joseph Sissels**, *Leader, Ukrainian Jewish Community*

**Vadym Skybytskyy**, *Major General, Deputy Director, HUR*

**Vladyslav Sobolevskyi**, *Former Deputy Commander, AFU*

**Taras Tkachenko**, *President, SpaceRay*

**Yuliia Turba**, *Advocacy Manager, Snake Island Institute*



## KYIV MEETING LIST CONTINUED

**Dmytro Tuzhanskyy**, *Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs*

**Oleksandr Turchynov**, *Former Interim President of Ukraine*

**Pavlo Verkhniatskyi**, *Managing Partner, COSA; Co-founder, Fincord-Polytech*

**Dmytro Zolotukhin**, *Former Deputy Minister of Information Policy*

**Maksym Zhorin**, *Deputy Commander, Ukraine's Third Army Corps*



## **DNIPRO MEETING LIST**

**Katarina Barbashyna**, *Manager, International Partnerships, RISE OF UKRAINE*

**Oleksandr Budnyk**, *Soiuz-Yutaps LLC*

**Serhii Burkina**, *KORUM Druzhkiva Machine-Building Plant LLC*

**Kateryna Chyzhyk**, *Head, CommUnity*

**Kim Chengbau**, *Director, L'UKRAINE*

**Iryna Derhaus**, *Kramatorsk Special Fasteners Plant LLC (KZSK)*

**Yuliia Dmytrova**, *Director, The TAPS Charitable Foundation*

**Borys Filatov**, *Mayor, City of Dnipro*

**Viktor Ignatovich**, *Head, Aid to the 25th Separate Airborne Sicheslav Brigade Foundation*

**Schmuel Kaminetsky**, *Chief Rabbi, Dnipro*

**Maksym Korotun**, *NVP Kramtechcenter LLC*

**Roman Kryvdyk**, *Frontline Paramedic Sergeant*

**Oleh V. Lazakovich**, *Research and Production Association Szkhno LLC*

**Serhiy Lysak**, *Head, Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Civil Administration*

**Katerina Merkulova**, *Founder and Manager, Garnizon*

**Ksenia Onyshchenko**, *Volunteer and Lawyer, Human Rights Protection Group SICH*

**Olekdsandr Peredriy**, *KORUM Druzhkiva Machine-Building Plant LLC*

**Ksenia Samoilych**, *Co-founder, Shveina*



## ODESA MEETING LIST

**Ivan Liptuga**, *Chair, International and Culture Department, Odesa City Council*

**Yaroslav Mohylnyi**, *First Deputy Chairman, SE USPA*

**Hanna Shelest**, *Director of Security Programmes, Ukrainian Prism*

## WARSAW MEETING LIST

**Phillip Bendarczyk**, *Director, German Marshall Fund - Warsaw*

**Gaetan Damberg-Ott**, *Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Brian George, Public Affairs Counselor, U.S. Embassy*

**Daniel Lawton**, *Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy*

**Colonel Casey Shuff**, *Army Attache, U.S. Embassy*

---

## About AFPC

For more than four decades, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) has played an important role in the U.S. foreign policy debate. Founded in 1982, AFPC is a non-profit organization dedicated to bringing information to those who make or influence the foreign policy of the United States. AFPC is widely recognized as a source of timely, insightful analysis on issues of foreign policy, and works closely with members of Congress, the Executive Branch and the policymaking community. It is staffed by noted specialists in foreign and defense policy, and serves as a valuable resource to officials in the highest levels of government.



WWW.AFPC.ORG | 509 C ST NE WASHINGTON, DC | 202.543.1006