



American Foreign Policy Council

Debate Transcript

A DEBATE: WHEN SHOULD THE U.S. USE FORCE ABORAD?

PART I

Moderator

Ilan Berman

Speakers

Phil Giraldi, PhD.

Michael Doran, PhD.

PART II

Moderator

Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Speakers

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Part 1

Herman Pirchner: Welcome. I am Herman Pirchner, president of the American Foreign Policy Council. I first want to thank Senator Hogan for making this room available for us and want to welcome you all to this gathering. I think there are few decisions more important in government than those that decide war or peace. In February, American Foreign Policy Council hosted two panels dealing with the question of the role of Congress versus the Executive Branch in deciding to go to war or not go to war and other questions of national security.

Today we are talking about not who is making the decisions, but how those decisions should be made. What are the lessons that we have learned from the past use of force and how those experiences should guide decisions to use force in the future? Our first panel will be moderated by an American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, Ilan Berman. Ilan has written hundreds of op eds, dozens of major journal articles and you see him from time to time on various TV shows. Without further ado, I will turn it over to Ilan who will introduce the panel and moderate the discussion.

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Ilan Berman: Thank you very much, Herman. It is wonderful to see you all here. Delighted to be able to participate, to ride herd, I hope, over my panelists. Without further ado, I think it is necessary to sort of frame the topic that we will be discussing for the next hour or so. The question of Iraq and the legacy of the Iraq war looms very large in American politics today. We have heard about it on the campaign trail this time and we have heard about it on the campaign trail for the last decade. And there is a good reason for this. It is an enormously important and also an enormously divisive political and strategic issue. And I think it is a very good place to start in our examination of American use of force, the constraints, the parameters, the acceptable dynamics that go into that decision making.

To do so I am delighted to have two distinguished panelists with me. Phil Giraldi is a former CIA case officer and Army Intelligence officer. In those roles he spent 20 years overseas in Europe and the Middle East working on the issue of terrorism. And he is now a contributing editor to the American Conservative, as well as the Executive Director of the Council for the

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National Interest. He holds a PhD in modern history from the University of London.

Our second panelist is Mike Doran who is currently a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. In the George W. Bush Administration Mike served first as Senior Director at the National Security Council responsible for Gulf affairs and subsequently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Diplomacy at the Pentagon. And he holds a PhD in Near East Studies from Princeton University.

And I say those last points, the doctorate, to show exactly how much more educated these gentlemen are than I and also to prove their bona fides. And I am delighted to frame it in that context because that discussion, the transition from the academic to the political, to the actual, is I think a hugely important one. Because what we have learned over the last twelve years or so is that what is proper in theory is not necessarily proper in practice. And I think that should inform as we begin our discussion of the use of force through the lens of Iraq. So let me stop there. Let me invite my panelists. Feel free to

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sit at your seat. Please hit the button - Phil, take it off.

Phil Giraldi: Okay. I am fighting allergies, so I hope you won't mind if I basically read my initial comments and afterwards you can throw a shoe or a tomato at me as you prefer. There are really two questions here. When is the use of force justified, with the key word abroad, and what have we learned regarding overseas interventions from the Iraq experience. I was, as some of you know, a foreign policy advisor for Ron Paul in 2008 and 2012, so I lean in a non-interventionist direction. But that is largely due to the fact that recent interventions have not worked out very well and have, in fact, increased the number of our enemies rather than reduce them while also killing 7,000 American soldiers and more than 1 million inhabitants of the countries we have become entangled with.

Nevertheless, I am not anti-war and spent three years in Army intelligence during Vietnam, followed by seventeen years as a CIA case officer overseas. I believe in robust diplomacy, but I also believe that sometimes active U.S. engagement with hostile entities of various sorts is a price we have to pay to remain secure.

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The simple answer to when to use force is to defend the U.S. against a clearly defined threat to the country itself or to vital interests. Indeed, unless a vital interest is threatened, then we have no right to intervene anywhere. And how to do it is for Congress to declare war as required by the Constitution. But when you add abroad into the mix, you are suggesting that our country might sometimes best be defended preemptively at a distance. My answer to that would be that it depends on the situation and the nature of the threat. I do not believe in humanitarian interventions, democracy promotion by force of arms or wars of choice unless those wars are somehow connected to other vital national interests.

For example, if Mexico were to become a failed state, a limited U.S. military role to stabilize the situation near the border might be justified in part on humanitarian grounds, but mostly in terms of national security. To cite the example of Iraq, if Saddam Hussein had, indeed, had gliders capable of flying across the Atlantic Ocean with chemical or biological weapons and had the intent to use them,

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then attacking him would have been fully justified with or without UN permission.

But lacking capability and intent to actually threaten the United States, I believe that it is best policy to avoid overseas military engagement as unforeseen consequences inevitably surface that result in haphazard mission creep. And even when a military option is considered, it should confirm to the so-called Colin Powell doctrine. It should be an unambiguously vital interest, it should be the last available option, it should have a clear and achievable objective with risks and costs clearly explained. Consequences of the action must be understood and it should have a timetable and an exit strategy. The American people must understand and support the mission and ideally foreign support should also be in place.

I think the lessons learned from Iraq are several and they reflect failure to satisfy some key elements of the Powell doctrine. Active monitoring and discussions over Iraq's weapons were ongoing when the decision to go to war was made by Washington, so the war was not a last option. There was, in fact, no vital interest at

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stake, though that might not have been clear at the time. The objective to bring about regime change was both clear and easily achievable, but there was not much consideration of what would happen on the day after or of consequences for the entire region. There was no timetable and no exit strategy and the mission morphed into nation building, not a fit task for the military and also an endeavor which was already in trouble in Afghanistan.

But as a former intelligence officer, I would like to consider that there was another problem that quite likely fed into and helped produce the other failings and that was a failure in intelligence from start to finish. Those of you present who have worked in intelligence know that the CIA was founded in 1947 to prevent another Pearl Harbor by providing the government with objective information regarding what was going on in the world that might threaten either the U.S. or its interests.

The key is information because the intelligence community traditionally is not involved in policy for very good reasons. The best available information provided to the President must be untainted by

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political considerations to prevent the best possible decision. To be sure the line between intelligence and policy has been crossed more than once in the past 70 years and information has even been politicized as in the Soviet estimate which made Moscow appear to be both more threatening and capable than it actually was.

But the lead-up to the Iraq war took intelligence tampering to a whole new level. Sir Richard Dearlove [phonetic], head of Britain's MI-6 and a key player in the Anglo-American effort to make a case against Saddam said subsequently that the intelligence had been sexed up to make it more convincing regarding Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. The so-called Downing Street memo confirmed that the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy rather than vice-versa and Dearlove specifically claimed that questionable evidence was being described as solid in making assessments.

Meanwhile on this side of the Atlantic, George Tenet and the CIA were frequent visitors at the White House and fully onboard to the fallacious propositions that Saddam had connections with Al Qaida and that weapons

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of mass destruction were in the Iraqi arsenal, together with system to deliver them on target. Sources like Curve Ball in Germany were simultaneously being discounted by the operations officer, people like myself, who were closest to the cases even as senior managers at CIA were providing exactly a contrary view to the White House.

I was at CIA at the time and working level analysts were highly skeptical of the case for war being made by those, but those concerns vanished by the time the analysis reached the building's 7th floor which is where the agency leadership was. There was also considerable intelligence community dissent, particularly over the aluminum tubes which never made its way into final briefing papers that reached the White House. This rush to war culminated in Tenet's UN appearance to give credibility to Colin Powell's speech, indicting Saddam. Powell subsequently described the intelligence that he had been given as deliberately misleading.

Elsewhere in the system, fabricated information about Iraq seeking yellow cake uranium from Niger was stovepiped through the Pentagon's Office of Special

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Plans and onto the White House. This was supplemented by false intelligence provided by Iraqi exile and known fabricator Ahmed Chalabi who eventually turned out to be an Iranian agent. All of this arrived on the desk of policymakers in the White House and almost certainly had an impact on the decision to go to war.

I don't know if war would have been prevented if the intelligence product had been better, but it certainly might have caused some of the supporters of intervention to hesitate. As it is critically important to get the intelligence right so the decision making will be shaped around reality rather than overblown expectations. The firewall between intelligence and policy has to be maintained at all cost. That firewall was broken in the lead up to Iraq and Iraq demonstrated that bad intelligence produces bad results just as it did some years later in regard to Libya.

As I noted above, I am no great fan of military interventions for practical reasons, but I at the same time recognize that it is regrettably an option that the United States will most likely continue to exercise given the express foreign policies of both

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major parties. The useful lesson to be learned from Iraq is that basically you have to know what you are doing and why and you have to understand what you are getting into. The intelligence community can be essential in that process, but only if it deals with issues of concern with both detachment and honesty. To me, the need to restore the independence and integrity of the intelligence process was the single most important lesson coming out of Iraq. Thank you.

Ilan Berman: Thank you very much, Phil. Let me turn it over to Mike for a few minutes.

Michael Doran: Thanks, Phil and thanks Ilan for having us and for that kind introduction, although when you said you were going to ride herd over us, it suggested that we were cattle. So I hope I am not cattle in your eyes. I agree with Phil that we have to, we use force to look after our vital interests. When I look at the experience of the last ten years or so, I guess we are now at thirteen years in the Middle East, what I see is a failure to define our vital interests very clearly, number one. And number two, a failure I think to understand the dynamics in the Middle East that are at work.

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And I think they are the lessons that I would have drawn from the Iraq war. I will get to a couple of those in a moment. But they are very different from the lessons that the Obama Admin, and I think the public at large, drew from the Iraq war. I think any of us going forward, we have to take into account where we are in the story at this point, what the Obama Administration decided and what the public decided.

Let me run through some conclusions I think that the Obama Administration decided, which I think are basically wrong. First of all, I think that there is a decided feeling in the Obama Administration, and particularly with the President himself, that the use of force itself is almost always counterproductive. I think the President probably goes further than Phil in saying that it is not just a last resort, but that it is absolutely counterproductive. And you can see there is a whole intellectual climate around that attitude. What am I speaking about?

For instance, the books by Joe Nye [phonetic] of Harvard about soft power, this notion that we rely too much on our hard power and we should actually be using

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our soft power to achieve our objectives and so forth. And you can see it in the President's speeches, including recently at the UN. The notion that we really should be working through multilateral institutions and to forms other than our military in order to achieve our aims. So there's a sort of general reluctance to use hard power.

And then secondly, there's a specific analysis of the Middle East that suggested that by using our hard power in Iraq, we alienated those elements in the Middle East that would have worked with us to achieve our vital interests which was to destroy Al Qaida or, I think we would now say, Sunni Jihadism, or Salafi Jihadism. So as the administration today defines our vital interests in the Middle East, our number one priority is to defeat Isis and everything else is kind of relegated to a secondary position. The result of that, once you say Isis or Sunni Jihadism is the strategic threat that we are fighting against, then you automatically by default fall into a situation where you see Iran and Russia as partners, or at least as potential partners and you begin outreach to them.

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And I think that leads to a disastrous situation, like we have in Syria where we are continually sitting around the table with the Russians and the Iranians trying to get them to identify this common threat of Isis. They make a show of concern, but then on the ground carry out a much different policy which is designed to undermine us and to undermine our allies. Which creates greater disruption, which then leads to greater use of force by the United States.

I mean, one of the really striking stories in the Obama Administration is a very strong impulse on the part of the President to be the President who ended wars in the Middle East and didn't start new ones, on the one hand, combined with a steady increase in the use of force in the Middle East. So obviously he has not found the diplomatic formula to keep the United States from having to use force. And we see mission creep, almost weekly now we see mission creep in Iraq and Syria. Another conclusion, an erroneous conclusion of mine is that the Obama Administration came to was that regime change by definition is a huge, is a huge mistake because we destroyed the system, so the argument went in Iraq, created chaos and made our life that much harder for us.

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And so therefore when the insurrection began in Syria in 2011, the last thing that the Administration wanted to contemplate was a regime change strategy in Syria. Which meant, once again, that we ended up, whether we defined it this way or not, we ended up as cooperative partners with Russia and Iran. When they, who have drawn no such conclusion about the use of force, are using massive force on the ground and creating the very chaos that we thought we were avoiding by not using, by not using force.

One last thing that I think kind of permeates the culture. I don't want to say of the Obama Administration, but I think generally on the left. But even beyond the left, I think just in sort of popular culture, I notice when - I do a lot of teaching with students from universities. And they are always kind of jolted when I use the term "enemy" when talking about people, even adversary, strikes them as abrasive. When I talk about countries like Russia and Iran, enemy - they are okay with Isis, but beyond that, they are uncomfortable with the notion of adversaries. And I think that we need to reinject that kind of language into our discussion of the Middle

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East and understand that there is a struggle for mastery going on in the region and we have to take a side in that.

We can't - our decision to sit on the sidelines, that doesn't mean that that struggle for mastery goes away, it just means that we play no role in shaping it whatsoever. So then what are the conclusions that I would draw? Well, oh, I have to add one more conclusion that both the Obama Administration and I think the general public drew from the experience in the Middle East of the last 13, 15 years. And that is that a large scale George W. Bush style invasion of a country is absolutely the last thing that anyone wants to contemplate. And so I think that I would have to say that massive use of force by the United States is really off the table. That the country won't support it.

But when I look at the experience of the last seven years of the Obama Administration, I have to conclude that we are going to be using force in the Middle East. So it is not whether or when, it is how do we use this force to the best effect so that we achieve our vital interests? And I think that from the

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analysis that I just gave you, there flows a couple of very obvious points. One is we need to define the problem much wider than just Isis and Salafi Jihadism. It is a problem that has to include Iran and Russia.

The way I would put it in shorthand is we have to see ourselves responsible for creating a new order in the Middle East. That doesn't necessarily mean and it shouldn't mean a massive nation building, massive nation building exercise that our country will not support. But it does mean putting together the coalition of powers that are, the coalition of powers that would be our traditional allies that are supportive of an American dominated order in the Middle East.

Because what the Obama Administration has done is it has moved away from the traditional role of the United States as the guarantor of regional order. And we have tried to work with the Russians and the Iranians to create a kind of concert system where we can all work together to contain or destroy the worst pathologies of the region. That has been a failed experiment in my mind and we need to go back to an older way of thinking which is allies and enemies and building a

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coalition that will support an order on the ground. And that will allow us to build up proxies on the ground who will look after our interests without having to have a major application of force. This to me is the lesson that should have been learned from the Iraq war.

The best lesson we learned was the lesson of the surge when General Petraeus understood that if we worked together with the Sunnis of Iraq to provide them with security, they will work with us against our primary enemy which was Al Qaida. But in order to give them security, we have to give them security against Al Qaida and we have to give them security against the Shiites who want to destroy them.

The Obama Administration has left that bargain, has abandoned that bargain and we are now working with the Shiites, with the Shiites of Iraq, with the Alawites of Syria and with the Iranians to destroy Sunni society, basically. That is not our goal, that is not what we think we are doing, but that is - our power is being applied in such a way that it is giving license to Russia, Iran, the Alawites of Syria, the Shiites of Iraq to destroy Sunni society. That is only going to

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create a breeding ground for greater Sunni Jihadism. And it is only going to create an instability that is going to further suck us into the region without a clear sense of what our purpose is. So I would say that we should use our force as sparingly as possible, but we should define the goal as to create a new order in the Middle East, together with our allies, against the Iranian and Russian alliance system. Thanks.

Ilan Berman: Thanks, Mike. Lots of food for thought there. Let me exploit mercilessly by position as moderator to ask each of you a question before we start of open it up. Mike, let me start with you. I think you talked very eloquently about the reaction to the Bush Administration's over-reach in Iraq breeding almost an under-reach on the part of the Obama Administration and sort of the negative currents that that has put in place.

But to my mind, you talked about sort of the regime change question and the question of whether or not the United States should be involved. I want to take one step back from that. We are thirteen years out from the Iraq invasion of 2003 and we have spent billions of dollars of American Treasurer, we have spent untold American blood on Iraq. And yet the country still

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remains perilously close to being a failed state. So what does that tell us, teach us? Does it teach us anything about democracy promotion, about whether or not this is a bridge too far or whether or not this is a defensible foreign policy priority?

Michael Doran: I would put myself somewhere in the middle on that question. You know, I just - if I can give you a long winded answer? I just happened to re-read NSC-68. And I skimmed through this book, I haven't read it yet, about the hawk and the dove, about the divide between Paul Nitze and Kennan. And I was interested to see how Nitze, the basic author of NSC-68, defined American interests in NSC-68 and the interests of the Soviet Union.

And basically NSC-68 says the Soviet Union wants to impose its system globally and it wants to destroy us. That is its goal. And what do we stand for? We stand for liberty and democracy and he quotes the Declaration of Independence. And I think NSC-68 is a great document, by the way, I love it as a strategy. But it is very easy to pick that apart from, to say is it really true that the Soviet Union is trying to destroy America, is it really true that the Soviet

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Union seeks to impose its system globally and so forth and isn't that a recipe for U.S. overreach and so on?

On the other hand, I think you can't ask Americans to use force abroad. You can't explain to Americans publicly a major endeavor in foreign policy if it doesn't connect up with our basic values. So I think we always have to stand for democracy, human rights and so forth, but also we have to be judicious and wise about what that means.

Democracy and human rights in Iraq is difficult because these are not, you can't have a democratic system unless you have - democracy is based on the notion of limited government. There has to be a sense of a political community that recognizes itself as a community and that is willing to play by the rules of the game.

Iraq and Syria are such divided societies and everybody in that, every ethnic group, ethno-religious group in those societies has a tape going through their head of how they are going to be raped and murdered when their ethnic rival gets control of the state. So in those circumstances, it is ridiculous to

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talk about democracy. You can talk about more representative government and so on, but you have to realize that we're going to be playing a role, a continuous role in, like we did in Iraq, as being that element that balanced - that we were holding the balance between the Sunnis and the Shiites and the Kurds, basically, in that country and we decided that we didn't want to play that role anymore. I think we have to realize that if we want stability, we're going to have to play such a role. It's required.

Ilan Berman: Thanks, Mike. So, Phil, a related question for you. You talked in your remarks, in the first half of your remarks, you talked about the Powell Doctrine and about sort of be more judicious about what we define as our national interest. So, let me push back on that a little bit. So there's another part of the Powell Doctrine that talks about, if you break it, you bought it. And how Iraq, his counsel in the run up to the Iraq war, was that we should be judicious. But the second half also holds true. So, to your mind, given the sort of, if we're applying the Powell doctrine across the board with regard to the Iraq experience, what level of engagement after the initial hostilities was acceptable for the United States and what was an overreach?

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Phil Giraldi: Well, this kind of goes back to the intelligence problem that I surfaced because obviously we went into a country not knowing the dynamics of the country, the history of the country, the culture of the country. We were basically getting information from Ahmed Chalabi, who was an interested party and Iranian agent. So he, to a large extent, was shaping the after-invasion scenario and this was a tragedy. But I would take it back a couple of steps further. I mean, the ultimate tragedy is the fact that we went in there in the first place. That the United States had no justification in terms of its own interests, for going in there.

And I would broaden that critique. The United States has no interest in being in Syria. The United States had no interest in surfacing in 2004 the idea that we should be interested in changing the government in Syria. Syria was a stable place more or less. It had problems, it had dissidents. But the fact is, we to a large extent by our actions had created the vacuum in the Middle East, and created the situation that we're looking at right now.

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So my point is, you err on the side of caution in these situations. And I think I'm an old 19th century guy in that I believe it's your interests that should be driving all this stuff. It's not a question of promoting democracy because it seems like a good idea. We promoted democracy in Eastern Europe, and sometimes it's worked a little bit; sometimes it hasn't. And this has been true in a lot of other places. If a society is not ready for democracy it's not going to work. And we tried to install it in Iraq; we've tried to install it in Afghanistan now, for 15 years and it's been a failure.

So, you have to go to first principles. What is our interest in these places and the interest should guide what we do. And Powell is right; once you've wrecked a place, you have a moral responsibility to do something about it. I think we have a huge moral responsibility right now to help take care of Syrian refugees because I think we were major contributors to the catastrophe which has engulfed that region right now.

Ilan Berman: Thank you, Phil. I have tons of additional questions, but I think this is a good moment to sort of to just throw it out to the audience, and see if

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there are any questions from the audience. I can always circle back with mine. Before I do, let me ask for two things. First of all, please identify yourself, yourselves, when you ask a question. And then second, please ask a question, rather than make a comment. I know this is a topic that is I think near and dear to many people. Sentiments are fine; please end your sentence with a question mark though. So, with that, let me throw it out, sir?

MS: Hi, (inaudible)

Phil Giraldi: Could you speak up a little bit?

MS: Yes. You mentioned the Colin Powell Doctrine and the need for an exit strategy at times. Would you agree that more (inaudible) should be done or Congress pass a new authorization (inaudible)?

Phil Giraldi: Yeah. Absolutely. I mean, if we're going to war with somebody, Congress first of all should be declaring war. And Tim Kaine even I think has a couple of times proposed that there should be a declaration of war relating to Syria. If we're sending more and more troops in there, then there should be an explanation, there should be a public debate. And I absolutely agree with that.

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I think the AUMF is flawed in that it gives too much blanket authority to the White House to start a war, and continue a war, and then come up with justifications for keeping it going. And we've seen this in Libya, we've seen this in Syria, we'll see it in other places too. Look what's going on in Saudi Arabia where we're covertly supporting a very destructive Saudi invasion of Yemen. There have to be limits on the ability of the White House to go to war. And I perfectly understand it if we're attacked, the White House has to be able to respond.

But that's not what we're talking about here. We're talking about calculated policies, insofar as policies actually exist, to maintain military footings in numerous countries simultaneously. When on September 9th, which I remember because it's my birthday, *The Washington Post* had a front page article, gloating over the fact that over the Labor Day weekend, the U.S. armed forces had attacked in six different countries, and killed terrorists. I mean, this - we're not at war with any one of those six countries. And the fact is that using military force is a big responsibility. And it's not something to gloat over.

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It's something to do in a deliberate and legal and constitutional way. And that's the way I see it.

Ilan Berman: Thank you. Anyone else?

MS: (inaudible) from the Foreign Policy Council. One quick point, despite Amman's - I mean we were using force in terms of a no-fly zone and that was a much more limited use of force before. My question is, the secondary effects specifically with regard to Iran. It seems to me in the 1980s Iran and Iraq had fought. (inaudible) Our intervention in Iraq did a lot of things with regard to Iran and therefore our national interests (inaudible). So could you comment on that?

Ilan Berman: Well let me have Mike start there and then Phil you can jump in after.

Michael Berman: So, traditionally we've said that a vital interest of the United States is to protect the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf at reasonable prices. And a kind of corollary of that has been to protect a multiplicity of suppliers and not to let any one power dominate the Gulf. I think that's a vital U.S. interest. And I think it's one of the ones that has been abandoned or nearly abandoned in the last seven years. Because Iraq has some of the largest oil reserves in the world and we have created a situation

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in which those reserves are increasingly coming under the control of Iran.

The Shiite staplet [phonetic] that is Southern Iraq is now a satellite of Iran. One of the more disturbing things to me about what's happened over the last seven years is there's almost no discussion of this and what it means. So, have we abandoned the idea that the free flow of oil is a vital interest and that no single power should dominate the Gulf? There should be a debate about that. I think it's a big mistake to do that and I think we will regret it in the long run. And I think we're going to find ourselves engaged in - as these resources come under the control of Iran and they use it against us, I think we're going to find ourselves engaged increasingly in military activities that we failed to perceive because we were reading the region incorrectly. And reading our vital interests incorrectly.

Ilan Berman: Phil?

Phil Giraldi: Yeah, I agree completely. To me the vital national interests in the Middle East is the free flow of oil. Not that we get a lot of oil from the Middle East; it mostly goes to Asia and to Europe. But the fact is, if there were an oil shock because 7 to 20

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percent of the oil production of the world were stopped, it would affect our economy in a huge way. So yeah I think it's of vital interest. And I think that by focusing on vital interests you tend to come up with a better answer in terms of what you're doing. And as Mike has noted, we created the situation, essentially by invading Iraq, where we've empowered Iran. And so who was thinking that one through? It should have been obvious to anyone who was an observer of the Iran-Iraq War which was just a few years before.

Michael Doran: Just a quick - on that. I don't entirely agree with what Phil just said. I don't think that the invasion of Iraq is what necessarily empowered Iran. I think it was the failure to think more clearly about Iran when we invaded Iraq to begin with. And then when President Obama pulled back from Iraq, to assume that many of our vital interests were shared by Iran when they weren't.

Ilan Berman: Thank you, gentlemen. Sir?

MS: (inaudible). Let me make a comment first. Regarding foreign policy, after studying (inaudible), I think the best way to resolve should be done by that country. (inaudible). I don't know if I am explaining it right. Japan, they did the rebuilding themselves.

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It is kind of like that. Anyway, that is my comment. My question is, you mentioned something about regime change. When should that be used for a fight, under what circumstance, in the Middle East and Asia Pacific?

Michael Doran: So let me take the last one first, the regime change. I think that there has been a blurring or an illusion of two different ideas when we say regime change so that regime change has become synonymous with massive use of force like George W. Bush did against Saddam Hussein, a military overthrow. I think we carried out a regime change policy against the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Cold War until the fall of the Soviet Union. We understood that we were in a prolonged conflict with a regime and that that conflict came from the very nature of the regime and that it would never be resolved until that regime went away and it was the goal of our policy to see that happen. That is different from saying that we are going to go invade the Soviet Union today and start a major war.

I think that those assumptions that we had about the Soviet Union apply today to Iran and they apply to Syria. So I would like to see a regime change policy

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against Iran and a regime change policy against Syria. Like I say, that doesn't mean that we should go to war with them tomorrow, but we should understand that - I mean, how do we decide what countries are enemies and what countries are allies? That is the big problem in the Middle East.

I would submit as a starting point, it's a more difficult question than one thinks because there is a lot of frenemies in the Middle East. But I would submit that the easiest way to start is that those countries that overtly proclaim undying hostility to the United States are our enemies. Right? We should let them get a vote to begin with and that is certainly true of the Iranians. They openly proclaim at the highest levels that they want to throw us out of the region and they won't have peace with us until we and Israel disappear.

They are an enemy. We should show them the same respect that they show us in that regard. And that would change the way, I think, we see what the whole dynamics that are going on in the Middle East. With regard to your first question, it is just not the case. Japan, you made a comparison to Japan and the

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countries of the Middle East. Japan is a nation state. I mean, if we had a spectrum of countries from perfect example of nation state to hodgepodge like we have in Iraq and Syria, Japan is probably the greatest example of a nation state in the world.

So it is possible to work with the civil society to empower certain elements so that they build up their country in that way. When you have these fractured countries like Iraq and Syria, like I say, where different groups feel that they are in an existential, with great justification, feel that they are in an existential struggle with other elements in their society, it is simply not the case that you can step back and things will naturally and an order will naturally result. We have to be involved in tinkering on the ground.

The question is, how much military force should we use in that tinkering? And I would agree with Phil that we should try to minimize it to the extent possible, but we shouldn't kid ourselves, military force is a key aspect of it. The Middle Easterners do not love us because of our soft power. They don't want us there because of our soft power. They want us there first

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and foremost or they don't want us there primarily because of our soft power; they want us there first and foremost because of our hard power.

MS: Should the result by the hand of Middle Easterners is my point.

Michael Doran: If you adopt that principle, you cannot look after vital American interests.

Ilan Berman: Phil, did you want to jump in?

Phil Giraldi: Well, again, I have to go back to basic principles. Basic principles are you use military force when there is a palpable imminent threat to the United States. I don't see where Iran poses a threat to the United States. It poses a threat to the United States' interests in terms of oil flow. I don't see where Syria poses a threat to the United States. So I agree with Mike that we should be putting pressure on regimes in soft pressure, soft power in terms of regimes that don't like us or that are against our broader interests, for one reason or another.

But there is something quite different when you go into a country to overthrow the government as we did in Libya. Let's not just talk, you know, let's not just talk about Iraq here. Libya is possibly as big a disaster as Iraq was and nobody wants to talk about it

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because we have a Secretary of State, an ex-Secretary of State who is running for president now and she was responsible.

So anyway, the point is that you have interests and you have capabilities, but that doesn't mean that your capabilities, if you have overwhelming military strength becomes your option. And I agree with you. Countries basically will wind up better if they make their own decisions and make their own mistakes and still at the end of the day come up with a solution that works for them. That is what I think.

MS: My point is, we should be doing everything to help the insurgents, like -

Phil Giraldi: Help the insurgents?

MS: The Kurds or whatever.

Phil Giraldi: I wouldn't be involved in someone else's civil war.

Ilan Berman: Let's move on from this. Is there another question. I see a hand raised high. Yes?

FS: Yes. My name is Shashani [phonetic] and I (inaudible).
My question is (inaudible) -

Ilan Berman: Can you speak a little louder?

Phil Giraldi: We can't hear you.

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FS: Since you said that Syria is not a nation state, per se, how could we (inaudible), empower the other factions to rise against whoever is in power.

Michael Doran: First of all, I would start with an observation and that is that as a result of the dynamics that have taken place over the last five years in Syria, there really isn't an autonomous Assad regime anymore. What we are calling the Assad regime is now completely under the thumb of the Russians and the Iranians. And that is the problem from my perspective is that the Russians and the Iranians are using Syria as a base from which to spread their power and influence throughout the regime.

And I am making a big assumption, that I don't think the Obama Administration agrees with, that in the final analysis, the Russians and the Iranians have hostile intentions towards us. They want to undermine us and they want to throw us out of the region or reduce our influence to the extent possible. And that is what we have to be worried about. I think under any possible scenario, whether it is one that is based on my ideas or ideas on the, say, the Obama Administration, there is going to be a lot of turmoil and chaos in Syria for years to come.

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I don't see, though, what the Russians and the Iranians are doing is they are ethnically cleansing Syria. Those Sunni refugees which are now something like a half the population of the country if you could internally displaced people, not just the UN designated refugees, those people are not going back to their houses, ever. And there is going to be a ring of misery around Syria that is going to generate an enormous amount of problems for us including generating radical Jihadi organizations.

So if we adopt a regime change policy which doesn't mean, like I say, that we go in and topple Assad tomorrow, but we start organizing elements around the region to impose costs [phonetic] on the Russians, the Iranians, Hezbollah and so on, that will allow us at least to create some areas in the country, say pockets of stability, where the Sunni population will not be under threat by the people that are dominating the country right now. That is the best I can offer.

Ilan Berman: Let's go over here - sir?

MS: (inaudible).

Phil Giraldi: Well, they were essentially ignored. It was a - Obama was clever about how he played it or Hilary

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and Obama, whoever actually was the architect of it in that they made it look like a United Nations, Europe, European operation though the United States, in terms of the logistics and everything, was the driving force behind a lot of it. But again, you get back to the fact is, that this was based on false intelligence, essentially.

There was a lot of intelligence being generated just like we are getting now out of Syria where you can't tell what is true and what isn't about how there was going to be a massacre of at least 500,000 Libyans in Benghazi. You might recall that press, alarmist press reporting at the time. And of course, none of this was true. So you had a pretext for war being jinned [phonetic] up basically because someone had, in Washington in the White House, had decided that Kaddafi was a bad guy and had to go. And the other kind of pretext were wrapped around this to make it a viable argument.

So what we wound up doing was destroying the state that was quite stable, that had the highest standard of living in North Africa, free medical care and education for everyone and other things and we have

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turned it into a hell hole. And what responsibility - and also, let's not forget the weapons that flew out of the arsenal that Kaddafi had that wound up in central Africa that wound up also in Syria by virtue of help from the Turks. So there were a lot of things that went wrong from this operation. And again, it is something that Americans, some European politicians said something about the United States of distraction about how we forget everything immediately. And it is forgotten just how disastrous Libya was, and this is recent history.

Michael Doran: I largely agree with what Phil said. It is kind of surprising how some of the lessons of Iraq, not the lessons that I would have drawn, but the lessons that the Obama Administration itself drew from Iraq were not applied to Libya. There was no, there was inadequate planning about the post-conflict stage of the operation, which is, of course, one of the biggest complaints or biggest critiques of the Bush Administration war in Iraq. I suspect that one of the reasons that they made this mistake was that they thought that they were applying one of the lessons of Iraq correctly which was that a large impetus for the war came from the Europeans, the Europeans have a much bigger interest in stabilizing Libya.

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I actually don't agree with Phil that Libya was a stable country. I mean, clearly there was a serious problem there. But it was the Europeans who had the bigger interest in Libya. And I think President Obama thought that he was applying a new, the lead from behind idea which is that the U.S. would play the supporting role, but the Europeans would be in the lead.

But it turned out that the Europeans ran through their magazine very quickly and they didn't have the tools or the wherewithal to take care of the job without us, so we had to jump in order to save the situation from becoming a disastrous intervention, we had to jump in and take a much bigger role. So we got kind of dragged into because of an inadequate understanding, I would say, from the beginning, from President Obama, of the role that the United States plays in the international system and in maintaining order in places like this.

I mean, we saw in the April *Atlantic* article, the Obama Doctrine by Jeffrey Goldberg that the President doesn't like the Washington playbook and regards a lot of our allies as free riders. One of the dramatic

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things that came from that article was the only European ally from whom he had, a leader from whom he had uncritical things to say was Angela Merkel. Because the Germans have taken themselves out of the hard power game. They are not calling up President Obama on the phone and saying - intervene in this country but the French and the British are. The thing is, like I say, when you take yourself out of the hard power game, you leave the field open to those like the Russians and the Iranians who are very much in the hard power business and not looking after our interest.

Ilan Berman: So let me circle back now to sort of where we started and just ask a final question of you both. So using the Iraq experience and the experience of what we concluded from it and how it has shaped our foreign policy since, where do we go from here? How should that experience, the past experience in Iraq and the years since, help inform how we approach challenges like Isis on the one hand, the resurgent Russia on the other hand? What have we learned, what haven't we learned yet? Mike?

Michael Doran: When I listen to the debate between Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump, I see - and when I look at the debate about the Middle East and I see what they

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are saying. And I compare it to what I understand to be the realities in the Middle East, neither one of them is presenting really coherent alternatives. Because both of them are saying, using different language depending upon the topic under debate, both are saying that we have to work with the Russians, number one, and both are saying that we have to push back against the Iranians throughout the region.

But Iran and Russia are in an alliance. I think it's an alliance across the region, but it is certainly an alliance in Syria and it is a very close alliance. So if you are going to push back against Iran in Syria, you are pushing back against Russia and neither one of them have come to grips with that reality. And the other point I would make is that we have a tendency to talk about all of the conflicts in the region like they are in hermetically sealed boxes.

So we can have a Syria policy and an Iraq policy and an Iranian nuclear policy and talk about each one of these separately. But they are all connected and we are dealing with strategic actors on the other side. So if we start pushing back against the Iranians and the Russians in Syria, well, what is going to happen?

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The Iranians are going to start, they are going to start shelling the green zone in Iraq. We are going to suddenly find hostages being taken, Western hostages being taken by very shadowy militias and offshoot Shiite militias in southern Iraq and so on and so forth.

And we might see the Russians responding to what we are doing in Syria by turning up the temperature in the Ukraine or in the Baltics or through cyberattacks or you name it. So we have to look at it as a matrix, as a complex and we have to be ready to win the escalation ladder across all fields. And that is something that none of our leaders want to say. They want to say we can recalibrate in Syria and we don't have to worry about the rest of it and I think that that is very, it is just erroneous.

Ilan Berman: Phil, you have the last word.

Phil Giraldi: Okay, I think the lesson learned is that the use of the military as a foreign policy tool gives you a very blunt instrument that produces instant gratification, but in the long-term, frequently very bad results. I would say almost invariably very bad results, at least in the last twenty years. So I think it is something we would use only when you have

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absolutely vital interests at stake. I would have to disagree with Mike, I don't see the threat from Iran against the United States.

And I agree with Donald Trump that it is absolutely essential to work with the Russians. If we want to resolve the situation in Syria, we have to work with the Russians. If we want to disengage from Syria, we want to get out of some of these complications we have gotten into, we have to work with the Russians. That is not to say I endorse Putin or his policies, but the fact is this is the realistic way to look at the state of the world and the fact is we occasionally have to bend our knee a little bit.

I think if you listen to what has been said here today and if you read *The Washington Post* in particular, you can sort of put yourself on the other side of the argument. And I would think the fact is that it is not the Russians who are trying to impose a system on the world or the Iranians, it is the United States. We are the ones that are in all of these places. We are the ones that are stirring things up in all these places, whether we call it democracy promotion or whether we

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call it whatever, because these things are basically fake arguments anyway.

The fact is, we are the ones that have become engaged in all of these places where we didn't have to get engaged based on our interests and now we are kind of stuck. We have bought into all of these things, the Democrats buy into humanitarian invasions of country to change the regime. The Republicans basically buy into doing the same sort of thing just to show how tough we are. I think these policies are wrong. And I hope that whoever is the next President will figure this out and will start to basically become the country we once were, getting back to taking care of our people within our own borders. Thank you.

Ilan Berman: I almost wish that you had led with that at the beginning because that would have opened up an hour of Q and A. But unfortunately, we will have to cut it short there. As you can see, there is some commonalities, a great deal of difference and I think the importance is in the differences in terms of plotting out the proper course and figuring out what the lessons are and what the lessons aren't. So thank you both for what has been an enormously enriching

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discussion and please, join me in thanking Mike and
thanking Phil. [Applause]

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Part 2

Herman Pirchner: On the next panel we have two veterans of the U.S. Senate. Jeffrey Bergner, a long-time aide to Richard Lugar of Indiana, served as staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Gerry Warburg who was a Foreign Policy Advisor to the Democratic Whip of the Senate, Alan Cranston. They both have strong academic backgrounds and have taught at both Georgetown and the University of Pennsylvania, among other places. Without getting into a long discussion about their varied and rich backgrounds, I think we will just begin the program so we can focus on substance. We will begin with Gerry.

Gerry Warburg: Thank you very much, Dr. Pirchner. Before I begin, a quick salute to my sparring partner. The young people in the room will have heard talk about the good old days when the Senate worked and issues of great consequence were advanced in bipartisan fashion. The truth is that Secretary Bergner and I did great combat in those days almost daily. We worked for opposing party leaders and we represented two very divergent political philosophies at times. We fought hard, but it was never a zero sum game. There were no final victories and no permanent enemies.

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And it is my earnest hope, particularly for some of the younger staffers in the room, that you might experience that same type of interaction across the partisan aisle.

Now our host has challenged us to address four controversial topics in ten minutes and Jeff and I have a small bet on this. So to provoke you, I am going to go over four points rather quickly. The first one is that White house, and especially civilian policymakers have often proved too ready to use force in places where I believe smart power might have proved more effective.

Look at some of the successes of smart power in places like Chile and Salvador and Colombia and Burma and indeed, much of Eastern Europe. Contrast that with disasters such as George W. Bush's decision to invade and occupy Iraq...or the insertion, then retreat under calamitous circumstances of U.S. Marines into Lebanon following Ronald Reagan's policy in 1983. Or the folly of our failed war against Nicaragua's Sandinistas. The use of force by presidents since Vietnam has, in my opinion, very often suffered from a lack of sustainability, transparency and an exit strategy.

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You would do well to ask indeed, what exactly is the United States doing in Afghanistan fifteen years after 9/11 if it is not nation building, the policy that George W. Bush specifically ran for president against?

Second point: I believe the drift on the fringe of both major political parties towards isolationism and unilateralism is unhealthy. It harms our ability to pursue U.S. national security interests. We must strengthen alliances against terrorist networks, not retreat from them. Threats from climate change to cyber-attacks require greater multi-lateral collaboration, not less, to secure U.S. interests.

A third point which we heard articulated very effectively in our previous panel from some members of the intelligence community, is that the Powell Doctrine is more essential than ever to maintain credible sustainable military commitments, we must first secure U.S. voter support. Americans overthrew a king in good measure to ensure that one ruler could not commit the nation to war without the express approval of the people's representatives in Congress.

Fourth, and perhaps most provocatively, I would appeal to the liberal Obama/Clinton supporters in the room to

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join with our Libertarian and conservative, strict constructionist friends to check what since 9/11 has been an out-of-control Executive on the issue of war powers. This ought to be an issue where admirers of Bernie Sanders and the Koch brothers can agree. Article 1 of the Constitution is crystal clear in giving Congress the power to declare war.

The next Congress, in my opinion, is morally obligated to rein in Executive excess, and to make the people's representatives accountable by regular public votes for the sacrifices we ask daily of our brave soldiers.

Now let's put today's debate in historical perspective. For a generation Republicans were said to be strong on defense - the Hawks. They were eager to use sticks, not carrots, to use force unilaterally, from Grenada to Iraq, from Afghanistan to Lebanon. From the whole bogus "who lost China" debate of the 1950s, to the ever-growing Defense budget of the post-Cold War decades, the GOP's position was quite clear.

Democrats were caricatured as doves, labeled weak on defense. They were eager to restrain enemies' nuclear arsenals with international treaties. They were

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determined to secure U.S. popular support, even U.N. votes, before making foreign military commitments.

Now, Democrats and Republicans were united on such common sense questions as maintaining a strong NATO alliance, or checking expansionist Soviet policies. Obviously these party caricatures no longer fit. The Republican establishment has been bitterly divided by the demagoguery of their isolationist standard-bearer and his admiration for the Russian dictator, Vladimir Putin. Indeed, scores of leading Republican foreign policy professionals have endorsed the Democratic nominee.

A substantial portion of thinking Republicans now ask why we still have so many forward based troops. They ask what are we doing paying for the defense of Japan and Germany, 70 years after World War II ended? Many believe that allies from South Korea to Israel to the Baltics should pay for their own defense. Some embrace a "Come Home America" line, with calls for greater investment in U.S. infrastructure and new trade barriers. Listen very carefully...you can almost hear George McGovern and Big Labor being channeled.

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Today it's hard to recycle the old saw about Democrats being weak on defense. It's true that Obama seeks multilateral accord before inserting U.S. forces in some instances. But it was Obama and not Bush who made the unilateral strike in Pakistan and took out Osama Bin Laden. Obama has made very aggressive use of drone attacks and cyberwar against multiple nations, as our previous panel pointed out. And Obama has been unrestrained in his use of force by a Republican-led Congress. Obama has focused on ISIS, he's even made cyber-attacks against Iran.

His would-be successor, Secretary Clinton, is far more internationalist than the Libertarian Rand Paul's or the Donald Trumps of the alt-right. Now, there remain some important points of bipartisan consensus I'm sure we'll talk about. Before we commit forces to combat, per the Powell doctrine, the U.S. has to have clear national security objectives, an exit strategy, and the express support of the American voters so the commitment can be sustainable and we need to revitalize the American economy, and rebuild our infrastructure, another bipartisan point of consensus.

Professor Bergner and I will have different views on the wisdom of force in certain instances. To

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telegraph my hand, I believe the Reagan invasion of Grenada, for example, was an embarrassing distraction from a much more pressing Middle East challenge. The fact that 8,000 medals were given out for killing a few dozen soldiers in a Caribbean island is a little bit beyond the pale. The Reagan deployments in Lebanon were similarly ill-considered. And of course the Bush-Cheney rush to war in Iraq has become the most tragic U.S. foreign policy error since Pearl Harbor.

One key point about unilateralism - the rhetorical champions of America First are deeply suspicious of any international accords. I understand they fear these will compromise U.S. freedom of action. But recall, they rejected major nuclear arms accords advanced by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. They engaged in demagoguery on the Panama Canal Treaties, which were clearly in the U.S. interest in retrospect. They're delighted that the U.S. Senate since 1998 has almost refused to pass any international treaty, from nuclear test bans, from environmental protection accords, to the TPP, most any agreement. Critics fear multilateral accords would give socialists in Europe or dictators in the U.N. Security Council control over U.S. interests.

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But the fact is that many national security threats based in the United States today are not primarily a contest between two sovereign nations. Man-made climate change, which is already now taking lives and threatening economies is not a contest between two nations. The same with counter-terrorism, or cybersecurity or Russian military imperialism in Crimea, or Communist China's occupation of South China Sea islands in violation of international law.

I believe U.S. interests are much more effectively advanced in such cases if we act multi-laterally in concert with our allies. Our generals get this. Why can't our politicians or our would-be leaders?

A final opening comment about the use of force. If conservatives are truly strict constructionists, and I believe they are, how could they contest the crystal clear statement our founders made in the Constitution, that only Congress can declare a war and fund it? The Constitution is not ambiguous here; Congress must vote to authorize wars of choice. And I believe we're far stronger as a nation when we have that public vote to back a commitment of U.S. forces. Soldiers who fight and die to advance U.S. interests deserve to know their political leaders are accountable. That is why

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I support the bipartisan initiative to reform War powers laws, and ensure troops know voters have their backs.

In conclusion, I believe we're a stronger nation when we use force in a much more accountable fashion, and that we heed one of our wisest foreign policy presidents, John Quincy Adams, and not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Making the public case for military commitments is an obligation of leadership. You lead people, you try to explain the logic of your proposed course. It is what George Washington did, and Lincoln, and the Roosevelts, and Jack Kennedy.

Leaders do not go abroad searching for villains among the 192 nations we share this fragile planet with. Leaders do not play the demagogue, trashing our generals and our war heroes. True leaders do not whip up xenophobic fears and reflexively oppose all things multi-lateral by refusing to explain the cost and consequences of the policies they propose.

The use of force requires accountability. We need to put long-term military commitments to public votes.

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To do less is unseemly for the world's oldest and greatest people's democracy.

Thank you for your interest. I look forward to your questions and to learning from my friend, Secretary Bergner.

Jeffrey Bergner: Well thank you very much, Gerry. I look forward to mixing it up a bit with my friend and colleague from UVA. Gerry and I agree about some things, and we disagree about others, as you will soon see. I'd like to offer a general defense of the use of military force as a tool in achieving American national security interests. And to do that, let me take the four points that Gerry made serially and respond to each one. I think that may frame the debate going forward in the clearest possible way.

First, on the use of force generally, I don't think the evidence supports the view that presidents, and I think that is what we are talking about here, have been too quick, too eager, too willing, too ready to use force. To the contrary. If you look at the period since 1973 when we withdrew our forces from Vietnam, and I think this is a good period to look at, we fight very differently now than we did in Vietnam for a number of reasons and in a number of ways.

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First, no president is interested in another episode like Vietnam in which we lost 58,000 American lives for an objective that was not very clearly defined. Secondly, in 1973 the Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, which has at least to an extent affected how presidents and Congresses work with one another. Third, we have now an all-volunteer military. Not since 1973 have we used conscripts or draftees to fight. Fourth, we have seen other changes like the Goldwater-Nichols Act. We spend a good bit more time and attention on how to fight effectively and efficiently without risking unduly American soldiers' lives. So we fight very differently.

In the 43 years since 1973, there have been twelve major instances of the use of U.S. force abroad. There have been a number of smaller ones to be sure, but there have been twelve major ones. And by major I mean either with a very substantial number of U.S. forces or for a very long duration or with a considerable number of casualties or with a very broad notion of what we are trying to achieve, like regime change or, in some cases, two, three, or four of these goals. Now, three real quick points:

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First, in every one of these instances presidents have worked very hard to try to accomplish the ends they sought to achieve by using force as a last resort, not as a first resort. One can go through the diplomatic history of these events and see that presidents have used diplomacy, they have used economic means, they have used political means, they have moral suasion, and they have used other allies to try to address problems. Presidents have not been interested in repeating the Vietnam episode.

Anybody who has seen presidents visit with families of the fallen or visit with wounded soldiers at Walter Reed would know that presidents are not eager to go to war. No modern president - maybe Teddy Roosevelt, but no modern president - glories in war at all.

Secondly, I think because we do fight more carefully now and more cautiously as well, I think the record of success has been somewhat better. There have been some obvious failures along the way and I would name two, one of which Gerry mentioned. Our experience in Beirut in 1983 and our experience in Somalia in 1993 were failures by any metric that anybody could reasonably devise.

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I would make an argument - and I am sensitive that what I am really making right now is an assertion - that you one make a strong argument that the other ten times we have deployed military force it has been successful. In several cases it was not the use of force, but follow on decisions that were not implicit in the use of force, that created problems. I have a piece coming out in The Weekly Standard which will detail at great length my thinking on these twelve instances.

Finally, and maybe most importantly, many times there is kind of a false dichotomy in which the costs of action are put against what? The costs of inaction? No, the costs of action are often balanced against a world in which inaction has no costs. For example, if we look at the Gulf War in 1991, we can identify what the costs of that war were. We can identify how many Americans lost their lives there. We can identify how much American treasure this war cost, what were the follow-on consequences in terms of American pilots having to fly a no-fly zone for more than a decade afterward and a number of other things. We know what those are. We can count those costs up.

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But to what do we then contrast that? What we usually contrast it to is nothing, as if the current situation would go on forever without any change or any costs. And that, I think, is an unfair way to look at this. In particular, I don't think there is anybody in this room who could tell me to a certainty that Saddam Hussein would have remained perfectly content to stay in Kuwait and not proceed an inch further toward the Saudi oilfields if he were unchecked in Kuwait.

I understand all of the arguments about Kuwait as a province of Iraq and all the rest of it. But I would just offer as evidence, the Saudis themselves were scared to death that that was what was going to happen if we didn't deal with the Kuwait situation. And there is no way in the world Saudi Arabia would have allowed hundreds of thousands of American forces on Saudi soil if they didn't think this was an existential threat.

The second point concerns multilateralism. Sure, why not? Of course we should act multilaterally if our friends and our allies will be helpful. What could be wrong with that? But this sometimes blends over too quickly into the notion that we have not acted multilaterally often enough. And I would just submit that with regard to these twelve instances of the

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major use of military force between 1973 and 2016, ten and arguably eleven of these were all conducted multilaterally. Most were conducted under UN Security Council resolution auspices.

And by the way, those resolutions are not so easy to get because they require the tacit approval of Russia and China. Other actions were undertaken with our NATO allies or with non-NATO allies or, in many cases, with all three. Beirut, Somalia, the Gulf War, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq--all of these took place with our NATO allies. So did Kosovo, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Libya and now more recently Isis.

Arguably the one case of unilateral American action in all of these twelve instances was George H.W. Bush's invasion of Panama in 1989. This was not a multilateral action; this was a unilateral action, without a doubt. You all know, we have had a bit of a special history with Panama and we had many thousands of American forces already in the Canal Zone when this intervention occurred. But certainly in ten or arguably eleven cases, and I will come back to Grenada if you would like, the United States has acted multilaterally.

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And so the notion that we are careening around the world in a unilateral way is a canard. We should act multilaterally where we can, but we have done that over and over again since 1973.

The third point is popular support. Yes, of course, this is very important in a democracy and it is especially important for a war or a conflict that goes on as long as some of these have, in particular Afghanistan which is now the longest running continuous war in American history. We spent more time with the Barbary pirates, but that was episodic. Afghanistan has been continuous.

Let me make a couple points about this. First, each one of these twelve military actions was strongly supported by the American people, including by the way, the Iraq war, which received bipartisan authorizations in the Congress in a much more fulsome way than the Gulf War had in 1991. There were stronger bipartisan votes in 2003. Secondly, there is a notion around that the American people have become war weary to which I would ask, weary of exactly what? What is it exactly that the American people are weary about? 95 percent of Americans have sacrificed exactly

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nothing for any one or all of these conflicts all put together. Not anything. Not a dime of tax money, since Congress always prefer to borrow the money rather than to pay for it as we go. Most Americans have not sacrificed anything.

The sacrifices that we have entertained have all been taken on by one very narrow slice of the American public, and that is the people who serve in the all-volunteer military and their families. This is where all of the sacrifices come down and why it is that the average American should be war weary, I am not too sure. Most Americans could not name one solitary way in which their lives have been inconvenienced in one way for one day by the totality of the use of force that the United States has engaged in from 1973 until the present.

Now, I was going to ask you to think for a moment, how many Americans do you think have been killed since 1973 in combat? But our previous speaker was kind enough to tell us the answer to that - roughly 7,480 Americans have been killed in combat in the last 43 years in the 12 major hostilities we have been engaged in, including especially Iraq and Afghanistan.

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It is a bit crass to do this, but that averages out to about 170 American lives per year. Each and every one of these is a very sad and a very difficult experience and I would be the last person in the world to minimize this. A number of these people have been my friends, or they are parents of my friends. I live down in the Second District of Virginia in a neighborhood full to the brim with Navy Seals and their parents and many of these people are friends. So I would not in any way seek to minimize it.

Just to put this in context for you, in the year 2015 alone 16,000 Americans were killed in homicides and 28,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses, prescribed or not. 35,000 were Americans killed in highway traffic fatalities. All together, more than 80,000 Americans were killed in 2015 alone in traffic fatalities, in drug overdoses and in homicides. And again, this is not to diminish in any way the sacrifice which any of these 7480 people have made, but it is to say that I think this certainly suggests that we are not a blood soaked imperial regime or a country that is too quick to want to go to war.

It has been our assumed responsibility and maybe rightly, maybe wrongly, but it has been our assumed

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responsibility in the last 43 years to try to bring a degree of civility and order to the world and we have lost 7400 people in the process. The average American, by the way, is 200 times more likely to know someone who has been killed in a car accident than anyone who has been killed in combat in the last 43 years.

One last point, real quickly, and then I will stop. On the question of War Powers and Congress, I am in complete and total agreement with my colleague Professor Warburg. Congress to its credit has authorized the use of force consistent with the War Powers Resolution on the three biggest occasions for the use of military force - the Gulf War, the Afghan War and the Iraq War.

Congress also authorized, by the way, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the activities in Beirut which turned out not well. On the other eight occasions, Congress has simply been AWOL -- and has not lived up to the responsibilities it has prescribed for itself in the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution was in part designed to check presidents, but in equal or greater part to compel the Congress to step up and take a position on whether the

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use of force is something which is going to be authorized or not authorized.

Now in one or two of these cases it may be understandable. The Panama invasion, for example, came and went so quickly that Congress was out of session the whole time for Christmas recess--although Congress might have bestirred itself to come back for a day. But some of these situations - Libya, Kosovo, Bosnia, and ISIS - have gone on for months or years, and Congress has still not acted. And the situation with regard to ISIS is right in front of us now.

So far, Congress has done nothing; it has preferred as my colleague has said, to let the President do whatever he pleases in Iraq and in Syria. So far a lot of the action has been from the air; more than 13,000 Coalition airstrikes, most of which are ours. But increasingly we are now putting troops on the ground. We have now more than 6,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, more than half the number we had it when the President drew them down and took us out of Iraq in 2011.

Congress has a very difficult time with situations in which Presidents fight wars where the casualties are

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not very high, where they're minimal. But in this particular case, despite what all four of the presidential candidates who will appear on the ballot had to say about "no boots on the ground, no boots on the ground," it's a little bit late - we already have 6,000 or 12,000 if you count both feet, 12,000 boots on the ground in Iraq. And we're going to have more as the operation to move toward Mosul continues, and more and more of these are going to be on the front lines.

If Congress were to do nothing about ISIS going forward, it would be something of a disgrace. Now just so I don't end on a totally down note, let me say I share Professor Warburg's optimism; I think there are ways that sensible people can work together. I'm much more sanguine about it when it comes to national security issues than I am with domestic issues where the country is really riven in parts, and has two different visions of where to go.

But I think that if we're going to work together it has to be on the basis of a very dispassionate, a very non-ideological, a very non-partisan understanding of what we've done and what we haven't done, not trying to score political points. And I think if we do that,

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in all fairness, one will conclude that there is a significant role for the use of military force in securing American foreign policy and national security objectives. And in some cases there is even an indispensable role. So with that I will stop and turn things back over to our moderator.

Herman Pirchner: Because Jeff talked a bit longer than you did, Gerry, maybe you want to respond. And I'm going to have a question to you both, and we'll go to questions from the audience.

Gerry Warburg: I'm just delighted that we agree on a lot of things, and I'm struck by the contrast between the consensus that we enjoyed in a previous era and the challenges of today. The one observation I'd make without being argumentative, is it's true that the U.S. casualties have been thankfully somewhat limited by the use of drones. And as the son of an Army Intelligence officer, I'm grateful for the limit to U.S. loss of life. But our actions certainly have profound consequences around the world and in other populations and in other countries, and in refugee movements, and of course for the people of Iraq and other countries in the Middle East.

I have a European friend who said to me the other day - gosh we really ought to be able to vote in American

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Presidential elections because the decisions that you make have such a profound impact on our lives. And I think that's certainly true in other regions of the world as well. But thank you for your comments Jeff.

Herman Pirchner: Okay. Everybody has talked about the use of multi-lateral coalitions. And I wonder if both of you could address the problems inherent in working multilaterally with Russia in the Middle East? As was mentioned, Russia's main ally there is Iran, who is in opposition to American interests in the Middle East. Russia's government under Putin, has broken practically every agreement that's been made over the last two years, and some treaties of long standing. And yet, there can be a reason for tactical cooperation. But how do you work with somebody that doesn't keep their word, and whose long-term interests are different than those of the United States?

Gerry Warburg: I suspect we have a point of strong consensus here, because I do not trust in any way, shape or form, the Russian influences in the Middle East. Remember that Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem in part because he was concerned that the Russians might get back involved in the Middle East. And I believe the United States should be extraordinarily wary of their influences and the pernicious impact of Mr. Putin.

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I would just say more generally that one has to have a sober and realistic understanding of the nature of the dictatorship on the march advancing now in Russia and a willingness to use U.S. force and work with our allies to check the influence of Mr. Putin. And I think it's crystal clear that there's only one candidate who has that approach; and the other one has a dispiriting naïveté about Mr. Putin's objectives. With that I'll turn to my colleague.

Jeffrey Bergner: Well, I'll leave aside the comments on the election, but I think beyond that we do have a very strong consensus about this. I would only point out that this is not a brand new problem. It's not a problem that's just arisen in Syria in the last few years. We have not really had a confluence of interest with first the Soviet Union and then Russia, with the exception of a couple of years in Russian history after the Soviet Union's demise. We've not had a confluence of interests with Russia for many, many years.

I can tell you all too clearly from hard, personal experience. Many, many times I came back and forth from the State Department to the Hill to explain to Senators and Congressmen how difficult it was to try

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to get Russia to cooperate with even the most elemental, sensible UN Security Council Resolution dealing with Iran's nuclear program. We had to work overtime to try to get Russia and China to agree with us on even the most minimal kinds of sanctions against Iran. And so, this is a problem of long standing.

I think maybe it's a kind of a misplaced hopefulness that when a new group comes in they think - well, we are the ones who can now break through the fog and find that great confluence of interests that must exist between us and Russia, between us and the former Soviet Union. I think that's just a mistake. I think we need to look at it in a very clear-eyed way. There are undoubtedly some things we could agree on with the Russians, but there are some things which we cannot and never will, as long as they have the system in place over there that they have.

Gerry Warburg: I just wanted to add one comment on that, because I think of our friend John Kerry and the brief he's had to carry in dealing with the Russians, which is an extraordinarily difficult one. I don't want anyone to misunderstand that I agreed with Professor Bergner on the necessity of the United States acting unilaterally to secure our national security interests. In fact I had an opportunity to talk to my

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Dad recently, a U.S. Army Intelligence officer whose portfolio on Eisenhower's staff was following Russian tank formations in 1945.

And if the United States had been unwilling to act unilaterally against Japan, I might not be here. Because he and his fellow troops were about to be sent to invade Okinawa before the United States decided to act unilaterally in Japan. So I support unilateral U.S. military action when our national security interests are at stake.

Herman Pirchner: We'll go to questions from the floor.

MS: Reed Smith, Charles Kock Institute. You mentioned at least kind of ten or at best eleven major military operations. It seems to me that the biggest difference between those and what we're facing now is those actually ended. Do you see any prospects for a global and permanent preventive war ending?

Jeffrey Bergner: Not on the horizon. I share Gerry's view. It is unclear to me what we're hoping we're going to achieve in the 15th year in Afghanistan that we did not already achieve in the 14th year. It is very unclear to me upon what that hope is based. And so, here I would not dissent from some of the comments that the first panel made about nation building. It's a very difficult thing - very difficult. It's much harder

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than we thought it would be. We tried it in Somalia and it didn't work so well. We've tried it in Iraq, it turned out to be very hard. We've tried it in Afghanistan, it turned out to be even harder.

We've tried it in Libya in a different way by simply bombing the hell out of the place and then standing back and letting the Libyans sort it out, and that hasn't worked so well either. And so I think the short answer is, I don't see anything on the horizon like that. One of the reasons, which Michael on our first panel mentioned, is that once a war was ended with Germany or with Japan they were ended by the nations of Germany and Japan.

The countries were done, they'd had enough. Whereas when you fight against these more difficult groups that are at each other's throats, in Afghanistan or Iraq, as Michael said, every one of them has a tape in their head about how if they don't play their cards just right, someone from another sectarian group is going to murder them. I don't think Japanese had that feeling about each other, or Germans had that feeling about each other. And so I am not wildly hopeful that that would be the case.

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Gerry Warburg: Let me just add, two of the most articulate individuals on this topic, to my mind, are war hero, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, and the junior Senator from Virginia, a guy by the name of Tim Kaine. They have pressed Congress to be on the record on when this war might wrap up. And if it's not going to wrap up, which in my opinion it's not going to, I think we're going to be battling extremists, Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, for a generation. Let's be honest about that.

But to use the authorization for the use of military force after 9/11 to go after Al Qaida, which we've now decapitated, and use that as a justification in the year 2030 or 2040 to continue to prosecute this war against ISIS, I think is a mistake. And one of the most striking things of a series of eight interviews that our students conducted with members of Congress last week, 4D's, 4R's, was the Members' frustration that they haven't been held accountable by having to vote on this stuff. They actually want to be on the record, most men and women of good will in the United States Congress, to let the soldiers know we've got their back. And if there's an exit plan and an exit strategy or a time limit, vote, well at least be

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accountable - that's why they ran for office in the first place.

Jeffrey Bergner: Can I just jump in and add one more thing about Congress? I don't mean to be so critical of Congress, but I think one of the places that Congress has the hardest time trying to figure out what it wants to do in terms of authorizing the use of force or not, is in these situations of relatively fewer casualties, where Presidents can fight wars, (Libya is the perfect example) from far off with very few or in this case no real American casualties. Congress is not sure how to act. And it seems to me that the problem of technology is making this a bigger and bigger problem for Congress.

Increasingly, Presidents are going to fight wars with minimal casualties, with standoff weapons and with drones, particularly. And if Congress is ever going to have a role again, in speaking about the question of when and how should we use force abroad, somebody is going to have to do some pretty hard thinking about it. Because it's not at all obvious to me that Congress is really in a position to step up and take a position on these kinds of tough issues. Somebody is going to have to do some hard thinking about that.

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Gerry Warburg: Let me just underscore one key point there.

And the previous panel noted that last month the President of the United States undertook drone strikes against six different nations. And I want to be fair in my challenging of partisans. I've made some tough remarks about my friends in the Grand Old Party. But I challenge Obama Democrats. Imagine how you'd feel if a President Dick Cheney had undertaken six drone strikes against six different nations in a matter of days. Or a President Dick Cheney had used drones to kill American citizens who were overseas...without engaging the Congress in the way that's authorized and required by the Constitution. I think Democrats would be singing a different tune. So I think they're morally obligated, as well as my Republican friends, to be held accountable.

Herman Pirchner: Yes?

MS: Hi. I'm Tim and I serve with Human Rights First [phonetic]. The other day I went to a hearing, the House (inaudible) and Services Committee. Congressman Adam Smith asked an interesting question saying, we've had different strategies of involvement in Iraq and Syria and Libya. In Iraq we went all in, Libya we bombed but we didn't have troops on the ground and in Syria (inaudible) regime. And in all three cases, there was no good solution. And there's ongoing civil

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war in Syria. And in the other cases it is ongoing war. So what would be a popular strategy of intervention or non-intervention for the U.S. to adopt in these countries?

Jeffrey Bergner: Sure. I'd make a couple of points about that. First, one has to compare the consequences of action with the consequences of inaction. And you can say, well, none of these have worked out right so we shouldn't do anything. But I'm not sure that follows quite so clearly. It may well be, and I personally think in the case of Libya, that we were a bit over-sold a bill of goods by the opponents of Qadaffi about the impending bloodbath. And President Obama based his decision to intervene in part on the notion of responsibility to protect under the UN Outcomes Document of 2005. He couched it in terms of American interests, but it was really more a question of American ideals, I think.

And Qadaffi had come around quite nicely, actually. He had come more or less from what he was, a murderer and a terrorist, to become increasingly aligned with the United States. We were working very hard at the State Department when I was there, to reestablish diplomatic relations with Qadaffi, to open embassies in both places, to appoint ambassadors, to rebuild our

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embassy in Tripoli and so forth. All of which was delayed only by the ongoing legal issues from the Pan Am 103 dispute.

President Obama may have prevented a large loss of life on the ground but in exchange for it, we've had an ongoing smaller loss of life. And we've had in addition several places in ungoverned spaces where ISIS now exists. It's unclear as I sit here today on September 26th, that that was a very good bargain from the standpoint of American national security interests.

I am still willing, and Gerry may faint here, to give President Obama the benefit of the doubt here. And to say, if it so should turn out over the next couple of years that the Libyan government rolls up ISIS in Libya, and is able to pull together some kind of a regime to produce some kind of order in Libya, with some kind of decency and moderation, it may still be that this was something that turns out all right. But I think the jury is out on that.. There are a lot of "ifs" in terms of that scenario.

And I might also add that the only way that could happen is if the U.S. military helps Libya to roll up

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the ISIS cells in Libya. So, I take the point. We haven't found a particularly good way to reconstruct places that are falling apart, whether we're the agent of helping them to fall apart, or whether they're just falling apart on their own without us.

Gerry Warburg: I would really entertain a more sweeping statement in answer to the gentleman's question, that it has not served the U.S. interests in any of those three cases to be involved with ground troops. And I think Iraq is the most obvious and clear example. I'd also just try to clarify for the record that I believe while many Democrats deeply regret their vote for the authority for George Bush to use force, the explicit request put to them was to give him the stick and the threat so he wouldn't have to use it.

And I don't think any of those Senators who are publicly explaining their votes, including Clinton, Biden, and others, were voting for a 15 year occupation of Iraq and the kind of expenditure of money and treasure and lives that we have had. But a broader point that I would just challenge the audience to consider, that Jeff has alluded to, the use of technology becomes very attractive for these standoff wars, where we don't put boots on the ground, where we send drones.

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And my friend and boss, a former U.S. Army Special Forces, Dean Allan Stam says 'if you don't care to send your very best you're not sending the right message.' If the United States is just going to stand off and throw Tomahawks and throw drone strikes, the clear inference for folks on the ground is we don't care enough to send our soldiers, just wait us out.

And I think in some cases it's akin to beating a hornets' nest with a baseball bat and then walking away and being very surprised that you've stirred up trouble. So I think it's incumbent upon us as scholars, think tanks, politicians, moms and dads, to think very seriously about are the implications of new technology in wars of the future, what challenges they pose for the revitalization of our democratic institutions, such as having Congress vote accountably on these issues.

Jeffrey Bergner: Amen to all of that except - every single United States Senator knew exactly what they were voting for with the authorization to use force in Iraq. It was to use force in Iraq; it was not to threaten Iraq with force. We'd already threatened Iraq with force, on and on and on. And so I think this particular latter-day reconstruction of

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motivation is not right. It's really not right. Secretary Kerry knew what he was doing, Hillary Clinton knew what she was doing, Joe Biden knew what he was doing. They all voted for the war - each one.

Gerry Warburg: Well the great thing in this instance is we have their detailed positions based on intelligence explicated in the Congressional Record. And we don't have to go back to tapes of the Howard Stern Show to see where the candidates stood at the time.

Herman Pirchner: Yes?

MS: (inaudible).

Gerry Warburg: How many hours have we got?

Herman Pirchner: Might repeat the question.

Gerry Warburg: The question was, how do you define your U.S. national security interests in order to determine whether we should indeed go to war. I will try to give a short answer.

It's difficult. It is kind of like the Justice Stewart's definition of pornography - 'I can't tell you, but I know it when I see it.' A U.S. national security interest is a threat to the continental United States, Alaska or Hawaii. It is a threat to our lives, our values, our economy, our environment. It is why I say that climate change is a national security threat to us presently now. It is causing seawater

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rise in our cities, in Jeff's hometown of Virginia Beach. Pollution is causing hundreds of thousands of people to die prematurely in cities like Beijing.

So a national security interest is a threat to the lives and livelihood and values of the United States. Careful - that last word gets us in trouble because when we go abroad trying to promote our values by force of arms, it does not work well. And that is where you have to draw a very clear distinction of whether it is worth committing force and killing people to advance our positions. But I hope I am going to learn a better answer from Professor Bergner.

Jeffrey Bergner: Well, I am not sure. I agree with most of what you said. It has always seemed to me there are two kinds of arguments against using force. One is one I am going to call a pragmatic argument, is this outcome really important to the United States? Can this not be achieved any other way? Even if it is important, are the costs acceptable and not so high that we wouldn't do it even if it were important?

And finally, have we thought through the consequences of action and inaction as best we can, knowing that we will only be able to do that imperfectly? Those

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arguments, it seems to me, are very reasonable, sensible arguments that any policymaker will confront.

There's another set of arguments, so-called moral arguments, which seem to be weak and so simple as to be simpleminded. And that is, we have no moral ground to intervene anywhere outside the United States. Now from whence comes that position, I would ask? This is as much to say that it is the United States' position as found in the Declaration of Independence, the universal rights of man, that any country that happens to be taken over by some guy, whether the rest of those people in that country like it, can oppress them, abuse them, murder them, kill them. That is quite okay with us because that is what these people have - quote - "decided to do for themselves." I think it is better that we stand with the people of other countries as opposed to tyranny or despots.

And I have no particular compunction in saying that I think that not only in these twelve cases, but probably in 50 other cases around the world, we would have solid moral ground to intervene if we felt like it. But there are many practical reasons that should hold us back from feeling like it. And so I have not ever been persuaded by this so-called moral view.

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I mean, was it a particularly moral position not to aid people in Rwanda when the Hutus and the Tutsis were fighting it out, when 700,000 people were hacked to death or burned to death or otherwise tortured to death and 2 million people displaced? A very small American military presence might not have prevented all of it, but would have prevented most of it. Now we may have had good practical reasons not to do that, but morality doesn't strike me as being one of them. And I think Bill Clinton would agree with that if he were sitting here. He said a while back it was his deepest regret about his presidency is that he did nothing about that when it would have been relatively so easy to address it.

Herman Pirchner: Let's pursue the question of values a little bit more. We have heard in these debates the question of nation building. Now in countries that have had a democratic tradition in their post-communist life, they were able to translate that tradition into democracy such as Poland. But what about countries in the Middle East with no democratic tradition and arguably nowhere near a critical mass of people that were small democrats, that have believed in democracy. How do you evaluate the arguments that

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say with military force we can make democracy where there are no democrats?

Gerry Warburg: I am highly skeptical we can impose democracy by force of arms. As a strong and long-time supporter of our alliance with Israel, I haven't seen that kind of democracy flourish in other countries in the region. And indeed, that is one reason I have been critical of the current government in Israel. There are very few examples where force yields democracy.

As Steven Kinzer in his book *Overthrow* chronicles 125 times presidents have used force without military authorization. Indeed, fourteen regime change attempts since the annexation of Hawaii. I confess, I am a little sympathetic to the annexation of Hawaii where my mom lives - that worked out pretty well. There is a very vibrant democracy in Hawaii. But in most of the other cases, it has worked out very badly.

You think of Iran, 1953, you think of Guatemala and the United Fruit-backed military takeover. You think of the Bay of Pigs debacle. And you think of the disastrous long-term impact of the United States trying to impose democracy with the force of a gun. And indeed, in defense of some of our policies and both our presidents, I think in the end we shy away

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from that goal often. We say no, we are just trying to promote stability so we can get out of here and locals can decide. That is an issue where probably President Bush and President Obama shared some of the same objectives in the end in Iraq and Afghanistan - they just want to get our troops home.

And I would finally point out, trying to be bipartisan, defending President George W. Bush, he ran for president as an isolationist - domestic agenda, come home America. No nation building. He was critical of the Clinton Administration for its attempt at regime change and nation building. And it wasn't by choice that he was handed a war against terrorists who attacked our country in multiple sites. I certainly understand his feeling the need to respond in Afghanistan. I will never understand the wisdom of his decision to go into Iraq; I think was a serious mistake.

Jeffrey Bergner: I would agree. I think you would almost have to be blind not to have learned how difficult it is to build a country up in the first place that doesn't have any traditions of the kind that you are trying to inculcate. It turns out there is a very big difference between rebuilding nations as we did so successfully with the Marshall Plan after World War

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II, but we were rebuilding nations that were advanced and developed and very much like the United States before the war.

And there is a big difference, it turns out, between that and building up a nation in the first place. I think nation building is probably too forward leaning a goal to have anymore. And I think even regime change, which is a bit narrower an objective than nation building, is itself extremely difficult if what you mean by that is a regime that looks totally different than the prior regime and looks a lot more like a liberal democracy. That too is difficult. And I don't think we have, to be honest, solved that problem.

Herman Pirchner: Yes?

FS: Hi, I'm Molly (inaudible). It seems that both of you and an earlier panelist all seem to agree that the use of force abroad should be limited and that there is just disagreements about how to define the vital interests we want to defend. And so if we take that perspective, I want to ask about our civilian (inaudible) of development and diplomacy, what is the appropriate role of using those and how do we prioritize the use of those resources to maximize

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impact and prevent (inaudible) use of force abroad later on?

Jeffrey Bergner: Sure. Well, you will recall from back at the time when I was at the State Department, between 2005 and 2008, the phrase went around concerning the 3Ds -- development, diplomacy and defense. And certainly, development and diplomacy have huge roles to play. I think my only point would be is that the world is not such a perfect place that you can always accomplish what you might need to with those two alone. And that there are times when for better or worse, the third D is necessary. It would be very nice if it weren't.

I know there is a certain notion out there that if you just do enough development, you can basically accomplish what you want to without any use of force at all. Would that were true, it would be great. But it is hard for me to see that working out well in some instances. It has its limits.

Gerry Warburg: My favorite Republican Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, likes to note the fact that there are more members of U.S. military bands than there are Foreign Service officers. And I believe that the extraordinarily small amount of our gross national product that we spend on foreign assistance as

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compared to our military budget I think is way out of whack. I think we have often been more effective in promoting U.S. interests with targeted foreign aid.

And here again, I will compliment President George W. Bush. I believe the investment he made in humanitarian relief and in combating the AIDS crisis in Africa will be one of the greatest parts of his international legacy. And I would like to see the United States taking those targeted creative approaches when possible in concert with our allies, but if necessarily alone, for the same interests that the left and right share. To make us a stronger country and a safer world where we can then do the investments we need to make in our own infrastructure and our own economy. And as I said before, I sincerely believe those are the type of issues where the Bernie Sanders left and the Charles Koch right can work together and ought to find some common ground.

Herman Pirchner: We are down to the last question. Yes?

MS: Hi, my name is John (inaudible). In a world in which the nature of conflict is changing to (inaudible), greater military oversight and restrained foreign policy makes the United States government (inaudible), the United States government will fail to respond in time to - everything from, I am including (inaudible),

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everything from Isis to Colombian cartels (inaudible).

How do you respond to something like that?

Gerry Warburg: The question was, how in a fast moving world where technology and the force of events occurs so quickly, how do you involve the legislative branch in a meaningful fashion in deliberations? Really good question. I teach a class, the 21st century public policy challenges for the young people of the next generation. Managing and adapting to technology will be the number one challenge. Because how you adapt our system of democracy to a changing world where the pace of change itself is accelerating is key.

My short answer, sir, is this: it is not that hard. It is not that hard to anticipate the types of challenges we might face, to pre-brief a leadership committee of Congress, to have them available in real time to consult. And I don't mean to be informed of all of the planes that are in the air, but to consult with the President of the United States.

The current President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State and the former Secretary of Defense were all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where Dr. Bergner and I were privileged to serve as staff

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members. They know, and they gave eloquent speeches about, the importance of having Congress be accountable and involved in this process. And they reversed themselves and their positions once in the executive branch. Because where they stand is where they sit. They appreciate the unilateral authority to act that they have seized and run with.

It is incumbent upon the 538 members of Congress left and right, liberal and conservative, to get our system back into order. It is not that hard to have real time communications with a select committee of congressional leadership about an ongoing crisis. And it is certainly appropriate to give authority in advance as we do indeed for strikes against terrorists, where the Intelligence Committee is sometimes informed about covert actions. So you can set processes in place to anticipate some very foreseeable events.

Jeffrey Bergner: I have nothing to really add to that. It is hard, but it is not that hard. And a lot of the time Congress has taken umbrage because it is too hard - it isn't hard at all. ISIS - this is not a surprise. You can still authorize the use of force against ISIS if you felt like it. This has gone on for two years, going into a third. And so technology moves fast, but

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sometimes these events don't move quite so fast and there is plenty of time for Congress to do what Gerry was describing, I think.

Gerry Warburg: And just to be clear, I think you have seen some candid admissions here. I want to cite for example Jack Kingston of Georgia and Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania acknowledging on the record that members of Congress like to have it both ways. If they don't vote, they can make up their position after the fact. It turns out well, they were all for it, the president should have done it quicker. If it turns out badly, they say no, it didn't go well or run around the country saying they were against the war in the first place. You need to have stuff on the record, hold people accountable, have public roll call votes. And this is something where I truly believe the left and right can work together.

Herman Pirchner: A couple of comments before we formally thank our wonderful speakers. One, on the question of high tech and national security, American Foreign Policy Council has a wonderful program in that area run by Rich Harrison. And on the table outside the door you will find three of his recent publications on cybersecurity, on missile defense and on drones with many more to come.

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Also, those of you that looked at the program, the advertisements for this forum knew that Will Ruger [phonetic] was going to be moderating this panel, not me. Will was caught in an airport in New York when his plane didn't take off on time, so I had to sit in at the last minute, but he sends his regards. And now we have really come to the end.

Jeffrey Bergner: One last thing?

Herman Pirchner: One last thing.

Jeffrey Bergner: One last thing. I feel like I have been very critical of Congress. So I would like to conclude on a more optimistic note. You Congressional staffers have one thing certainly right - the big debate today is not the presidential one at 9:00 pm, it is the American Foreign Policy Council debate.

Herman Pirchner: Well, thank you and thanks so much to both panelists. [Applause]

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