DEFENSE DOSSIER

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FROM THE EDITORS

Welcome to the November 2015 issue of AFPC's Defense Dossier. In this installment, we discuss the changing politics and strategic challenges confronting the Eurozone.

Though the international policy community has focused its attention on other corners of the world of late, Europe remains a geopolitical arena of paramount importance—a fact hammered home by the recent terrorist attacks in Paris. Here, our contributors and experts examine the changing strategic relationship between the European Union and Russia, as well as related topics such as missile defense, energy and Trans-Atlantic ties. As always, we hope you find the pages that follow both insightful and informative.

Sincerely,
Ilan Berman
Chief Editor

Richard Harrison
Managing Editor

America and the European Gas Equation

AGNIA GRIGAS, JASON CZERWIEC

Global energy markets are changing rapidly and in ways which few, if any, energy experts predicted five or ten years ago. These changes are being spurred by a variety of catalyzing factors: the technological breakthroughs in shale development are making it possible to exploit long dormant reserves of oil and gas in the U.S. and beyond at historically low cost, while liquefied natural gas (LNG) and new technologies for gas delivery by sea are incentivizing the establishment of new gas hubs around the world. These changes may help liberate gas from its position as a geographically fixed commodity, which in turn could go a long way in resolving security supply issues in countries that are net importers of natural gas.

Many have argued that American LNG exports could diminish Europe's reliance on Russian gas.[1] Yet there is still a great deal of uncertainty as to whether or not the market conditions will be met for American LNG to make a significant impact in Europe. What is more readily apparent, however, is that Russian aggression in Ukraine and the memory of Gazprom's gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 are underpinning the EU's growing solidarity in its plans to consolidate an internal gas market through regulation and infrastructural development.

Even so, market factors in Europe and the U.S. will ultimately trump political considerations. Policymakers will need to support and facilitate (or at least not interfere with) market developments, even as they remain cognizant of the fact that Russia will attempt to hold on to its monopoly grip in Central and Eastern Europe gas markets by all of the means at its disposal.

Supply side geo-economics

Although once relegated to being a perennial gas importer from Canada, Qatar and even Russia, the U.S. has defied most expectations in recent years to become the world's largest producer of natural gas. With LNG potentially becoming the dominant mode of transporting fuel, the U.S. now has the potential to become one of the world's largest exporters of natural gas as well.

However, American gas can and will only go to Europe if the price is right. Even if it cannot effectively compete on the European market due to the transportation costs and seasonal changes in gas demand across markets, the influx of vast amounts of American LNG onto the global gas markets (particularly to Asia) will still have an indirect – and salutary – impact on the European gas sector. With Asia increasingly importing from the U.S., LNG from other sources such as Qatar and Norway (and possibly Azerbaijan and Iran in the years to come) will become more and more available for European markets, all of which could place competitive pressure on Russia's state natural gas monopoly, Gazprom.

Still, American gas companies and infrastructure have yet to clear the hurdles that prevent the United States from becoming a major net exporter of gas. The U.S. will have the opportunity, by 2040, to export over 320 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year by LNG shipment if the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) approves all 18 pending LNG export sites, and if these export projects are actually completed.[2] Building LNG export terminals is no easy feat, and the costs are significantly higher than those for oil export terminals, but their strategic importance is immense; the export capacity of these 18 sites is equivalent to more than twice Gazprom's exports to the EU. In 2013 and 2014, respectively, the EU imported about 161 bcm and 147 bcm of gas from Gazprom.[3] Compare this to the 95.36 bcm export capacity of the five FERC preapproved terminals

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that should be operational by the year 2020,[4] and even short-term U.S. export potential becomes apparent.

However, much of these projected exports are already tied up in long-term supply contracts with Asian buyers. In fact, no LNG exports of U.S.-produced natural gas are taking place today from the lower 48 states, while Alaska only exports minor quantities of LNG to Japan.[5]

Thus, if the U.S. is to realize its potential as a major net exporter of LNG, and thereby have an impact on global and European gas markets, two internal developments will need to take place. One is entirely within the policy purview of the U.S. government. The other will require both investment in energy infrastructure, something which so far has had mixed results.

Building boom

The first step the U.S. must take to become a major exporter of gas is expediting the approval process for LNG export sites. Getting approval for the construction and operation of such a facility is a lengthy and bureaucratic process that involves an array of uncoordinated state and federal agencies, and which can sometimes take upwards of 12 years.[6] On the state level, in places like Louisiana and Texas, the local economic benefits of LNG export should convince legislators to streamline the approval process. This also means, however, that FERC will have to speed up its evaluation of proposed LNG terminal sites, which are mostly grouped along the Western coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. These sites form the largest gas hub in the United States, which – by virtue of their size – pool the most affordable gas resources in the world. Such regulatory steps are critical to the viability of mass exports of LNG, and segue into the second necessary step: investment in U.S. gas transportation infrastructure.

Improved infrastructure would lower the cost of producing gas in the U.S., making it more competitive in the European and other distant markets.

Doubling down

America is on the cusp of an energy renaissance thanks in large part to shale gas, of which it is the world's leading producer by a large margin. Yet the infrastructure



Figure 1: US Leadership in Global Shale Production 2014
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration – 6/08/2015



Figure 2: European gas imports
Source: IEA 2014 Natural Gas Information
Sourced from: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas

for transporting natural gas from the two new large shale fields in the U.S. – the Bakken in North Dakota and the Marcellus in Pennsylvania – is still severely deficient. Pipelines remain the only safe and efficient modes of land transportation for natural gas. Rail and truck transportation remains a major bottleneck for the gas industry because they raise safety concerns[7] along with costs. Improved pipeline infrastructure between these fields and export terminals would eliminate waste in the production process, which is costing shale fields like Bakken hundreds of millions of dollars annually in marketable gas.[8] The most conspicuous of these is flaring (the burning off of unusable or not readily transportable gas); in the third quarter of 2014 alone, 30.3 bcm of gas was flared off in the Bakken region – slightly more than what Gazprom sells to Germany in a year.[9]

Second and more important, improved infrastructure would lower the cost of producing gas in the U.S., making it more competitive in the European and other distant markets. The process of liquefying and transporting natural gas in the form of LNG is still relatively expensive, but U.S. hubs like Louisiana's Henry Hub trade gas for the lowest price in the world. The lower the cost of gas at these hubs, the more appealing LNG exports to markets with higher trading prices become for American gas companies.

Europe's needs

On the demand side, the EU's collective political will is growing to reduce its energy dependence on Russia and finally reverse a decades-long Russian practice of projecting political power through its gas exports to Europe. This use of energy as a political weapon has been most pronounced in the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, where Gazprom has enjoyed a near monopoly. By contrast, as the graph above illustrates, the gas imports of Germany, Italy, and France are much more diversified, and those countries do not feel deeply threatened by Russia's share in Europe's natural gas supply. Russia has traditionally exploited the different levels of energy vulnerability of EU states as part of a larger strategy to disrupt European energy cooperation and integration.

The EU is currently reliant on Russia for around 30 percent of its gas imports for domestic consumption. In the crucial winter months, about half of Russian gas exports to Europe (versus 16 percent in the summer), arrive by pipeline via Ukraine[10] – a factor that both makes Europe insecure as an energy importer and Russia too dependent on a single export route. This vulnerability has resurfaced as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine, but was already evident in Gazprom's gas cutoffs to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, during which half a dozen EU member states were also cut off from gas supplies as a result. Meanwhile, Russia has been trying hard to hold on to its European markets, but on its own terms. Russia has made clear that it seeks to eliminate Ukraine from its role as a major transit country for gas into Europe. Gazprom has said it will not renew transit agreements after 2019[11] and has invested heavily in projects like Nord Stream and the now-delayed Turk Stream (to replace the cancelled South Stream) that would serve to forge new routes for Russian gas into Northern and Southern Europe. The failure of Russia's South Stream pipeline project demonstrated Brussels' resolve to limit Gazprom's influence in the EU's internal energy market.

Russia has traditionally exploited the different levels of energy vulnerability of EU states as part of a larger strategy to disrupt European energy cooperation and integration.

Three things sealed the project's fate and allowed the EU to brush aside the interests of a few peripheral states in favor of the larger group: 1) solidarity in the EU response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, 2) the EU's mandate to diversify energy supply from distribution networks outlined in the third energy package, and 3) the inflexibility of the Kremlin once Russian gas began to lose its privileged place in the EU market. Now, the EU is seeking to foster more competition via the "unbundling" of European energy assets, the anti-trust case against Gazprom, support for LNG terminals, and through projects like the Southern Gas Corridor (designed to bring Caspian gas from Azerbaijan).

This new drive for diversification is increasingly apparent. Currently there are 27 operating LNG import terminals in Europe, but they are mostly located in Western and Southern Europe rather than the more vulnerable states in Central and Eastern Europe. There are eight new import LNG terminals under construction, and 27 new facilities planned across Europe. Lithuania completed its "floating" LNG terminal in 2014, while projects in Croatia, Poland, Finland, and others are also in the works. Lithuania in particular is eager to import American LNG and already is in talks with American company Chenier Energy to import LNG.[12] But this is just the barest tip of the iceberg in terms of potential U.S. exports to Europe.

Nonetheless, the import infrastructure necessary to realize these efforts requires a significant investment. Building an LNG terminal can cost upwards of a billion dollars and take years to complete – though the smaller "floating" terminal projects are quicker and cheaper to bring online. Commercial considerations and markets will largely drive this process. Likewise, to spread the benefits of LNG imports beyond countries that have terminals, Europe will need to invest in its own gas pipeline infrastructure and storage facilities. The creation of a single interconnected European energy market has been one of the EU's top priorities. The total cost of linking the energy markets of all EU states by 2020 is projected to be upwards of 200 billion Euros.[13]

Looking ahead

If the EU realizes its plans for an internal energy market, and one that is more diversified from Russian gas, it could become more insulated from Russian energy politics. Meanwhile, the demand for LNG generated by new gas hubs could add another layer to U.S.-EU security cooperation. If the aforementioned steps are taken, and the requisite conditions are met, the American export market and the EU's internal energy market could become very different places over the next 30 years. In the U.S., the supply of gas is exploding, with export capabilities lagging behind. In Europe, political will is coalescing into a coherent plan for achieving energy security and diversification. Given these changes in the global gas landscape, there is a real opportunity for both the U.S. and the EU to establish a robust LNG trade partnership by the end of the next decade. ■

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The European Union's Refugee Crisis

SIMOND DE GALBERT

On June 26, 2015, after several hours of tough discussions, the European Council, the EU's Heads of State and Governments forum, settled on parameters for a plan to cope with the dramatic increase of migrants now crossing the continent's borders. In comments to the press following the meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called the ongoing migration crisis "one of the biggest challenges" Europe has faced during her ten years in office. Subsequently, in September, EU ministers voted to relocate 120,000 additional refugees EU-wide, despite the opposition of some member states like Hungary or Slovakia.

The ongoing migration crisis involves the arrival of increasing numbers of migrants from Europe's Southern and Eastern Neighborhoods to EU territory, primarily in Italy, Greece and Hungary. According to Frontex, the EU agency in charge of managing cooperation at the external borders of the member states, 1.2 million migrants crossed into Europe illegally so far this year— four times the 282,000 recorded in all last year. But that figure only represents the number of illegal entries detected by authorities; the actual number is likely much higher. Most of these migrants now arrive in Europe by the Turkey-Greece sea route, with 540,000 having arrived this year through the Greek islands, before moving on the Western Balkans, where about 500,000 illegal border crossings were detected.

The humanitarian and political challenges involved in hosting refugees are also now compounded by security concerns. Some of the terrorists involved in the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, France appear to have reentered EU territory from Syria using refugee routes from Turkey to Greece, while insufficient border controls prevented French intelligence agencies from noting their return.[1]

Navigating the crisis

The growing number of refugees arriving in Europe is related to several dire political and humanitarian situations affecting countries in Europe's neighborhood, including the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and severe government oppression in countries like Eritrea. Additionally, for some time, a large number of migrants have concentrated on Libya's shores, waiting for smuggler networks to help them cross the Mediterranean in what are often terrible and unsafe conditions. Now that that passage has become increasingly complicated (including because of a lack of boats for Libyan smugglers), many migrants are heading toward Greece, and from there toward the Western Balkans – a safer land route to get into Europe.

Unfortunately, many of the ongoing conflicts in Europe's neighborhood do not appear to be on the verge of resolution, so this migration trend is not likely to stop anytime soon. That leaves the EU in dire need of solutions to the crisis. But doing so requires navigating three major constraints.

Authorities. Migration is a domain where the transfer of powers from member states to the EU remains patchy and, therefore, tricky to regulate. On the one hand, while EU member states have agreed on a set of rules and standards for the international protection of third-country nationals, the decisions to actually apply these measures remain solely within the jurisdiction of each nation. On the other hand, the monitoring of the EU's external borders is a collective duty—while decisions by member states to allow a migrant to access their territory are individual choices. Yet those same choices enable the refugee in question to circulate freely within other member states as well, thanks to the internal reciprocity arrangements codified by EU members in the Schengen agreements.

Humanitarian concerns. Because it mostly deals with human beings in situations of extreme vulnerability, the migration crisis is an emotional issue, making pragmatic decisions difficult. According to the International Organization

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for Migration (IOM), 3,515 migrants, most of them trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea either between Libya and Italy or between Turkey and Greece, died in the first half of 2015.

These events are clearly tragic and unacceptable. Yet the migration issue also invokes mixed feelings among Europeans who may sympathize with the drama taking place at their borders while simultaneously being wary of the consequences of the uncontrolled arrival of an increasing number of migrants. Populist political forces (such as the National Front in France or the United Kingdom's Independence Party) are keen to exploit such fears to delegitimize migration as a whole.

Unfortunately, many of the ongoing conflicts in Europe's neighborhood do not appear to be on the verge of resolution, so this migration trend is not likely to stop anytime soon.

European interests. While it is in Europe's interest (and aligned with its values) to host refugees, the continent as a whole is also concerned with attracting migrants who fit economic and demographic needs. European interests are far removed from the emotional idea that Europe is or should become a "fortress." Instead, they lie in more rational and transactional migration policies. Such policies should ensure that Europe can take better care of those in real need of protection, host those that Europe needs economically, and return irregular migrants safely and more effectively back to their countries of origin.

Moving toward action

It is within these constraints that the EU must define a long-term strategy to tackle the challenge of migration, on at least two fronts.

First, European member states need a standardized protocol for rescuing, relocating and returning migrants already in Europe. While the EU has been doing more in recent times to save migrant lives, Europeans must continue rescuing those at sea and in danger of dying. Skeptics argue that doing too much on this front could serve as an incentive for migrants to take the risk of crossing the Mediterranean, but tragic events (such as the shipwreck off Italy's Lampedusa on April 19th that left almost 800 dead) and basic humanitarian considerations dictate that the EU has no other choice but to continue rescue operations.

Likewise, more solidarity is necessary among European states to cope with the increasing number of migrants arriving primarily in Italy, Greece and now Hungary. Political decisions taken in June and September 2015 to relocate refugees across Europe are positive steps that now need to be swiftly implemented. Europeans as a whole have already displayed a significant level of solidarity with member states by adopting biting sanctions against Russia. It is therefore only logical that southern member states, now grappling with the refugee crisis, benefit from such solidarity as well. Absent such assistance, vulnerable states could backslide into isolationism; thus, countries such as Poland are now questioning the prudence of refugee absorption, relying on the Paris attacks as justification for concluding that hosting refugees may not be safe.

The logical counterpart for greater solidarity, however, is more responsibility. Europeans need to more effectively and efficiently identify and register migrants upon their arrival in order to differentiate between legitimate asylum seekers and irregular migrants. In the words of the EU Heads of State, "effective return, readmission, and reintegration policies for those not qualifying for protection are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people from risking their lives." Additionally, an insufficient number of irregular migrants actually return to their country of origin. Return and readmission obviously require cooperation from both the countries of origin and transit, but more EU resources must be allocated to identification, registration and—where appropriate—return procedures.

Additional resources for border control are now also becoming a political requirement in the wake of the Paris attacks.

Additional resources for border control are now also becoming a political requirement in the wake of the Paris attacks. At France's request, EU Interior Affairs ministers decided on November 20th that the Schengen Border Code would be modified in order to allow systematic control at Schengen external borders under the supervision of the EU agency Frontex. This measure is logical, both as a way to reinforce the Schengen system, and to avoid the possibility that refugee absorption and relocation processes fall victim to fears of terrorist penetration.

Second, the EU must ramp up its cooperation with countries of origin and transit, those from where these migrants emanate and which they cross. There is no illusion among Europeans that doing a better job in coping with the arrival of more migrants in Europe will address the root causes of migration. Cooperating with those countries, therefore, is critical—whether to reduce incentives for irregular migrants to leave or to create more effective return policies. The Valetta Summit of November 11th and 12th between EU and African countries enabled early steps to be taken in this regard; for example, the European Commission put in place a $2 billion fund of aid and development assistance to African countries.[2] Yet much more remains to be done.

A more holistic approach that identifies common interests among member states and weakens the capacity of the smuggler networks themselves is necessary.

Finally, interdiction is key. Back in May, the EU foreign affairs and defense ministers announced Operation Naval Force in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) with the goal of seeking to disrupt the "business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean." EUNAVFOR MED will identify, capture, and dispose of vessels and assets used by smugglers to bring migrants to Europe's southern shores. But naval interdiction is not enough; focusing on sea routes (such as those from Libya) alone will only push migrants to attempt other means of entering Europe. Therefore, a more holistic approach that identifies common interests among member states and weakens the capacity of the smuggler networks themselves is necessary.

Divisions on the continent

The countries of Europe now find themselves facing tough questions regarding the level of integration they are willing to contemplate as they navigate this crisis. While some are asking for a restrictive reform of the Schengen agreements, something that EU public opinions seem to support, others believe that more integration will be required in the long run. The Paris attacks have make it politically unsustainable not to reform the way the Schengen system is built and currently operates.

An integrated immigration policy would likely be a more efficient means of dealing with the unprecedented challenge that migration now poses to European cohesion. Such a response, however, is unlikely to materialize in the near future due to lack of public support, leaving individual European nations to fend for themselves—with grave consequences for the continent as a whole. Clearly, tough choices lie ahead. ■

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East European Missile Defense Is Needed Now More Than Ever

James S. Robbins

At the July 2015 press conference in Vienna announcing the nuclear deal with Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "we all probably remember that in April 2009 in Prague President Obama said that if the Iran nuclear program issue is sorted out, then the task of creating the European segment of the missile defense system will disappear."[1] Minister Lavrov has a good memory; at the time, Mr. Obama said that "Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat," that requires a missile defense system. However, he continued, "if the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed."[2]

Lavrov was calling Obama's bluff. The United States has consistently maintained that an Eastern European-based missile defense system was a response to Iran's missile program, not to a potential Russian threat. However, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Acton (JCPOA) with Iran does not eliminate the Iranian missile threat. And changes in Russia's strategic posture since 2009 have shown that from the perspective of countries in Eastern Europe, deploying a robust American missile defense system makes more sense than ever.

The missile defense system has been a long time coming. The Bush administration had planned a major complex near Redzikowo, Poland, known as the European Interceptor Site (EIS), supported by a radar tracking system in Brdy, Czech Republic. However, in September 2009 the Obama administration abandoned the EIS program on the grounds that intelligence reports indicated that Iran had scaled back its long-range missile program in favor of short- and medium-range missiles.

The new plan formulated by the White House was called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which would feature "existing SM-3 interceptors as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense on Aegis-equipped ships in the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere by 2011, and on land in Central Europe" by 2015.[3] A third phase would deploy the system to Poland by 2018, and the phase 4 deployment of missiles capable of intercepting ICBM's would take place by 2020. "Aegis Ashore" was also scheduled to be deployed at the Deveselu air base in southwestern Romania.

But even this scaled-back plan did not satisfy Moscow, which had been a persistent critic of any American missile defenses in Europe. The Obama administration was sensitive to Russian criticism, and had never shown a strong commitment to missile defense anyway; it is noteworthy that the phase 3 deployment to Poland was scheduled to take place after a projected Obama second term was complete. The "reset" with the Kremlin was a higher priority, and the White House did not want the missile defense issue to interfere with the START nuclear arms talks, or to discourage Russia from supporting planned nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Missile defense was the topic of the notorious March 16, 2012 open microphone gaffe between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, in which Obama said that "this can be solved but it's important for him to give me space… After my election I have more flexibility."[4] A year later, the White House killed phase 4 of the EPAA, which was widely seen as a manifestation of that promised flexibility. However, while Mr. Obama's commitment to missile defense withered, the missile threat increased and the strategic setting has grown more challenging.

Iran

With respect to Iran, Foreign Minister Lavrov's statement that the JCPOA should make the EPAA "disappear" is incorrect. The JCPOA does not forbid Iran from developing and deploying missiles, but rather "calls on" Iran

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not to test "missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads."[5] Non-nuclear missiles of any range are not covered by the agreement. Secretary of State John Kerry noted in a letter to Senator Marco Rubio that "it would not be a violation of the JCPOA if Iran tested a conventional ballistic missile."[6] And since Iran's missiles are designed to be dual-use weapons, they could be made into nuclear weapons after the restrictions of the JCPOA are removed, or if Tehran pursues an illicit nuclear breakout. Plus even under the strictest reading of the JCPOA, suspected violations by Iran would only trigger a review process, not an automatic penalty. Any sanctions "snapback" would have to be approved by Russia and China.

There is no reason to believe that Tehran would abide by any limits on its missile program with or without the JCPOA.

Furthermore there is no reason to believe that Tehran would abide by any limits on its missile program with or without the JCPOA. Iran had already been placed under a United Nations sanctions regime for its missile program, under UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1803 and 1929, among others. In August 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that "a violation of the U.N. resolution [against Iran's missile program] does not mean violation of the JCPOA,"[7] a point on which he and Mr. Kerry seem to be in agreement. Rouhani added that the Islamic Republic is "not committed to the restrictions on its missile program," and noted that Iran's missile force had expanded on his watch.

A noteworthy addition to Iran's arsenal was unveiled in March 2015, when Iranian defense minister Hussein Deghan announced that production had begun on the Soumar long-range land attack cruise missile.[8] The weapon is based on the Russian Kh-55 missile, and has a range of 1,250 miles, or slightly further than the distance from Tabriz to Bucharest. The weapon is believed not to be able to carry a nuclear payload, but nevertheless represents a major step forward in Iran's domestic missile production capability. In October 2015, Iran test fired the new Emad (Pillar) long-range, precision-guided missile, which, according to Defense Minister Dehghan, is "the country's first long-range missile that can be precision-guided until it reaches its target."[9] And despite the rationale that led President Obama to abandon the EIS missile defense plan in 2009, there is no evidence that Iran has abandoned the idea of developing even longer range missiles, including ICBMs. Thus the Iranian missile threat will continue to grow regardless of the JCPOA, which does not meet the requirement laid down by President Obama in April 2009 that the Iranian threat be "eliminated." Missile defense remains a strategic investment against an uncertain but certainly more dangerous future with Iran.

Russia and Eastern Europe

If anything, the case for missile defense outside of the Iran context is even stronger. Though the United States has tried to keep Russia out of the equation for diplomatic reasons, the shifting strategic environment has made that obfuscation increasingly untenable. Russia's uncontested annexation of Crimea, support for separatist insurgents in Ukraine, and persistent Kremlin rhetoric about protecting Russian minorities in neighboring countries, have created a general sense of instability in the region.

To countries in Eastern Europe, wary of the American force drawdown on the continent, the missile defense installations have been a means of securing a long-term American presence and strategic commitment. Participation in the program was not just defense, but also deterrence against Russian adventurism. Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu confirmed as much in August 2015, when he said that the project is "defensive, as it is designed to defend national and European soil"[10] but also that the "long-term presence of the US in Romania will guarantee that Romania will not be transferred into a different zone of influence." Even President Obama alluded to this linkage in a September 2014 speech in Tallinn, Estonia, when he said that in order for NATO to deter Russia the alliance needed to invest in "capabilities like intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance and missile defense."[11]

Russia's strategic missile modernization program underscores the general need for robust missile defense capabilities, but there are more specific threats. In 2013, Russia reportedly deployed *Iskander*-M tactical ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad Oblast between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea.[12] Around the same time, the Obama administration canceled phase 4 of the EPAA, and Poland announced that it intended to pursue its own missile defense program within NATO, fielding ten Patriot batteries by 2025.

To countries in Eastern Europe, wary of the American force drawdown on the continent, the missile defense installations have been a means of securing a long-term American presence and strategic commitment.

Russia has lately demonstrated both new missile capabilities and the willingness to use them. In October 2015, Moscow made first operational use of the SSN-30-A "Kalibr" supersonic sea-based cruise missile, launched from ships in the southern Caspian Sea against insurgent targets in Syria.[13] The new missile has an estimated range of 620 to 923 miles, and can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. A land-based version of the "Kalibr" would violate the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, which Russian officials have criticized as a Cold War relic. But the INF Treaty does not restrict sea-based weapons, and an SSN-30-A launched from the northwestern Black Sea could reach the German border.

Russia has also not reduced its fervent opposition to missile defense in Europe, sometimes taking it to undiplomatic heights. Earlier this year, after Denmark had announced that it would equip one or more of its frigates with radars that would support the general NATO missile defense umbrella, Moscow warned Copenhagen that Danish warships could become targets for Russian nuclear attack.[14] Denmark's Foreign minister, Martin Lidegaard, called this statement "unacceptable."[15]

Needed: a resolute response

Developments in Iran and Russia point to steps the United States should take to ensure that missile defense systems are adequate to meet the emerging challenges. The U.S. and its allies must not demonstrate weakness in the face of adversaries who show increased willingness to use hard power in smart ways. The U.S. needs to engage in confidence building measures with Eastern European and especially NATO allies, explicitly to reaffirm its commitment to missile defense to reassure allied countries that American resolve is strong.

In addition, the Defense Department should conduct a strategic review of the evolving missile threat in Europe and the Middle East, and assess whether the EPAA as originally conceived in 2009 is adequate to the defensive tasks of the coming decades. Much has changed in the last six years, and the strategic premises underlying the EPAA no longer apply. This could be part of a comprehensive missile defense review, aimed at identifying gaps in the system as currently projected and proposing ways to close them.

Given the uncertainties in the world, both regarding the objectives and intentions of expansionist states, and the willingness and ability of the United States to confront and contain them, this is no time for lack of clarity or diminished commitment. The U.S. must reassure its vulnerable East European allies that it is not preparing to wash its hands of its responsibilities to ensure their security. Backing down on missile defense would signal more than a lack of confidence in a specific strategic program. It would show a serious uncertainty in the belief in the American mission. ■

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NATO's Current Challenge... and Its Next Ones

Ilan Berman

It is not an exaggeration to say that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now stands at a crossroads. Since February of 2014, the Alliance has been confronted with what is arguably its greatest strategic challenge since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the form of Russia's ongoing aggression in Ukraine.

TThe implication of Russia's empowerment and backing of separatist rebels in Ukraine's eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions – and the massive campaign of political and economic subversion that Moscow has concomitantly launched against Kyiv – extend far beyond the common border between the two countries. They represent nothing less than an ongoing attempt by the Kremlin to rewrite the post-World War II settlement in Europe. Russia's blatant disregard of Ukraine's territorial integrity, and its plans for an expanded sphere of influence encompassing other parts of the "post-Soviet space" (defined by Russian President Vladimir Putin as "Novorossiya," or "new Russia") are a major challenge to the existing geopolitical status quo in Europe – a balance that, until recently, was believed to be permanent.

In response, the Alliance has begun to adapt. At its September 2014 summit in Wales, England, it formally launched its "Readiness Action Plan" – a series of measures intended to convey a resolute response to Russian aggression. This has included, among other things, stepped up overflight and policing of Baltic airspace; increased maritime patrols in the Black Sea, and a series of high-profile military exercises with Eastern European nations.[1] At the same time, the bloc has increased the pace and scope of its military exercises in the Black Sea region and throughout Eastern Europe. It has also begun bolstering its military presence in Europe's east through the creation of six new military bases and the deployment of a "spearhead" force of several thousand soldiers to respond to future instances of Russian aggression.[2] Most recently, in a concrete show of force, it launched Operation Trident Juncture, a massive two-part exercise that represents the Alliance's largest military maneuvers in over a decade. The message was unmistakable: NATO "can adapt" to meet the Russian threat.[3]

Unfunded mandate

Nevertheless, a significant gap between rhetoric and reality remains. Whatever the political pronouncements now emanating from Brussels, the hard truth is that Alliance forces remain under-resourced, overextended and fiscally stretched.

Just how much is readily apparent. At the Wales Summit, Alliance members pledged anew to "move toward" the long-standing goal of spending two percent of GDP on defense over the next ten years. But this objective is still largely aspirational. As of this summer, just five of the Alliance's 28 member states meet or exceed this standard: the United States, Great Britain, Poland, Estonia and Greece.[4] And while others, like Lithuania and Slovakia, have begun to move in this direction as well, the idea of a fully-capitalized defense bloc is still a long way from being a reality. Indeed, in real terms, NATO is today spending less on defense ($892 billion) than in either 2014 or 2013 ($942 billion and $968 billion, respectively), despite the renewed challenge now posed by Moscow in the east.[5]

This underfunding is hardly a new phenomenon. In the summer of 2011, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates memorably took the Alliance to task over its chronic failure to commit adequate funds for the common defense, warning that "(if) current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost."[6] The rhetorical broadside was well-placed: European nations for decades have relied on the United States to shoulder the burden of NATO, and used America's continued largesse as an excuse to neglect making serious, sustained investments of their own.

Under the previous conditions that prevailed on the Con-

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tinent – in which the Alliance concerned itself largely with expanding the so-called "zone of stability" in Europe in the post-Cold War era – such a preference for butter over guns could perhaps have been excused. In the face of current threats, however, it cannot be. Quite simply, without far greater financial backing, the objectives of NATO's current strategy are unattainable. Absent significant infusions of capital from its constituent parts, the means by which the Alliance has chosen to deter Russia and reassure the bloc's vulnerable Eastern European members will remain something resembling an unfunded mandate.

Whatever the political pronouncements now emanating from Brussels, the hard truth is that Alliance forces remain under-resourced, overextended and fiscally stretched.

It is a reality that planners in Brussels understand very well. So, too, do their counterparts in Moscow – which is why Russia can be expected to calibrate its strategy in Ukraine (as well as elsewhere in the "post-Soviet space") in direct proportion to the robustness of NATO's response. The Kremlin's moves to date suggest that it has little fear of fully funded Alliance defense anytime in the foreseeable future.

But resources are not NATO's only problem. Alliance cohesion represents a real hurdle as well.

Closing ranks

Alliances, the old saying goes, move along at the pace of their most grudging members. The logical corollary of this axiom is that international partnerships by nature adapt and change over time, as allies go their separate ways and national priorities among members shift. Indeed, throughout history, adaptive alliances – such as the Triple Entente of World War I, the Allied Pact of World War II, and the "coalitions of the willing" that emerged during the 2000s in response to al-Qaeda – have been the norm. Static organizations, those with outdated missions and unhelpful members, tend to become obsolete, or fall apart altogether.

NATO today suffers from this problem in spades. While the Alliance has elaborate mechanisms for inducting new members (chief among them the Partnership for Peace program that dominated its relations with Eastern European nations during the decade of the 1990s), it lacks the converse. Nowhere in the North Atlantic Charter can be found provisions to penalize members deemed out of step with the priorities and direction of the bloc as a whole. Yet such mechanisms are desperately needed, because the traditional roles and interests that bound Alliance partners together during the Cold War have changed considerably – and, in some cases, have evaporated altogether. Take the European Union. While NATO to date has marshaled a coherent – if underfunded – military response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, that of the EU, to which many of the bloc's constituent members belong, has been far less so. As the Heritage Foundation's Ted Bromund notes elsewhere in this issue, European attitudes toward Russia have been shaped by a "species of neutralism" that has complicated serious, sustained European economic and political pressure against Moscow. Some countries, such as France, have been all too eager to countenance a lessening of sanctions against Russia without any material change of attitude on Moscow's part.[7] Others, like Greece, have gone further still, advocating on Russia's behalf in European forums and tightening their political ties to the Kremlin.[8] These attitudes, moreover, have prevailed even though the success of NATO's military strategy against Russia depends in large part on the ancillary pressure that its constituent parts can bring to bear, and on the steadfastness of their resolve in doing so.

Still more striking is the case of Turkey. During the Soviet era, the country served as NATO's sole Middle Eastern partner, and as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. But recent years have seen Turkey take on a far more problematic role, flirting with the acquisition of Chinese missile defenses (and thereby potentially compromising NATO's emerging missile shield)[9], helping to undermine Western pressure on Iran,[10] and becoming a key conduit for foreign fighters from Europe and North Africa traveling to join the *jihad* in Syria.[11] All of which has led many to question the traditional view of Ankara as a continuing strategic asset for the Alliance – and even to reclassify its role from that of ally to one of "frenemy."[12]

Such fissures have profound implications. Simply put, a house divided cannot stand, and an Alliance riven by political divergence dooms itself to strategic obsolescence. Squaring this circle requires that the bloc formulate internal mechanisms to help maintain discipline and unity of purpose among its constituent parts on a range of issues. Without them, NATO's

Static organizations, those with outdated missions and unhelpful members, tend to become obsolete, or fall apart altogether.

effectiveness inevitably will fall victim to its internal contradictions.

Adapt, or perish

These twin priorities – adequate funding and Alliance solidarity – are paramount to NATO's continued viability, for at least two reasons.

First, the Alliance now faces what is arguably the most challenging strategic environment of its 66-year history. For, although responding to Russia's aggression in Ukraine (and potentially elsewhere in Eastern Europe) remains the bloc's most immediate priority, it will likewise be compelled to play a role in resolving the other crises now engulfing the Eurozone. These include:

- the refugee crisis created by the West's ongoing passivity in Syria, which has security – as well as economic and social – implications for nearly all NATO member states;
- potential coalition involvement in the Syrian civil war, which has now expanded with the entry of Russia into the hostilities;
- multiple zones of Islamist insurgency in theaters like North and Central Africa, where a number of Alliance members maintain vital strategic interests.

Only an Alliance with the resources and internal cohesion to act decisively on these fronts, and others, can truly be, in the words of Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, a guardian of the international order "ready to act to uphold international rules and the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace."[13]

Second, these imperatives are all the more urgent because the Alliance could be poised to get bigger. Six years after the last round of NATO expansion, its officials are once again mulling the possibility of adding new members (most prominently Montenegro).[14] Needless to say, such an expansion – if and when it does occur – will only serve to exacerbate the Alliance's inherent cleavages, unless bolstered by new funding commitments and a redoubled emphasis to political unity.

Over the past year, Russia's aggression in Ukraine has provided NATO with new momentum, and a reinvigorated raison d'etre. But the Alliance's success in deterring Moscow is still far from assured. So, too, is the bloc's ability to act in response to future crises. Time – as well as money and political priorities – will determine whether it can. ■

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U.S. Strategy in Europe: Advice to Policymakers

Ted R. Bromund

The fundamental problem confronting American strategy in Europe is that the United States has forgotten that it needs to have its own strategy in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, and with the important exception of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the U.S. has regarded Europe as an area where power politics no longer operate, and thus as an area that is reliably stable, peaceful, and prosperous. As a result, it has ignored the broader implications of Europe's worsening security environment, and outsourced the effort to care for the future of the European continent to the European Union. Both of these approaches are wrong.

Reshuffled deck

U.S. strategy in Europe took a new departure after 1945, when it became clear that Western Europe was not able to stand on its own—militarily, economically, or politically—against the external threat of the Soviet Union, that Western Europe risked sliding into neutralism or communism, and that the U.S., therefore, needed what it had since 1776 avoided: a strategy that brought it firmly into the political heart of Europe in order to prevent disorder or tyranny in Europe from again posing a threat to it.

The U.S. became a European power, in other words, for security reasons—though the means it used to address the security challenge were as much economic and political as they were military. Much has changed since 1945, but the underlying issue for the U.S. in Europe has not: the U.S. cares about Europe because, given Europe's power potential and its location on the Atlantic, the U.S. cannot enjoy a secure and prosperous peace if Europe is not itself sovereign, peaceful, and free.

The first necessity for the U.S. today, then, is to assess the threats to European peace. Within Europe, and again with the possible exception of the Balkans and the obvious one of Ukraine, the risk of conventional war remains extremely low. But the mention of Ukraine points out that what has changed since the early 1990s is Europe's neighborhood. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, it was possible to be optimistic about most if not all of Europe's neighbors. Russia was supposedly on a bumpy road to democracy; Turkey was in theory on a similar road to EU membership; there was a functioning Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and while Egypt and North Africa were mired in authoritarian rule (or, in the case of Algeria, civil war), this had no substantial effect on Europe.

Today, the situation is different. Russia is a revanchist, autocratic power that has threatened all of its neighbors, invaded Georgia and Ukraine, and intervened, directly or indirectly, in conflicts from Moldova to Syria to Armenia. In Turkey, democracy—and Ataturk's secular state—teeters on the brink of collapse. The refugees now reaching Europe from Syria are merely the latest sign of the catastrophe that has overtaken the Levant. The best that can be said of Israel and the Palestinians is that they are not openly at war. Egypt is entering a new autocratic deep freeze, Libya is in chaos, and Tunisia is under Islamist assault. The only bright spot is Morocco, and that is not sufficient compensation for the other failings.

What is remarkable is that the fundamental change in this vast crescent—from Russia in the north to Morocco in the west—has gone almost unremarked. U.S. and European policymakers have certainly reacted to individual crises, but they have not commented on the transformation, for the worse, of the entire European periphery. Yet that transformation is the basic fact confronting the U.S. in Europe: namely, the assumption that Europe is reliably stable and peaceful is no longer true. Europe as a whole now faces problems similar to those that confronted Western Europe in 1945. The difference is that in 1945, the threat was an assault from the periphery by the Soviet Union alone or, more likely, the rise of political neutralism within Western Europe. Today, the threat is a wider one—of assault from Russia and instability and Islamism from the rest—that comes from the entire European periphery. The risk of European neutralism, unfortunately, remains.

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The U.S. has ignored both the change in the European periphery and its implications. It has spent the past two decades steadily reducing the size of its forces in Europe, on the grounds that, with the Cold War over, the risk of invasion by the Soviet Union had also disappeared. While some force reductions were warranted, the U.S. moved too far, too fast.[1] Three reasons should have given the U.S. pause in this regard.

That transformation is the basic fact confronting the U.S. in Europe: namely, the assumption that Europe is reliably stable and peaceful is no longer true.

First, while the Soviet Union has disappeared, the dangers posed by the European neighborhood have not. The belief that they had been permanently banished was always an illusion. Moreover, U.S. forces in Europe were never there strictly for their military utility. They were there to remind Americans and Europeans alike that European security mattered to the United States, a fact that remained true even after the Soviet Union collapsed. Finally, the U.S. has always seen Europe, in part, as a road to and from other places. At the start of the Cold War, the U.S. saw the need to block the European road against advancing Soviet power. But Europe was also a road that the U.S. could and did use to go beyond Europe; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, like Reagan's bombing of Libya in 1986, were fought primarily from U.S. bases in Europe.

So the first piece of advice for U.S. policymakers in Europe is simple: remember that the core U.S. mission in Europe is and always will be about security, because that is why the U.S. became a European power in the first place. For the U.S., the security of Europe matters because Europe is too close and too important to ignore. The temptation for the U.S. is to believe that security threats in Europe have disappeared, or to argue that declining European defense spending relieves the U.S. of its obligation to care about Europe.

It is true that Europe's defense spending is a continental embarrassment, and that it is unlikely—even in the face of Europe's worsening security environment—to increase significantly, except in nations such as Poland that border directly with Russia.[2] But providing security for Europe is not a favor the U.S. does for Europe; it is a favor the U.S. does for itself, because it is a contribution to American security. It is also true that the U.S. cannot undertake this mission absent European support, but that support is as much political as it is military, just as the precise composition of U.S. forces in Europe is less significant than conveying the impression that they are ample, readily reinforced, and represent an enduring and credible American political commitment.

Declining salience

The second problem for U.S. policymakers relates to the nature of that political commitment. During the Cold War, the U.S. commitment was two-track: it worked both through NATO and bilaterally with important European allies, in particular the United Kingdom. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has assumed a larger place in U.S. policy, while NATO has embarked on a seemingly endless quest for relevance. As the EU has grown, as national defense spending in Europe has withered, and as Europe has diminished in geopolitical significance with the growth of Asia, bilateralism has also diminished: simply put, the capitals of Europe are less important than they used to be. President Obama's administration is the first since 1945 that does not clearly believe Europe is the single most important part of the world as far as the United States is concerned, but it will not be the last.

One reason for this is that while the risks to European security are rising, they are still less immediate than the challenges of the Middle East and the Pacific. But the fundamental reason for the U.S. turn away from Europe is that the European share of the world economy has shrunk, and will continue to shrink. Particularly as foreign policy is made in light of educated guesses about the future, it is not sensible to expect the U.S. to continue to care as much as it used to about a region of the world that is in relative economic and political decline.

The remedy for this decline, according to conventional American and European thinking, is the EU. Supposedly, the EU will promote European prosperity through closer integration, and the Euro will bring magically-increased efficiency to European defense spending, lead to a reassertion of European power in the world, and soothe any remaining European conflicts while bringing the European periphery steadily within its pacific fold. There has scarcely been a question for which the EU was not the answer.

But so many questions cannot have the same answer. America's support for the EU represents not a triumph of strategy, but the victory of intellectual laziness and political inertia. During the Cold War, U.S. support for a united Europe made sense as a way to encourage the countries of Western Europe to stop fighting endless wars amongst themselves and to stand up politically to the USSR. But this policy stopped making sense in 1989, when the Soviet Union collapsed. The value of European unity in the Cold War was that it reduced the ability of the Soviets to pick off vulnerable nations one at a time. Unity did not so much build European power—except insofar as it promoted freer trade, and thus economic growth, within Europe—as it increased the resistance of the nations of Europe to being politically suborned by the Soviets.

Yet when the Soviet threat disappeared, the U.S. did not change its policy. Instead, like the EU itself, it doubled down on support for European integration. The result has been that the EU has increasingly sought to develop its own defense role and foreign policy in ways that detract from both NATO and U.S. bilateral relations in Europe. This development has been a long time coming; starting with Eisenhower, the U.S. backed an integrating Europe in the belief that the European members of NATO would be a second pillar of the transatlantic Alliance, one that would relieve the U.S. of most of its European cares. As Eisenhower put it in 1951, "The U.S. does not have to stay in Europe if we build it up and we should not."[3]

The European pole, however, never fulfilled Eisenhower's hopes. Indeed, it has turned out to be both tilted and stunted. It neither stands in parallel with the U.S., nor strongly and stably on its own. Instead, NATO has increasingly become a basket from which coalitions of the willing can be drawn, while the European response in recent years has varied from feeble (Ukraine, the Balkan wars, and Georgia), to delayed verging on deceptive (Turkish EU membership), to biased (Israel and the Palestinians), to non-existent (Syria), to spasmodically interventionist (Libya). In short, the EU has failed to play any serious role in addressing the crises on its doorstep. A species of neutralism, led by Germany—instanced most clearly by Germany's opt-out from the Libyan War and its lack of enthusiasm for a vigorous response to Russia's assault on Ukraine—is returning to Europe, and recalling memories of the post-1945 European crisis of confidence. Without Germany, neither NATO nor the EU can fulfill the hopes attached to them by U.S. and European policymakers alike.

The EU's inability to develop any coherent strategy to respond to the Syrian civil war, or to do more than slap Russia's wrist in retaliation for its occupation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, is proof that the U.S. policy of outsourcing its strategy for Europe to Brussels has failed.

The EU has failed to play any serious role in addressing the crises on its doorstep. A species of neutralism, led by Germany, is returning to Europe, and recalling memories of the post-1945 European crisis of confidence.

The EU does not encourage the nations of Europe to look outward; rather, it preoccupies them with elaborating and resolving the internal governance structures of the EU. As in the case of the Syrian refugees, it creates arguments about burden-sharing at home, not an agreement to shoulder a burden abroad. In practice, the EU promotes not European globalism, but European disengagement.

Nor has the EU promoted European prosperity. Certainly, free trade within Europe makes sense, but the EU is not about free trade as Americans understand the term. It embodies instead the creation and ever-unfolding development of a managed market. By slowly reducing the margin within which different members can have different policies on regulation, taxation, and spending, it is gradually reducing the competitive drive within Europe. From the sixteenth century on, European power in the world grew not through unity, but because Europe was divided into competitive nation states. The smothering of economic competition will not restore European power in the world; it will slowly degrade the base of that power. The Euro, in particular, has proven to be a mechanism for destroying prosperity, not promoting it. By creating a single currency, and a single exchange rate, for the entire Eurozone, it ensures that interest rates are either too low (for the less productive and more profligate nations) or too high (for the comfort of Germany's export industries).

The resulting strains can only be assuaged by continual transfers of wealth from the European north to the south, coupled with fiscal tightening in the south—a process that, while economically necessary, creates rather than soothes political tensions within Europe. To put it simply, Greece on its own would be a national disaster. Because of the EU, it is a European one. Moreover, the rise of parties like the Front National in France, which are critics of free market capitalism, owes much to the accurate perception that the EU is seeking to subordinate the nation states of Europe, and to prevent them from keeping their own economic, financial, and immigration policies.

From France to Hungary to Greece, many of these alternative national policies are wrong-headed and deeply illiberal. But their advocates would have less popular appeal if they could not point to the ways the EU is undermining the power of their nations to make their own policies. Thus, far from soothing Europe's old conflicts and integrating its periphery, the EU is keeping these conflicts alive—witness the way Nazi imagery is used to protest the German-led measures used to keep Greece in the Euro—and is now within an ace of driving the southern periphery of the EU out of political Europe entirely.

It does not serve America's economic or financial interests, which are in the promotion of a free trading and economically vibrant Europe, not the building up of an interventionist, economically-centralized bureaucracy that seeks to suppress the competition that derives from different national policies.

The second piece of advice for U.S. policymakers, then, is that the time has come to rethink the so-far unthinking support given to the EU. The EU does not serve U.S. security interests. That is the job of NATO, and of bilateral U.S. alliances. It does not serve U.S. foreign policy interests. In fact, the EU detracts from the bilateral relations that have always formed the basis of broader U.S. policy with Europe's nations. It does not serve America's economic or financial interests, which are in the promotion of a free trading and economically vibrant Europe, not the building up of an interventionist, economically-centralized bureaucracy that seeks to suppress the competition that derives from different national policies. Further, it does not serve U.S. political interests, which rest in the preservation of democratic and sovereign nation states in the American tradition, not in the creation of a supranational elite that leads in turn to the rise of illiberal, anti-capitalist, statist political movements to oppose that elite.

Tough love

U.S. support for the EU contains a final paradox. The fundamental goal of the EU, starting with its origins as the European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s, has been to restrict the sovereignty, and thus the war-making potential, of the European nations. Many European nations, scarred by their experience of the Second World War, have willingly gone along with this, the result being that patriotism in Europe is at a discount, and has not been replaced by a comparable loyalty to Europe.

In a world where Europe was mostly a place from which people emigrated, that might, for a time, have been tolerable. But Europe is now mostly a place to which people immigrate. The problems and complexities of European immigration—and, thus, the problem of radical Islam—are immense. But it is impossible to believe that immigrants can be assimilated into a nation if that nation denies the importance and value of national loyalty.

In the long run, the EU's most important legacy will likely be the suicidal contribution it has made to the erosion of those national loyalties in precisely the era when they were needed to serve the cause of building liberal, pluralistic, and patriotic European democracies. Only this kind of democracy is likely to be outward-looking and a willing contributor to the transatlantic alliance. The risk is not so much the rise of radical Islam in Europe—though this does pose a distinct set of problems—but of the decline of European willingness and ability to play a wider role in cooperation with the U.S., and thus the return of the European political neutralism that U.S. policymakers feared after 1945. The risk is no longer that the nations of Europe will be picked off by the Soviets: it is that the EU is picking itself off.

The U.S. cannot force Europe, or the EU—and U.S. policymakers should remember that the two are not the same—to turn from this path. But it can at least stop cheerleading those who are making the problem worse. More broadly, if the U.S. is to have a strategy in Europe, that strategy must, by definition, be one of America's making, not one that rests on outsourcing vital questions to the EU, especially since the EU has never been the chosen American instrument for addressing the security concerns that brought the U.S. into Europe and keep it there today.

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The beginning of American strategy in Europe today thus rests where it did in 1945: in recognizing that the U.S. needs a European strategy that, while aligned with the true forces of freedom in Europe, is distinctly its own. ■

Endnotes

[1] The Obama Administration's laughably-named "European Reassurance Initiative" of 2014 testifies to the existence of the perception that the U.S. commitment to Europe was and is too weak. See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners," June 3, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support-.

[2] U.S. Secretaries of Defense have for over a decade engaged in ritualized calls for increases in European defense spending, a rhetorical exercise that has achieved nothing. For a report on one such speech, see "Gates Rebukes European Allies in Farewell Speech," Washington Post, June 10, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gates-rebukes-european-allies-in-farewell-speech/2011/06/10/AG9tKeOH_story.html.

[3] James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Cornell University Press, 2002), 19.

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