DEFENSE DOSSIER

JANUARY 2013 ISSUE 6

American Foreign Policy Council

DEFENSE DOSSIER

JANUARY 2013 ISSUE 6

American Foreign Policy Council

FROM THE EDITORS

Welcome to the January 2013 issue of AFPC's *Defense Dossier*. In this edition, we focus on the evolving global ballistic missile threat, the state of U.S. defenses, and the shape of U.S. defense policy to come.

Defense against ballistic missile threats has become more critical than ever. The U.S. today faces a widening array of missile dangers from rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea, which are bolstering their offensive missile capabilities. At the same time, recent events in the Middle East have provided proof that an effective missile defense shield can be a game changer in both political and strategic terms. Yet looming defense cuts and fiscal austerity now imperil America's movement toward a truly robust defense against ballistic missile threats.

To address these issues, AFPC held its 10th annual Capitol Hill conference on "Missile Defenses and American Security" in December 2012. As in past years, the event featuring top experts and practitioners in the fields of missile defense and proliferation. The articles in this *Defense Dossier* are drawn from the presentations featured at that event.

Sincerely,

Ilan Berman
Chief Editor

Richard Harrison
Managing Editor

REFLECTIONS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

SENATOR JON KYL

One cannot pick up a paper today without appreciating the strategic importance of missile defense in the current security environment. In recent weeks, incidents around the world have provided ample evidence for the necessity of missile defense.

While under fire from Gaza launched rockets, Israel's Iron Dome system protected the country's population against rocket attacks. This provided the military and political authorities in Israel the time and space necessary to avoid a devastating ground war—making a truce ultimately possible. As Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said at the time, "Iron Dome performed remarkably well during the recent escalation," adding: "Iron Dome does not start wars, it helps prevent wars." This sentiment applies to missile defense in general, and is a sea change from the old Cold War thinking, still held by some, that missile defenses are somehow destabilizing.

Turkey has requested Patriot batteries from NATO to protect that nation against Syrian ballistic missiles, potentially armed with chemical weapons—demonstrating again how missile defense can play a strategic role in providing security for Alliance members and, potentially, making it easier for Turkey to avoid preemptive action against Syria.

Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. activated short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missile defense systems in anticipation of North Korea's recent space/long-range ballistic missile launch—yet another indication that the threat to the U.S. from long-range missiles continues to advance. This is particularly concerning considering the proliferation between Pyongyang and Tehran.

As we know, in response to Iran's development of nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles, NATO has agreed to support the deployment of short, medium and long-range ballistic missile defense systems to protect Alliance territory, and thereby avoid potential Iranian nuclear blackmail.

There is clear recognition today in both the Administration and the Congress that missile defense is an essential element of U.S. national security, which can strengthen deterrence against regional threats, provide assurance to allies, and which can contribute to stability during a crisis. Therefore, it is imperative that we develop a missile defense of the homeland that protects the American people against limited long-range ballistic missile threats and, by reducing our strategic vulnerability to such threats, maintains U.S. freedom of action in support of our national security interests.

THE EVOLUTION OF MISSILE DEFENSE

Strong support for missile defense hasn't always been the case; there always has existed a tension between homeland and regional missile defense priorities, especially before the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002.

Fashioned in the midst of the Cold War, the ABM Treaty enshrined the fallacious notions that (1) missile defenses led to arms races; and that (2) vulnerability to nuclear attack was somehow "stabilizing." Contrary to these premises, the two decades following the signing the treaty in 1972 saw the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles actually double and triple, respectively. Yet, when the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, the number of deployed nuclear weapons was reduced from 6,000 (1991 START limits) to 2,200 (2002 Moscow Treaty) to 1,550 (2010 New START).

Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) *served in the United States Senate from 1995 until his retirement in January 2013. These remarks were delivered in December 2012, when the Senator was the outgoing Minority Whip.*

These trends, and others, call into question the validity of the missile defense and arms control theories of the Cold War. President Reagan was a strong proponent of missile defense and never subscribed to the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). It was Reagan's grand strategy and the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which not only accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union but laid the foundation for today's missile defense systems.

The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with an increase in ballistic missile proliferation by other countries—prompting the George W. Bush administration to focus missile defense efforts on a range of short, medium and long-range ballistic missile threats.

Its Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) initiative was meant to address deliberate theater missile attacks as well as accidental and unauthorized ballistic missile attacks against the United States from any source—which meant providing the capability to handle up to 200 nuclear warheads (the number on a single Russian nuclear submarine.

These criteria led to a three-tiered approach that included ground-based national missile defenses for the U.S. homeland; theater missile defenses to protect U.S. forces and allies; and an overarching space-based interceptor layer (Brilliant Pebbles), to provide boost phase defense and global coverage.

President Clinton essentially abandoned the National Missile Defense and space-based component of this defensive strategy and focused principally on theater missile defenses, likely due to the administration's fealty to the ABM Treaty. However, in January 1999, Congress made it clear that it would not abandon the goal of protecting the United States against even limited Russian strikes when it passed the Missile Defense Act, making it:

> *the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).*

The second Bush administration recognized the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles, and took the courageous step of formally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the move by stating: "I can say with full confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation." President Bush then began deployment of a national missile defense system while continuing to develop and deploy regional missile defenses and next-generation systems such as the Airborne Laser.

If funding were made available, space-based boost-phase defense could be a potential game changer. It could protect the U.S. against ICBMs, and thus provide a truly layered missile defense of the homeland.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration opted to change course on a homeland missile defense policy to focus on a regional architecture in Europe. The Administration argues that short- and medium range missiles pose a more urgent and abundant threat. However, defending the American people must be our first priority, not only because it is the President's constitutional duty, but because any homeland vulnerability to ballistic missile attack would have strategic implications far beyond any regional contingency.

The President does recognize the importance of missile defense, as noted in his 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Though he made a serious error in abandoning our Polish and Czech allies (in deference to Russia), subsequent plans to field SM-3 ballistic missile defense interceptors in Romania and Poland, as well as on naval vessels is at least some recognition that this Administration takes seriously the role of missile defense in our national security strategy.

However, there have been reductions made to the missile defense budget over the past four years—much of which have come at the expense of homeland defense and our next-generation missile defense systems.

In his first budget, President Obama cut $1.6 billion out of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) budget. The most recent five-year budget plan for the MDA is $3.6 billion less than Obama's own five-year

plan submitted last year and $2 billion less than the Bush administration projected for FY 2013. Presidential requests for MDA funding have gone from a high of $9.2 billion in FY 2005 to $7.8 billion in FY 2013; and there is no sign this trend will get any better over the next few years.

Furthermore, the next generation missile defense systems, such as the Airborne Laser and boost phase defense from space, were scrapped and funding for future missile defense concepts has declined to about $300m in the FY 2013 budget request. There simply is no serious effort to develop "game changing" technologies for missile defense.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Today, the American people enjoy a measure of protection against limited long-range ballistic missile threats from countries such as North Korea and Iran. However, budget cuts have reduced the U.S. Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs), capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), from 44 to 30. Over the next five years, only $4 billion is budgeted to improve their reliability to protect the U.S. homeland. The 30 GBIs, deployed in Alaska and California, may not be sufficient to address future threats. Nor is this deployment capable of fulfilling the requirement of the 1999 Missile Defense Act to provide protection against accidental and unauthorized launches from countries such as China or Russia.

The Administration cancelled the planned deployment of 10 GBIs in Poland, meant for the defense of the U.S. as well as our European allies. Now, it plans to deploy the SM-3 block IIB in Poland to provide additional protection for the U.S. homeland, but that program is only conceptual, is now delayed at least two years to 2022, and recent technical studies by the National Research Council have found that the IIB missile will not accomplish the ascent-phase intercept mission for the defense of the homeland.

Moreover, plans to modernize the 20+ year-old GBIs were terminated when the Administration canceled the multiple-kill vehicle (MKV) program; other than some software upgrades and the addition of radars, this White House has no plans to seriously improve our GMD system over time.

The Obama administration should seriously consider altering its view of the GMD program. The President would be well served if he did the following:

(1) Allow the MDA to address the causes of the past test failures and execute a robust test campaign to increase the readiness of the current system.

(2) Make a commitment to modernize the system by developing a new kill vehicle for the GBI.

(3) Reconsidered its current deployment plans by increasing the number of GBIs (recall that the Bush administration had planned on 54 as a starting point). Allowing for the uncertainty about the development and deployment of the SM-3 IIB missile, serious consideration should be given to expanding the number of GBIs deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska and/or at a new GBI site to protect the East Coast.

(4) Lastly, improving the capability of the Standard Missile 3 block IIA (available in 2018) to defend the homeland against intercontinental range ballistic missiles should also be examined.

Defending the American people must be our first priority, not only because it is the President's constitutional duty, but because any homeland vulnerability to ballistic missile attack would have strategic implications far beyond any regional contingency.

NEXT-GENERATION MISSILE DEFENSE

With the retirement of the Airborne Laser, MDA has no new "breakthrough" technologies in the works—at least none in the public domain. And funding for di-

rected energy programs in MDA is under $50 million in FY 2013, while spending on "classified" programs is just about $300 million—out of a total MDA budget of $7.8 billion. This leaves little funding for research and development of the next generation of missile defense capabilities.

If funding were made available, space-based boost-phase defense could be a potential game changer. It could protect the U.S. against ICBMs, and thus provide a truly layered missile defense of the homeland.

At the request of Congress, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) conducted a study in 2011 of issues associated with a space-based missile defense layer. That study found that a space-based interceptor layer could contribute to the defense of the U.S. against ICBMs; engage the anti-ship ballistic missile threat (a concern related to China); and that the technological maturity exists such that a space-based interceptor layer could be developed within ten years. Aside from allocating funding, the only thing lacking is the political will to do so.

THE PROBLEM OF RUSSIA

A final challenge for our missile defense program is not related to funding or technology, but is posed by Russia's ongoing campaign to limit U.S. missile defense systems.

First, Russia's objections led the President to cancel the deployment of GBIs in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Next, the Russians insisted there be a linkage between offense and defense in the New START treaty—as a means, no doubt, to walk the U.S. back into the ABM Treaty regime. Then they issued threats to the U.S. and its allies when NATO announced plans to deploy SM-3 missiles in Romania and Poland, and have even sought restrictions on where NATO can operate its missile defense capable ships.

The Senate made it clear in the New START resolution of ratification that there will be no limits on U.S. missile defense capabilities, and we hope the President understands this, notwithstanding his whispered remarks to former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

We've come a long way. Our nation, and our deployed forces and allies now enjoy a good measure of protection against ballistic missiles. The debate over missile defense is, for the most part, behind us.

But complacency is not an option. If current missile defense budget trends continue, there will not be enough funding to accomplish even the President's missile defense objectives; much less additional important and necessary efforts. These include:

- The modernization and expansion of the ground-based midcourse defense system;
- The development of effective boost phase defenses (especially a space based interceptor layer); and
- The development of next-generation "game changing" missile defense technologies.

Only if these measures are enacted can we expect to be prepared for the immediate and future missile threats of the 21st century. ■

THE MIDDLE EAST MISSILE ENVIRONMENT

MICHAEL EISENSTADT

As recent events have shown—in particular, the launch of more than 1,500 rockets by Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza against Israel during the week-long second Gaza war of November 2012, and the launch of a half dozen SCUD missiles by government forces against Syrian insurgents in early December 2012—the Middle East remains that part of the world where the threat posed by rocket and missile proliferation and use is most acute, and the need for effective rocket and missiles defenses most urgent.

ROCKET AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION TRENDS

To be sure, not all the news coming from the Middle East in the past decade pertaining to missile proliferation has been bad. The missile proliferation landscape in the region is characterized by a variety of countervailing trends, some positive, some neutral, and some negative, from the point of view of U.S. national interests.

On the positive side of the ledger, Iraq and Libya have abandoned their missile and associated nonconventional weapons programs, and are no longer countries of proliferation concern. Saudi Arabia is not believed to have modernized or replaced its inventory of CSS-2s, and it is not even clear whether these missiles remain operational; instead, Riyadh appears to be acquiring F-15S and Eurofighter Typhoon fighters for the long-range strike role. And Egypt's SCUDs are currently not perceived as a threat; that will remain the case as long as the new Egyptian government continues the foreign and defense policies of its predecessor.

Conversely, the rocket and missile threat from the so-called "axis of resistance" (Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iranian-supported special groups in Iraq) has become more acute in the past decade. Iran's missile program is the largest and most advanced in the region (outside of Israel) and shows signs of growing sophistication, including the claimed development of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability, as well as a satellite launch capability.

EVOLVING THREAT CAPABILITIES

The most noteworthy developments of the past decade related to threat capabilities have been the proliferation of rocket, and possibly missile, systems to those non-state actors in the region that are supported by Iran, as well as the growing capabilities of the expanding rocket and missile arsenals of Syria and Iran.

Non-State Actors. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the rocket became a signature weapon used by Iranian-supported special groups such as the Mahdi Army, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq, and Kata'ib Hizballah, against American forces and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The weapons of choice included 107mm, 122mm, and 240mm rockets, as well as improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs). It is not clear whether these capabilities have been preserved since the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

The de facto Hamas state in Gaza is an emerging rocket power. Since 2001, Palestinian forces

Michael Eisenstadt *is Senior Fellow and Director of the Military & Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Eisenstadt worked as a military analyst with the U.S. government. His military service included stints in Iraq; Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Jordan; Turkey; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff, and; U.S. Central Command headquarters.*

in Gaza have launched more than 12,800 rockets against Israel. At first, these groups relied exclusively on home-made rockets built from easily-available materials (sewage pipes, sheet metal, and a sugar and fertilizer propellant mixture). However, over the years, these Palestinian groups took delivery of Iranian Grad-type rockets, and more recently, long range Fajr-5 rockets (with a 75km range), smuggled in via the network of tunnels that connect the Sinai with Gaza. Israeli intelligence believes there are 12,000 rockets of all types in Gaza at present, including a domestically produced rocket, the M-75, as well as the Iranian Fajr-5, with sufficient range to reach the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Hezbollah has emerged as a non-state rocket superpower. During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Lebanese organization rained more than 4,000 rockets down on Israel. Since then, according to Israeli intelligence, its inventory has increased to more than 70,000 rockets, including systems that can reach nearly all of Israel, and it is believed that Hezbollah personnel have been trained in Syria on Syrian SCUDs. Some media reports claim that several of these missiles have been transferred to Hezbollah's control, though it is not clear whether they remain in Syria or whether they are now in Lebanon.

Syria and Iran. Syria and Iran have the most active rocket and missile programs in the Middle East today. Both countries conceive of their rocket and missile forces as a deterrent, as psychological warfare tools (during parades, Iran frequently dresses its missiles with banners declaring that "Israel should be wiped off the map"), and for the delivery of both conventional and nonconventional payloads in wartime. Both countries subscribe to the "resistance doctrine," which states that the path to victory is through demoralizing the enemy, by bleeding his army as well as his civilian population (by rocket and missile attacks against civilian population centers), and by denying him success on the battlefield—not by seizing and holding terrain. In this context, rockets are as important as missiles, since they yield the same psychological effect on the targeted population. For Iran, this was a key lesson of its eight year war with Iraq (1980-1988), and for Syria, of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Syria is believed to have several score SS-21 and perhaps 400-500 SCUD-B and –C missiles. All are capable of carrying chemical payloads. It also has 220mm and 302mm rocket systems, which it has provided in large numbers to Hezbollah. In past crises, Syria has used its SCUDs for signaling, and in recent weeks it fired a half dozen SCUDs against anti-regime insurgents. These incidents reflect the progressive escalation of the country's civil war and the Assad regime's growing desperation, and raise the possibility that Syria may eventually use its SCUDs to deliver chemical weapons against opposition forces or civilian population centers.

The Middle East remains that part of the world where the threat posed by rocket and missile proliferation and use is most acute, and the need for effective rocket and missile defense most urgent.

Iran has invested significant resources in building a large, capable missile force, with the total number of missiles perhaps in the high hundreds. These include single stage liquid fuel missiles such as the Shahab-1, and -2, Qiam-1, Shahab-3 and Ghadir-1 (with ranges of 300, 500, 750, 1,300, and 1,500km, respectively). Additionally, it has tested a two stage solid fuel missile, the Sejjil-2 (with a 2,000+km range)—though the latter is not yet believed operational. Iran has also claimed an anti-ship ballistic missile capability (Khalij-e Fars), and has demonstrated a satellite launch capability (Safir) which could eventually provide the basis for an Iranian ICBM. For now, however, Iran is apparently limiting itself to the production of 2,000km range missiles (sufficient range to reach Israel, but not Western Europe) and eschewing at least the overt development of ICBMs, in order to deflect concerns in Europe and the U.S. regarding its missile program. Iran also fields a very large number of solid fuel rockets—both short, medium, and long-range systems, including the Noor

122mm rocket (20 km), the Fajr-3 and -5 (with ranges of 45 and 75km, respectively) and the Zelzal-1, -2, and -3 (with ranges of 125 to 400km).

Iran has built such a large inventory of rockets and missiles in order to enable it to saturate enemy rocket and missile defenses, and achieve cumulative strategic effects on the enemy's morale and staying power through conventional means. All of Iran's missiles can be mounted on mobile launchers, and it is starting to place its missiles in concrete silos. This mix of launch options is likely intended to make it more difficult for potential enemies to pre-emptively target Iran's missile force.

REGIONAL DEFENSE: A WORK IN PROGRESS

The threat in the Middle East consists of very large numbers of conventionally (and a smaller number of nonconventionally) armed strategic rockets and missile systems. At present, the U.S. and its allies (except for Israel) lack the ability to counter the rocket threat, and are at risk of being numerically overwhelmed by the missile threat that they face.

In both respects, Israel is better prepared than is the United States and its other regional allies, though gaps in its capabilities remain. Israel has fielded the Iron Dome system to defend against short- and medium-range rockets from Gaza, and Patriot PAC-2/GEM and Arrow II (and eventually, Arrow III) interceptors to deal with short- and medium-range ballistic missiles from Syria and Iran. However, it currently lacks enough Iron Dome batteries to defend against the many thousands of short- and medium-range rockets held by Hezbollah, or the latter's inventory of long-range rockets (its five operational Iron Dome batteries are all currently positioned to deal with the threat from Gaza). The anticipated deployment of the David's Sling interceptor in 2014 will, however, enable it to deal with the threat of Hezbollah's long-range rockets. For now, Israel is relying on deterrence, and will resort to pre-emption, if need be, to deal with that threat.

The failure of Persian Gulf states to adequately protect their citizens could have a major impact on political stability in the Gulf in the aftermath of a war.

The U.S., by contrast, has not devoted sufficient resources to developing counter-rocket systems (though the threat of rocket attacks by Iraqi special groups led to the rush deployment of the largely ineffective Phalanx Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar System/C-RAM). However, there is a growing recognition that rockets can have a strategic impact, and that in the future, proliferators may use rockets and missiles in synergistic ways. For instance, Iran may attempt to suppress U.S. and allied missile defenses with rocket attacks by proxies operating on the ground or by missile strikes, in order to facilitate rocket and missile attacks against population centers, critical infrastructure, and military facilities. It is not clear, however, whether this growing recognition will result in the acquisition of more capable anti-rocket systems.

In recent years, the U.S. and many of its Arab Gulf allies have acquired large numbers of modern missile defenses, though probably not in the numbers required to defeat Iranian saturation tactics. The U.S. now has 1-2 Aegis ships in the Mediterranean, and 2-3 in the Persian Gulf. It has Patriot PAC-2s or PAC-3s in Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar, and can deploy a THAAD battery to the region in a crisis. It has also deployed AN-TPY-2 X-Band radars in Israel, Turkey, and Qatar. As for America's Arab allies, the Patriot PAC-2 has been purchased by Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and Saudi Arabia is upgrading its missile defenses to PAC-3 standards, perhaps as a first step toward eventually acquiring this system, which has already been purchased by Kuwait and the UAE. Finally, America's most advanced missile, THAAD, has been ordered by the UAE, and may be ordered by Qatar. By contrast, Turkey, a key U.S. ally, lacks any kind of missile defenses, and had to request NATO assistance to deal with the missile threat from Syria. More needs to be done to close this missile gap.

Israel is the only country in the region with a national early warning system and robust civil defenses, in the form of a nationwide network of shelters and

highly capable emergency services. This is critical for fostering societal resilience, for civilians must believe that everything possible is being done to protect them. This is a critical gap in the capabilities of America's Arab allies that needs to be filled—especially since the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" are likely to lead to increasing calls for greater governmental accountability in the Gulf Arab states. The failure of these regimes to adequately protect their citizens could have a major impact on political stability in the Gulf in the aftermath of a war. The U.S. needs to do more with these allies to enhance their civil defenses.

In the Persian Gulf, offensive air operations will be necessary to attack and attrite Iranian rocket and missile forces, and thereby lighten the load borne by the missile defenses, in accordance with lessons learned in previous wars in the region (in particular, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the 2012 war in Gaza). To this end, the U.S. maintains two Aerospace Expeditionary Wings and 2-3 Carrier Strike Groups in the region, while several U.S. allies have acquired very capable strike aircraft, including the Saudi F-15S and Eurofighter Typhoon, and the UAE F-16 Block 60 Desert Falcon. More needs to be done to enhance interoperability among U.S. and Arab air forces and to enhance the professional standards of the latter, so that they can take on a greater share of the burden in future wars.

Finally, to the degree that Iran and its allies in the "axis of resistance" use the threat posed by their rockets and missiles to intimidate and demoralize their enemies, countering this "fear factor" will be a critical goal of missile defense. Diplomatic and military public affairs and MISO (Military Information Support Operations) personnel should play a key role in formulating and implementing U.S. and allied rocket and missile defense strategies, by deflating frequently exaggerated Iranian claims about their rocket and missile forces, and publicizing what the U.S. and its allies are doing to counter them, so that Tehran is unable to derive any benefit from what is perhaps its most potent psychological warfare weapon. ■

MISSILE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ASIA PIVOT

BRUCE KLINGNER

The Obama administration has initiated an Asia Pivot strategy to demonstrate America's commitment to peace and security in the Asia–Pacific, particularly in the face of a rising China and belligerent North Korea. However, the American initiative, a multifaceted strategy affirming U.S. resolve to protect national interests in Asia, has been strong in rhetoric but weak in implementation.

While the Administration believes its Asia Pivot will animate U.S. policy toward Asia, the U.S. military lacks the resources necessary to implement such a strategy. Even as the number of threats to stability in Asia continues to multiply, there has not been a commensurate increase of U.S. capabilities. Indeed, even as the Administration heralds America's "return" to Asia, the President has proposed cuts to defense spending.

The Obama administration's bold rhetoric that its defense cuts will not degrade U.S. security capabilities in Asia has drowned out the need for greater allied contributions. Asian and European allies have long underfunded security requirements, making it more critical that they now devote greater resources to their security needs.

THE GROWING MISSILE THREAT IN ASIA

The United States and its allies are at risk of missile attack from a growing number of states and non-state terrorist organizations. The U.S. ballistic missile defense review of February 2010 warned:

> *[T]he ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range.*[1]

Under the currrent constitutional interpretation, Japanese missile defense systems would not be allowed to intercept missiles attacking the United States or to protect a U.S. naval vessel that was defending Japan from missile attack.

This growing threat is particularly acute in East Asia, where diplomacy has failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them on target, and where China continues the most active nuclear force modernization program in the world.

North Korea's successful launch of a long-range rocket in December 2012 dramatically underscored the growing threat. Although ostensibly carried out to launch a civilian satellite, the technology utilized is the same as that of a *Taepo Dong 2* ICBM. And, regardless of what the North Koreans call the launch, it is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council (UNSC) presidential statement, passed after North Korea's April 2012 launch, judged that "any launch that uses ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle, is a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)."[2]

Bruce Klingner *is a Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation. Klingner joined Heritage in 2007 after 20 years in the intelligence community working at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. He served as the deputy division chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence where he was responsible for analyzing Korean political, military, economic, and leadership issues for the President of the United States and other senior policymakers.*

Then Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, Ri Yong-ho boasted several months ago that North Korea had nuclear weapons that could be installed on a missile capable of striking U.S. territory.[3] Although the status of North Korea's weaponization and miniaturization of warheads is unknown, the regime has enough fissile material for 6-8 plutonium-based nuclear weapons and continues its quest to develop a parallel uranium-based nuclear weapons program. The U.S. intelligence community estimated that by 2015 North Korea may have the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead to anywhere in the continental United States.

North Korea also has approximately 800 *Scud* short-range tactical ballistic missiles, 300 *No Dong* medium-range missiles, and 100 to 200 *Musudan* intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The *Scud* missiles have an estimated range of 320 to 500 kilometers (km), which limits them to South Korean targets. The *No Dong*, with a range of 1,300 km, can target all of Japan. The *Musudan's* range of 3,000 to 4,000 km enables it to hit U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam.

Although the North Korean missile threat is perhaps the most immediately dangerous, the largest Asian missile threat in terms of size is China. Beijing has expended enormous effort in developing its missile forces. These provide Chinese military planners with a long-range precision strike capability that can hold a variety of targets at risk throughout the Asia–Pacific region. China continues to augment these forces with additional missiles, including variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.

For its strategic deterrent, Beijing is believed to have 170 to 180 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, including the *Dong Feng 3* (DF-3) and DF-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the DF-5, DF-31, and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). China continues to augment these forces with additional missiles, including variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.[4] These allow it to target a range of nations, including Russia, India, Japan, and the United States.

Beijing also has deployed 1,050 to 1,150 conventionally armed but nuclear-capable DF-11 and DF-15 short-range missiles opposite Taiwan. These allow the Chinese military to hold Taiwan's airfields, radar sites, military bases, and population centers at risk. China has also developed a new long-range land-attack cruise missile, the *Dong Hai* 10 (DH-10), further complicating efforts at defense. China is also expected to deploy an air-launched long-range cruise missile for its H-6 bomber fleet. In recent years, China has also begun deploying the DF-21C, a conventionally armed MRBM, and has deployed 200 to 500 DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles.[5]

RESPONDING TO ASIAN MISSILE THREATS

To combat these missile threats, the United States has sought to develop common missile defense policies with its allies to defend the region against missile attacks from North Korean and Chinese launch sites, but with mixed results.

Japan. Tokyo has long pursued a minimalist security policy. Even when faced with growing regional security threats, Japan has reduced its overall defense budget for ten consecutive years. Despite this, Japan has significantly augmented its missile defense program, spurred by concerns over North Korea's growing missile and nuclear capabilities.

Japan developed and deployed a layered integrated missile defense system consisting of *Kongo*-class Aegis destroyers with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors for high-altitude missile defense and land-based Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) units for terminal phase interception.

For the future, Japan announced it will equip two *Atago*-class destroyers with Aegis systems; expand PAC-3 deployment from three anti-aircraft groups to the entire six anti-aircraft groups, and develop an additional fire unit of PAC-3.

Japan should be commended for strong

technological developments in missile defense and also for deploying an integrated missile defense system. However, those missile defenses are handicapped by legal restrictions. Japan's postwar pacifist constitution precludes engagement in "collective self-defense" or defending another country against attack.

Under the current constitutional interpretation, Japanese missile defense systems would not be allowed to intercept missiles attacking the United States or to protect a U.S. naval vessel that was defending Japan from missile attack even if it was adjacent to a Japanese Aegis destroyer. The Japanese leadership, under both the Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Japan, have failed to implement the recommendations of three prime minister-initiated defense reform task forces.

South Korea. In contrast with Japan's strong development and deployment of missile defense systems, South Korea's efforts have been disappointing. Despite the steadily increasing North Korean missile threat, progressive South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun deliberately downplayed the danger to South Korea in order to garner domestic support for their attempts to foster reconciliation with Pyongyang.

They were fearful that deploying a missile defense system—or even criticizing North Korea over its military provocations and human rights abuses—would anger Pyongyang, lead to a collapse of the inter-Korean engagement policy, and strain relations with China.

Seoul's reticence against defending itself against the North Korean threat changed dramatically after the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak. He saw that South Korea's self-imposed restrictions on offensive and defense missiles had not constrained North Korea's continued development of its missile force. After Lee was elected president, South Korean defense officials were more receptive to augmenting missile defenses, but have not followed through with requisite actions. Seoul continues to resist joining a comprehensive regional network with the United States and Japan. South Korea has instead focused on an independent South Korean missile defense system rather than an integrated regional defense.

Then Chief of General Staff of the Korean People's army, Ri Yong-ho, boasted several months ago that North Korea had nuclear weapons that could be installed on a missile capable of striking U.S. terriroty.

CALIBRATING ASIAN MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES TO THE THREAT

South Korea needs to improve its *capabilities* while Japan needs to improve its *abilities*. (e.g., the will to use its existing capabilities)

South Korea should:
- Deploy a multi-layered missile defense system that is interoperable with a U.S. regional missile network to provide for a more coherent and effective defense of allied military facilities and the South Korean populace;
- Purchase and deploy PAC-3 ground-based missiles and SM-3 missiles;
- Augment missile defense planning and exercises with U.S. forces and initiate trilateral missile defense cooperation and exercises with the U.S. and Japan; and
- Implement a regional missile defense network with Japan. Establish new military relationships, including sharing security information. Linking sensors would improve defense capabilities against short-range ballistic missiles.

For its part, Japan should:
- Increase defense spending beyond the status quo of less than one percent of GDP to enable Japan to fulfill mission objectives, including defense of the Japanese homeland from ballistic missile attack;
- Continue ongoing missile defense deployment plans;

• Adopt a less constrictive interpretation of the theory of collective self-defense to enable Japan to protect U.S. forces and territory, including with missile defense, while they are engaged in defending Japan;
• Follow-through on the revision to Japan's weapons export laws by allowing export of the jointly developed SM-3 Block 2A missile interceptors to allied nations; and
• Enhance public diplomacy efforts to explain the imminent security threat from North Korean and Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the need for comprehensive integrated missile defense programs with the United States and South Korea.

CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED

Diplomacy, engagement, international condemnation, and United Nations resolutions have not deterred North Korea from developing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. While Washington continues to seek diplomatic resolutions to the ballistic missile threat, it is critical that the U.S. simultaneously pursue missile defense programs to protect itself and its allies.

To fully protect their citizens from ballistic missile attacks, the United States and its allies should continue to develop and deploy viable missile defense systems. An effective system would include ground-based, sea-based, and air-based components. An inability to defend against the North Korean missile threat leaves South Korea and Japan more susceptible to North Korean coercion. ■

ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Department of Defense, *"Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,"* February 2010, iii, http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for20web.pdf.

2 United Nations Security Council, *"Security Council Condemns Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Satellite Launch as Breach of Resolutions Barring Country's Use of Ballistic Missile Technology,"* April 16, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10610.doc.htm.

3 *"Ex-N. Korea Army Chief: Rockets Could be Used to Transport Nukes,"* KBS, September 11, 2012, http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?page=1&No=95239&id=Po.

4 U.S. Department of Defense, *"Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010,"* 66, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.

5 Ibid, 2.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES

E. WAYNE MERRY

Moscow does not think about ballistic missile defense (BMD) as does Washington. This is not a deviation from an American norm but a fundamentally different perspective based on Russia's post-Cold War security dilemmas. It is important to understand that Moscow's reactions to U.S. BMD policies are grounded in profoundly different perceptions than our own. Any dialogue with Moscow on this issue must begin with acceptance that these differences are significant and real.

In recent decades, nuclear weapons and delivery systems have lost their previous centrality in American military doctrine and practice, to the point that the Navy and Air Force have difficulty attracting top-flight personnel for what is seen as a career backwater. Not so on the Russian side. Nuclear weapons remain supreme in Russian security doctrine and planning, and are likely to remain so given the long-term deficiencies of the country's ground forces, the traditional shield of the Russian state.

When a Russian president is sworn into office, the ceremony includes the transfer of the briefcase containing the nuclear weapons authorization codes. This is shown on national television, as the codes are today the tangible orb and scepter of derzhavnost, the greatness of the Russian state.

Only three attributes make Russia today a great power: its geography, its nuclear arsenal, and its hydrocarbons. Without nuclear weapons, however, Russia's vast territory would become a potential liability rather than an asset. By way of comparison, if all nuclear weapons were by magic to disappear from the earth overnight, American security would be enhanced due to our dominance in non-nuclear military technologies and forces; by contrast, Russia would face a fundamental crisis of national identity and very real security dangers along its eastern and southern frontiers. Thus, American talk of global "nuclear zero" is viewed in Moscow as inspired by the goal of U.S. non-nuclear hegemony, rather than to free the world from nuclear fear.

Anything like BMD which contains the potential—or even the perception of the potential—to compromise the integrity or stature of the Russian nuclear arsenal is seen by policymakers in Moscow as a danger not only to the country's security but to its historic identity as a great state.

The visceral Russian reaction against BMD is something of an historic anomaly, as defense traditionally enjoyed pride of place in Russian strategic thinking. Such was the case in the early years of the Cold War when the Soviet Union devoted enormous resources to defenses against U.S. bombers, more even than to its own nuclear strike capability. This stance changed with the advent of long-range nuclear missiles. The initial Soviet ICBM advantage was quickly eclipsed by American progress in warhead accuracy, solid fuels, and deployments at sea. Moscow devoted more than a decade to BMD development and even deployed an ABM force around the capital, but finally recognized that a national BMD effort—even if technically feasible—would be prohibitive in terms of resources. It therefore opted for pure nuclear deterrence and the ABM Treaty of 1972.

The Soviet commitment to—indeed, obsession with—strategic nuclear parity and the superpower status quo explains the intensity of the reaction to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, whatever may have been the doubts of Soviet technical experts about the program. Thus, already

E. Wayne Merry *is Senior Fellow for Europe & Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council. In twenty-six years in the United States Foreign Service, he worked as a diplomat and political analyst in Moscow, East Berlin, Athens, New York and Tunis, and served in the State, Defense and Treasury Departments as well as on Capitol Hill and with the U.S. Marine Corps.*

Iran is not, for Moscow, a serious issue. NATO BMD deployments are, for Moscow, a testing phase and trial run for future American breakout system of a scale and sophistication to compromise the credibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent forces.

in the late Cold War, Soviet leaders encountered the basic strategic dilemma which now faces post-Soviet Russia: how to maintain superpower status in nuclear weaponry with an economy dwarfed by the United States and increasingly eclipsed by other Eurasian powers including China. As technology races ahead, Russia seeks to use political constraints on the United States to compensate for its long-term comparative decline.

The Russian strategic dilemma is complicated by other nuclear powers. The United States does not compute the British and French nuclear deterrents into its own force planning, but Russia obviously must. More to the point, Russian non-strategic nuclear forces (sometimes called "theater" or "tactical") have always existed principally to deter or even combat China. During most of the Cold War, Moscow developed and deployed thousands of such nuclear weapons against its ideological rival. Today, Moscow's retention of a vast stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons has little to do with the comparative handful of American nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe, but everything to do with the immense imbalance between its conventional forces and those of the PRC. (Although perhaps half this stockpile is obsolescent and could be scrapped, Moscow may value the deterrent value of its sheer scale.)

While relations between Moscow and Beijing are currently fairly benign, neither side is under illusions of a permanent rapprochement. Indeed, China's nuclear weapons program was, from the very beginning, "all vector" in concept, with Russia, India, Japan and America as potential adversaries, but Russia the primary potential target for many years. Today, the Chinese nuclear force is less oriented to the north than to the east and south, but the potential for regional rivalry and even conflict remains.

Russia is experiencing serious problems, in resources and in technology, to replace its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal with new systems. This is especially the case in the development and construction of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and the missiles to arm them. This is a long story of missed deadlines, busted budgets, many failed tests, and of general managerial and technical deficiencies. Russia is slowly deploying the new boats and missiles, but at a cost disproportionate to its other military acquisition programs. Russia is also creating a new generation of ICBMs, with ground mobility for strategic survival, reflecting a reluctance to depend on a sea-borne deterrent as much as does the United States.

Given the huge resources committed to the modernization of both sea-based and land-based nuclear forces, plus their centrality in Russia's security posture and geo-political identity, it is difficult to see how the Russian government could agree to significant reductions of either launchers or warheads below the New START limits of 2011. Thus, Russia has gone about as low as it can go in nuclear weaponry to retain the place it feels it must occupy in the global system.

A further issue of great concern to Russian planners is American developments in non-nuclear strategic weaponry such as precision-guided non-ballistic missiles. For the first time in the nuclear age, Russian planners must grapple with a strategic arms race not involving weapons of mass destruction. This concern, dating to the U.S. use of precision weaponry in the first Iraq war, must be understood in light of the persistent Russian fear of strategic decapitation. While the image of a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" loomed large in American thinking early in the Cold War, our concerns faded while the Soviet obsession intensified that an American precision strike could destroy its strategic command and control. (David Hoffman's recent book "The Dead Hand" is required reading on this issue.)

This Russian fear justified the maintenance and upgrading of its ABM system around Moscow at considerable cost even in the most threadbare post-Soviet years. The Moscow ABM system (of uncertain operational utility) is at the heart of the Russian "nightmare scenario." In this dystopian future, the United States would employ a combination of cyber

and non-nuclear precision attack to disable Russia's strategic command and control, then use its naval power and precision nuclear strike forces to eviscerate Russia's submarine and ICBM deterrents, and rely on its (by then, greatly enhanced) BMD capability to defend against any residual Russian retaliation, thus holding the Russian government hostage to the threat of further nuclear attack.

When asked why and in what circumstances the United States would ever conceive, let alone undertake, such a high-risk and near-suicidal adventure, Russian planners respond—with words they heard from our side during the Cold War—that a country cannot base its security on a foreign power's current intentions but only on its developing capabilities.

Anything like BMD which contains the potential - or even the perception of the potential - to compromise the integrity or stature of the Russian nuclear aresnal is seen by policy makers in Moscow as a danger not only to the country's secuirty but to its historic identiy as a great state.

It is in this light—of potential vulnerability to nuclear blackmail—that Russian planners perceive American developments in BMD. Iran is not, for Moscow, a serious issue. NATO BMD deployments are, for Moscow, a testing phase and trial run for future American breakout systems of a scale and sophistication to compromise the credibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent forces. Russian planners have no difficulty finding unofficial views in the United States to reinforce their most paranoid worst-case scenarios. Official assurances from Washington are treated with skepticism and even incredulity. The least-critical Russians note it was Washington, not Moscow, which withdrew from the ABM Treaty and thus, from their perspective, compromised the nuclear status quo and Russia's security.

Given the deep skepticism about BMD which exists within a number of important NATO governments, Moscow will work tactically within the NATO-Russia framework to limit U.S. deployments in Europe. While far from perfect from a Russian point of view, constraints imposed on the United States by its own allies may be about the best Moscow can hope for in the foreseeable future, as there is comparatively little in the bilateral relationship to hold hostage to BMD. In the Pacific, Russian suasion on countries threatened by North Korean nuclear and missile developments is marginal, which is why this region figures so much less prominently than does Europe in Moscow's anti-BMD campaign.

Ultimately, for Russia the issue is not Iran, nor NATO nor specific systems. American progress toward balancing ballistic missiles with credible defenses erodes the status quo essential to Moscow's assertion of great power status. Far from seeing nuclear weapons as a necessary evil of the modern world, Russia's elites perceive them as the bedrock of its state power and global identity for the foreseeable future. That is the starting point for any U.S. dialogue, let alone negotiation, with Russia on BMD. ■

PRESERVING MISSILE DEFENSE AMID FISCAL AUSTERITY

ROBERT ZARATE

Recent international developments demonstrate the growing importance of missile defense to U.S. and allied security. As nuclear-armed North Korea's successful launch of a missile into space in December 2012 shows, the proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technologies that can deliver nuclear warheads to U.S. soil is a real and gathering danger. Pyongyang's willingness to assist the weapons of mass destruction and missile programs of other rogue nations—for example, its cooperation on Iran's short- and medium-range missile programs, as well as its aid to Syria's nuclear reactor and missile programs—only serves to heighten concerns. North Korea's recent provocation thus makes clear the prudence of national missile defense—in particular, U.S. efforts to field ground-based midcourse defense anti-missile interceptors in Alaska and California.

In addition, theater missile defense has become more salient. For example, dictator Bashar al-Assad's use of short-range ballistic missiles against Syria's armed opposition groups—coupled with the regime's highly provocative movement of chemical weapons in recent months—has led U.S. partners like Jordan and Turkey to deploy American- and Western-supplied Patriot missile defense batteries along their borders with Syria. To take another example, theater defenses enabled Israel to refrain from launching a potentially bloody ground-offensive in the Gaza Strip during its late 2012 armed conflict with Hamas, and instead to rely on its Iron Dome missile defense system—which was developed with U.S. financial support—to deal with Hamas's indiscriminate rocket attacks.

What is troubling, however, is that the future of U.S. missile defense efforts faces great fiscal uncertainty. Over the last four years, the Obama administration has made real-dollar reductions to the Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, the Pentagon organization that is responsible for the vast majority of the military's anti-ballistic missile programs. Moreover, the prospect of defense sequestration—roughly $500 billion in across-the-board cuts to the Pentagon's regular annual budget over the next decade—fundamentally imperils efforts to improve and expand America's ballistic missile defense capabilities. Although sequestration was originally set to begin on January 2, 2013, a last-minute legislative deal has delayed sequestration's start by two months. Now that the White House and Capitol Hill have bought themselves a little breathing room, they should seize this opportunity to definitively end sequestration's threat of massive and indiscriminate cuts to the military in general, and to missile defense in particular.

Even as the United States facing growing pressures to control federal spending and rein in its growing national debt, it is imperative that the President and Congress be willing to make the tough sacrifices and make hard choices required not only to preserve, but also to quantitatively grow and qualitatively improve, America's BMD capabilities over the long haul. The international security environment—which is only becoming increasingly more competitive in the domain of ballistic missiles—demands no less.

MISSILE DEFENSE AMID GROWING FISCAL AUSTERITY

It is regrettable that President Obama sought over the last four years to make significant reductions to the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency. For example, while President Bush's fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget request for the MDA was $9.3 billion in non-inflation adjusted dollars, President Obama's FY 2010 request

Robert Zarate *is Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining FPI, Zarate worked as a Legislative Assistant for a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and earlier as a Legislative Fellow on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.*

Supporters of missile defense - in the Executive Branch, in Congress, and in the expert community - must ramp up efforts to explain to the public why the United States needs missile defense to face the continuing growth of foreign missile threats.

was $7.8 billion—a cut that equals roughly an -18.1% reduction in inflation-adjusted real dollars to MDA funding. Although Obama's FY 2011 budget for the MDA put forward one year of very modest single-digit real growth, it was followed by a year of near-zero growth in FY 2012, and then by an -11.3% reduction in real dollars in FY 2013. As Figure 1 makes clear, the overall trend for real-dollar MDA funding has been a downward one in recent years, even though the trend for foreign missile threats to the United States and its partners is clearly growing upward.

What's worrisome is that sequestration's massive and indiscriminate cuts to the military would almost certainly exacerbate the downward trend of MDA's funding. Unless the President and congressional leaders can agree to change current law before March 2013, a legally-mandated sequestration—triggered by the inability of a bipartisan "supercommittee" of lawmakers to agree to any long-term reductions to the federal deficit—will cleave yet another $500 billion in non-inflation-adjusted dollars from regular annual defense spending over the next ten years.

It's critical to note that sequestration, if it happens, would come *in addition* to the Obama administration's significant reductions to the Pentagon's long-term core budget in recent years. (See Figure 2.) In February 2012, the President's defense budget proposal to Congress for FY 2013 culled roughly $487 billion in non-inflation-adjusted dollars from anticipated Pentagon spending over a 10-year period. A year earlier, Obama's defense budget proposal for FY 2012 slashed another $290 billion in non-inflation-adjusted dollars in the next decade.

Especially given the magnitude of long-term cuts to the Pentagon in recent years, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has repeatedly warned that sequestration's across-the-board reductions will be "devastating" to the U.S. military.[1] General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has added: "In my personal military judgment, formed over 38 years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime right now, and I think sequestration would be completely oblivious to that, and counterproductive."[2]

It is likely that sequestration will deeply harm U.S. missile defense programs. To cite one anticipated consequence: In a letter to Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Secretary Panetta warned that defense sequestration would likely lead to further cuts to MDA, including the termination

Figure 1. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Funding in Real Dollars: FY1985 to FY2013
President's Budget Proposal vs Appropriated Budget Authority



Figure 2. Three Scenarios for Non-War-Funding National Defense (050) Spending Over the Next Decade in Nominal Dollars (FY 2013 - FY 2022)



of America's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) effort to field anti-missile interceptors in Europe to defend against Iran's growing regional missile threat in the near- and mid-term.[3] The House Armed Service Committee has projected that sequestration could also negatively impact national missile defense programs, such as efforts related to the ground-based interceptors that protect America's West Coast from ballistic missile attacks.[4]

DON'T THROW MISSILE DEFENSE OFF FUTURE FISCAL CLIFFS

Given America's critical need to field missile defense capabilities to meet growing foreign missile threats, it is imperative that the Executive and Legislative Branches take great pains to avoid throwing missile defense off future fiscal cliffs.

First, the White House and Congressional leaders—as a *sine qua non*—must act to definitively stop sequestration cuts to national defense. It will be neither sufficient nor likely politically feasible for them to continue delaying the onset of massive and indiscriminate defense cuts to the military. As *Defending Defense*, a coalition formed by the American Enterprise Institute, the Foreign Policy Initiative, and the Heritage Foundation, explained in an early January 2013 analysis:

> *By only delaying and not halting these cuts, Congress and the President have made it difficult for the military to adequately plan and make appropriate budgeting and programmatic decisions given ongoing uncertainty about FY 2013 funding levels. And, finally, sequestration will have a devastating impact on the country's defense industrial base by forcing both the sacking of large numbers of highly-skilled and experienced workers, and a decade's long drawdown in resources applied to research and development programs that sustain America's military technological edge.*[5]

Second, supporters of missile defense—in the Executive Branch, in Congress, and in the expert community—must ramp up efforts to explain to the public why the United States needs missile defense to face the continuing growth of foreign missile threats, and that America needs to make the hard choices and

sacrifices necessary to adequately fund and further develop missile defense. A key part of that effort will be to explain why the budgetary investments that the United States makes on missile defense are truly worthwhile.

The prospect of defense sequestration - roughly $500 billion in across-the-board cuts to the Pentagon's regualr annual budget over the next decade - fundamentally imperils efforts to improve and expand America's ballistic missile defense capabilities.

In parallel, it is critical that the Pentagon help make funds for the MDA go farther by making use of existing yet unused assets related to missile defense. For example, as part of any future missile defense sites to defend America's East Coast from ICBM attacks, it should consider deploying the X-Band radar currently laying dormant in the Marshall Islands that originally was going to be deployed in Eastern Europe. In addition, it should strongly examine the option of improving capabilities that we already have—e.g., upgrading the existing Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptor—rather than building entirely new systems to meet future goals for national missile defense.

Third, supporters of missile defense must push back against a particular strain of nuclear arms control-thinking that, as a matter of principle, fundamentally opposes missile defense. This ideological and anti-technology strain of thinking has its origins in the Cold War, when many arms controllers argued not only that any attempts at ballistic missile defense were inherently destabilizing, but also that America's safety in an increasingly nuclear-armed world instead should rest solely on the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—namely, apocalyptic nuclear threats against the enemy country's innocent civilians. Historian John Newhouse, who aligned himself with such thinking, nonetheless wrote that a "favorite apothegm" of pro-MAD arms controllers was: "Offense is defense, defense is offense. Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad."[6]

What's significant is how technological changes—for example, the precision revolution that enabled the United States to substitute exponentially more discriminate conventional weapons in military missions where it could once only rely on indiscriminate nuclear weapons—have helped to make MAD-inspired Luddite thinking on arms control increasingly less relevant. Indeed, such MAD thinking is manifestly unsuited to the international security environment of the 21st century, where rogue regimes not only seek to blackmail the world with nuclear weapons to preserve their own power, but also just might be crazy enough to use them.

To be sure, it will be no easy task to preserve missile defense amid a budgetary environment with strong pressures for at times indiscriminate fiscal austerity. But given the growing missile threats faced by the United States and its partners, supporters of missile defense must face this calling. ■

ENDNOTES

1 For the most recent example, see U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 001-13, "Statement by Secretary Panetta on Sequestration Delay," January 2, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15763.

2 Quoted by Karen Parrish, "Panetta, Dempsey: Sequestration Would Defeat Defense Strategy," American Forces Press Service, February. 16, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67226.

3 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Letters to Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham on the Effects of Sequestration on the Department of Defense, November 14, 2011, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=ae72f319-e34f-4f78-8c88-b8e7c9dee61f.

4 Republican Staff of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), "Re: Assessment of Impacts of Budget Cuts," a memo to HASC Chairman Howard "Buck" McKeon, September 22, 2011, esp. Attachment A, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=51add703-1543-411d-a9ae-e09a51738eb2.

5 "Don't Just Delay Defense Sequestration—Stop It," a Joint Statement of the DEFENDING DEFENSE coalition of the Foreign Policy Initiative, American Enterprise Institute, and Heritage Foundation, January 2, 2013, http://www.defendingdefense.org/publications/dont-just-delay-defense-sequestration%E2%80%94stop-it.

6 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 176.

DEFENSE DOSSIER

American Foreign Policy Council

MANUSCRIPTS SHOULD BE SENT TO the attention of the Editor at 509 C Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002, or submitted via email to defensedossier@afpc.org. The Editors will consider all manuscripts received, but assume no responsibility regarding them and will return only materials accompanied by appropriate postage. Facsimile submissions will not be accepted.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinions expressed in the Defense Dossier (ISSN 2165-1841) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the American Foreign Policy Council.

About the American Foreign Policy Council

For more than three decades, AFPC has played an essential role in the U.S. foreign policy debate. Founded in 1982, AFPC is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to bringing information to those who make or influence the foreign policy of the United States and to assisting world leaders with building democracies and market economies. AFPC is widely recognized as a source of timely, insightful analysis on issues of foreign policy, and works closely with members of Congress, the Executive Branch and the policymaking community. It is staffed by noted specialists in foreign and defense policy, and serves as a valuable resource to officials in the highest levels of government.

DEFENSE DOSSIER

American Foreign Policy Council
509 C Street, NE
Wahsington, D.C. 20002
www.afpc.org