In October 2015, Russia intervened directly in the conflict in Syria, seeking to prop up its beleaguered ally in Damascus and push back rebel groups that had plunged the country into civil war. The United States, which was backing several insurgent groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime, was not impressed.
At a press conference on Oct. 2 of that year, President Barack Obama maintained that Russian President Vladimir Putin "had to go into Syria not out of strength but out of weakness, because his client, Mr. Assad, was crumbling." He asserted that "Russia is not stronger as a consequence of what they've been doing," except insofar as it has "boosted [Putin's] poll ratings inside of Russia." He said that Russia was entering a "quagmire," that it would alienate moderate Sunni states and wind up isolated globally. Obama confidently predicted that this was "not a smart, strategic move on Russia's part."
Now, a year later, the Assad regime is no longer crumbling. The principal rebel groups, including those supported by the United States, have been pushed back to their bastion at Aleppo, which is suffering under a deadly siege. U.S.-led diplomatic efforts have failed to find a solution to lift the blockade and bring humanitarian relief to the tens of thousands of civilians trapped in the city. Moves by France to encourage the International Criminal Court to open a war crimes investigation in response to Russian and Syrian attacks in Aleppo underscore the futility of Western diplomacy to reach practical solutions.
U.S. impotence was on display earlier this month when Secretary of State John Kerry made good on a threat to suspend bilateral channels with Russia regarding reducing violence in Syria. Yet, less than 48 hours later, Kerry was again discussing the Syrian issue with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The State Department explained that the suspension only applied to a particular bilateral channel, and that it would be "irresponsible" not to make American concerns regarding Syria clear. But the only clear message was that the United States is desperate to maintain its relevance to the Syrian crisis, which serves to underscore its drift in the other direction.
The reason why Russia has largely succeeded in meeting its objectives in Syria over the past year is that Moscow has a coherent, well-defined strategy. The overall objective is to pacify the country under the rule of the Assad regime. Any forces that oppose the regime - whether Western-backed Sunni moderates or the Islamic State group or the nominally independent Nusra Front or Kurdish nationalists, or anyone that has taken up arms against Assad - is the enemy. Any of them can be attacked with ruthless force. Likewise, Syria's Iranian and Hezbollah allies have no illusions about whom they are fighting and why.
The United States, on the other hand, is in a strategic muddle. The objective, restated a year ago by Obama, is "for Mr. Assad to transition" (i.e., to leave power), which is the opposite of Moscow's objective, not to mention Assad's. The president said this transition must be "inclusive" and one that "keeps the state intact, that keeps the military intact [and] that maintains cohesion." But the state is not currently intact, there is no cohesion and the Syrian military is busy crushing the rebellion with Russian and Iranian assistance.
Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that Assad did step down, it would be difficult to have an inclusive transition when the U.S. is supporting some rebels and fighting others. Even if the U.S.-backed "moderates" prevailed, they would be unwilling to form a unity government with the hard-core Islamists, some of whom are on the American list of terrorist entities. But the Obama administration is so committed to its ideology of inclusiveness that it would probably make them try, with disastrous consequences.
Obama also expressed strategic confusion a year ago when he said that "we're not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and Russia." But there is no other way to describe a situation in which the U.S. is arming groups seeking to overthrow a Russian ally. It is, in fact, the literal definition of a proxy war.
Last year, Obama said flatly that "an attempt by Russia and Iran to prop up Assad... won't work." But it is working. And until the White House recognizes that the war it is trying to fight is very different from the one actually taking place, there will be no end to the suffering of the Syrian people.
James S. Robbins is senior fellow for national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive.
