In the early morning hours of January 3, 2026, the Trump Administration launched "Absolute Resolve," a military operation to apprehend Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro and remove him from office. The effort marked the most consequential U.S. intervention in Latin America in decades, involving large-scale coordinated intelligence, air and special operations assets.
While news of Maduro's ouster came as a shock to many, it should not have. The decision to remove Venezuela's illegitimate president—whose rule had not been recognized by the United States since 2019—was the logical extension of a reinvigorated focus on the Western Hemisphere on the part of the current U.S. government.
This priority was officially codified in the administration's November 2025 National Security Strategy, which outlines that the administration seeks "a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narcoterrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations," and one that "remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets."[1] The administration's subsequent National Defense Strategy, released in January 2026, reinforces this focus, detailing that "American interests... are under threat throughout the Western Hemisphere." It goes on to outline plans to secure the U.S. homeland by, among other things, "secur[ing] key terrain" in the Americas.[2]
The framing makes clear that, in the eyes of the Trump Administration, a more activist presence in the Western Hemisphere is not optional. Rather, it represents an essential component of homeland security.
Backward From Engagement
Such a reorientation amounts to a sea-change in U.S. policy. Back in 2013, in a speech before the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C., then-Secretary of State John Kerry declared that "the era of the Monroe doctrine is over."[3] Kerry's pronouncement was intended to signal to regional states that the heavy-handed interventionism that at times had characterized America's approach was a thing of the past. In practice, however, it also conveyed something else: that Washington no longer intended to actively contest the growing influence of outside powers south of its border.
The results were pronounced. In the years that followed, the U.S. scaled down its involvement in the region, cutting back funding for key initiatives and military partnerships and disengaging politically from vulnerable regional states.[4] At the same time, the influence of external actors expanded significantly. Russia deepened its political contacts, intelligence cooperation, and military collaboration with the region's anti-Western states, including Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. China made Latin America a major focus of its sprawling Belt & Road Initiative, engaging regional states in ways that increased their economic and political dependence on Beijing while heightening security risks to the United States through the construction of dual-use infrastructure and China-dependent telecommunications networks. Iran, meanwhile, undertook a systematic effort to expand its political, economic and operational footprint in the region, using Venezuela as a beachhead. Non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah flourished as well, exploiting permissive environments and weak governance to expand their fundraising, logistics and facilitation networks.
By early 2025, Latin America was increasingly characterized by deeply adverse political and security dynamics. These included the growing presence of strategic competitors—most notably China, through expanding economic, technological, and infrastructure activities, and Russia, through support for regional authoritarian regimes as well as reinvigorated disinformation operations and military contacts—who sought to undermine U.S. influence. Iran likewise expanded political, military, and economic cooperation with sympathetic governments while cultivating ideological networks capable of generating asymmetric leverage in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, transnational criminal organizations and violent gangs continued to exploit the region's weak governance, fueling drug trafficking, irregular migration, corruption, and endemic violence.[5]
The Road to Caracas
Even before President Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, it was clear that the Western Hemisphere would loom large on his second term foreign policy agenda. The Biden Administration's failure to control migration from Latin America, or to adequately secure the southern U.S. border, had become a heated national political issue. Meanwhile, the President's state of residence was shared by two of his top officials, National Security Advisor-designate Michael Waltz and Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio, thereby guaranteeing that Florida, with its large Latino population and focus on the Americas, would effectively drive foreign policy in a second Trump Administration.
On his first day in office, President Trump issued an Executive Order laying the groundwork to designate criminal organizations and drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).[6] Tellingly, in an early indicator of what would follow, that Order included an explicit reference to Venezuelan criminal gang Tren de Aragua. A month later, the administration formally designated eight Latin American crime organizations, including Tren de Aragua, as FTOs under U.S. law.[7]
By August, ongoing activity by drug cartels led the Trump Administration to initiate military deployments to the Caribbean. U.S. warships were deployed near Venezuela as part of an effort to curtail drug cartel activity,[8] and beginning the following month the Pentagon commenced a sustained maritime strike campaign against drug-smuggling vessels.[9] In October, President Trump confirmed that he had authorized the CIA to carry out covert operations inside Venezuela itself.[10] In November, the U.S. Department of State formally designated another Venezuelan cartel, the Cartel de los Soles, as an FTO—with the designation explicitly outlining the role of Maduro and other regime officials in its continued functioning.[11] And in December, the U.S. ordered a blockade of sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela, commenced the interception of such vessels, and levied sanctions on Venezuela's "shadow fleet" and oil trade facilitators.[12]
By the time it made the decision to remove Maduro from power, the Trump Administration had both attempted to mitigate Venezuela's destabilizing activities and explicitly linked Maduro himself to the criminal networks emanating from its borders. Thereafter, rather than pursuing wholesale regime change in Caracas, the White House has opted to allow Maduro's vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, to take power—reflecting the administration's core priority that, whatever its political composition, Venezuela cease to function as a source of instability and platform for regional power projection for hostile actors.
Looking Beyond Venezuela
In the aftermath of Maduro's ouster, speculation has abounded over which additional Latin American nations might become targets of increased U.S. pressure. For the moment, at least, a second American military intervention in the region appears unlikely. What has changed more fundamentally, however, is the tenor of Washington's approach toward several regional states.
Columbia is one. Once a privileged security and counternarcotics partner, Columbia under current president Gustavo Petro has come to be seen as a security concern. Accordingly, the United States has threatened tariffs, levied sanctions and increased political pressure over alleged links between elements of Petro's government and drug trafficking networks.[13] While recent weeks have seen at least a partial de-escalation of this confrontation, ongoing U.S. pressure reflects the fact that Bogota is now seen as a conditional ally whose behavior is best shaped through coercive leverage.
Mexico is another. The Trump Administration has exerted growing economic and political pressure on Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum in the form of against both cartels and irregular migration.[14] President Trump has gone so far as to threaten potential military action against cartels inside Mexico to eliminate the threat they pose to the U.S. homeland and American citizens.[15]
Cuba is a third case. In January 2026, President Trump issued a new Executive Order outlining that Cuba's government "has taken extraordinary actions that harm and threaten the United States"—including cooperation with, and support for, extra-regional actors such as Russia, China and Iran, as well as non-state groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.[16] In response, the new White House Order authorizes supplemental tariffs on any country providing oil to the island nation.
These and other examples reflect a sustained shift in U.S. policy—away from the passivity and disengagement that characterized the approach of previous administrations to the Americas, toward one that treats the region as a real arena of strategic competition.
Monroe, Modernized
"After years of neglect, the United States will homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region," the 2025 National Security Strategy lays out. "We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability toposition forces or other threatening capabilities, or to control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere."[17]
This formulation alludes to the 1823 address to Congress of James Monroe, in which America's fifth president defined the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence and warned external powers (back then, European nations) against establishing a significant beachhead there.[18] But the so-called "Trump Corollary" articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy represents a modernization of Monroe. Washington's focus is no longer simply preserving the independence of fragile Latin American states, as it had been in the 19th century. Rather, it revolves around ensuring that the Hemisphere is not exploited by hostile actors in ways that threaten the United States or disadvantage it economically.
That approach will require strengthening America's regional military posture, actively contesting the activities of external actors south of the U.S. border, and expanding economic partnerships with regional states. These priorities are reflected throughout the 2025 National Security Strategy. If the Trump Administration matches those words with additional concrete actions, it will reflect a long-overdue recognition of the centrality of the Western Hemisphere to U.S. security and prosperity.
NOTES:
[1] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
[2] U.S. Department of War, 2026 NDS: National Defense Strategy, January 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.
[3] Keith Johnson, "Kerry Makes It Official: 'Era of Monroe Doctrine is Over,'" The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/11/18/kerry-makes-it-official-era-of-monroe-doctrine-is-over/.
[4] J.D. Gordon, "The Decline of U.S. Influence in Latin America," AFPC Defense Dossier Issue. 9, December 2013, https://www.afpc.org/publications/e-journals/security-and-stability-in-latin-america.
[5] Admiral Alvin Holsey, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2025, https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture Statements/2025_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_FINAL.pdf?ver=5L0oh0wyNgJ2_qzelc6wKQ%3D%3D.
[6] The White House, "Executive Order: Designating Cartels And Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists," January 20, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/.
[7] U.S. Department of State, "FACT SHEET: Designation of International Cartels," February 20, 2025, https://www.state.gov/designation-ofinternational-cartels.
[8] Steve Holland, "US deploys warships near Venezuela to combat drug threats, sources say, Reuters, August 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-deploys-warships-near-venezuela-combat-drug-threats-sources-say-2025-08-18/.
[9] See, for instance, Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali and Steve Holland, "US military kills 11 people in strike on alleged drug boat from Venezuela, Trump says," Reuters, September 3, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-military-kills-11-people-strike-alleged-drug-boat-venezuela-trump-says-2025-09-03/.
[10] Nandita Bose, "Trump authorizes CIA operations in Venezuela, raising pressure on Maduro," Reuters, October 16, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-confirms-cia-authorization-venezuela-2025-10-15/.
[11] U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designation of Cartel de los Soles," November 16, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/terrorist-designations-of-cartel-de-los-soles.
[12] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Targets Oil Traders Engaged in Sanctions Evasion for Maduro Regime," December 31, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0348.
[13] Daphne Psaledakis, "US imposes sanctions on Colombian President Petro over drug accusations," Reuters, October 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-sanctions-colombian-president-petro-citing-illicit-drugs-2025-10-24/.
[14] See, for instance, "Mexico pledges action should U.S. talks fail by August tariff deadline," Reuters, July 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-pledges-action-should-us-talks-fail-by-august-tariff-deadline-2025-07-15/.
[15] Maria Verza, "Mexico dismisses US military intervention despite Trump's threats after Venezuela operation," Associated Press, January 5, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-trump-cartels-militarye8a8080b9b5ff429b2cf8c960202fe7d.
[16] The White House, "Executive Order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba," January 29, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/2026/01/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/.
[17] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, op. cit.
[18] National Archives, "Monroe Doctrine (1823)," n.d., https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine.
