When President Donald Trump met with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, earlier this month in Beijing, he received a stark warning. Throughout the two-day state summit, Xi and other Chinese leaders communicated clearly that, in their view, it is up to the United States to make way for China’s growing technical, economic, and military power.
Indeed, in his welcome remarks, Xi put President Trump and the visiting Americans on notice that there has been a “transformation of power across the globe,” and asked—rhetorically—whether China and the United States can overcome the so-called “Thucydides Trap” and “create a new paradigm of major-country relations.”
The 20th-century version of the “Thucydides Trap” theory was introduced by Herman Wouk back in 1980. Wouk argued that despite the heated Cold War competition between them, the United States and the Soviet Union could avoid a hot war.
The theory was subsequently popularized by Harvard professor Graham Allison in his 2017 book, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison suggested that a war between China and the United States is inevitable, based on the notion that rising powers (like China) will invariably challenge the leading hegemon (the United States). That challenge can lead to conflict between the two.
It’s a notion that Chinese officials and scholars have embraced, with a caveat. Chinese officials believe that the conflict envisioned by Allison can be avoided—so long as the United States changes its policies and accommodates China and its rise as a global power.
That was the core message Xi sought to convey to President Trump and the visiting American delegation. In his address, the Chinese leader made it clear that it was up to “President Trump to set the course and steer the giant ship of China-US relations” and open “a new chapter in China-US relations.” In other words, China will maintain its own policies and priorities. The United States needs to be the one to change course.
Xi’s warning, moreover, included a serious “red line”—one that demanded recognition from Washington, and real changes to US policy. Namely, Xi placed the onus on Trump to ensure that the movement toward independence in Taiwan is contained. It is up to the United States, he said, to “exercise extra caution in the Taiwan question,” including limiting American arms sales to the island. Other “red lines” subsequently elucidated in the Chinese press include the US stopping its pressure on Hong Kong’s political system, limiting its concerns about China’s myriad human rights abuses, and, relatedly, turning a blind eye to local conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang.
The rewards for such changes in the US behavior, Xi implied, were substantial: potential purchases of Boeing aircraft and engines, as well as future contracts for beef and grain. The administration was quick to seize on these potential dividends; White House press releases touted China’s intention to purchase 200 Boeing Aircraft and 400 or more aircraft engines, and the White House mentioned the possibility of Chinese purchases of $17 billion worth of US agricultural products. But it was less eager to discuss China’s “red lines”—and the reality that those proffered trade deals are probably contingent on changes in US policy.
The question is, will Washington accommodate these demands? In response to Xi’s opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan, President Trump seemed to suggest he was willing to entertain a compromise, quipping that US arms sales to Taiwan could be “a very good negotiating chip” with China. Ultimately, however, it remains up to both the administration and Congress to determine the importance of its commitments to the island, which are enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
That bit of legislation has long served as a lodestar for US relations with both Taiwan and China. Whether it will continue to be, or whether Washington chooses to accommodate Beijing and avoid the “Thucydides trap,” will determine a great deal about future US policy in Asia.
About the Author: Larry Wortzel
Larry M. Wortzel is a senior fellow in Asian security at the American Foreign Policy Council. A veteran Asia scholar with extensive government and military experience, Dr. Wortzel served two tours of duty as a military attaché at the American Embassy in China and was also assigned to Singapore, Thailand, and the demilitarized zone in South Korea. On the faculty of the US Army War College, Dr. Wortzel was director of the Strategic Studies Institute and, concurrently, a professor of Asian studies. After he retired from the military, Dr. Wortzel served as director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation and as vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at Heritage. Dr. Wortzel served as a commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission from November 2001 to December 2020. Previously, he was chairman of the commission for two years. Dr. Wortzel also served as an adjunct research fellow at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
