A recent week of meetings in Vietnam with Communist Party leaders, government officials, and other influential figures reveals how Hanoi views today’s economic and geopolitical challenges, as well as how Washington might reassure the country about its commitment to a deeper U.S.-Vietnam relationship after months of unhelpful friction between the two.
Hanoi clearly values the relationship, which is rooted in thirty years of “normalized” relations with Washington and, of particular note, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership inked in 2023. In fact, the Vietnamese want closer U.S. ties to help meet their robust economic goals and more U.S. assistance to deter China’s expansionist impulses.
A deeper U.S.-Vietnam relationship would also benefit America, as increased trade and investment would likely boost the U.S. economy. At the same time, enhanced military coordination with Hanoi (and other like-minded governments in the region) would help deter Beijing. These are realities that both President Donald Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth acknowledged during recent visits to the region and meetings with Vietnam’s leaders.
However, in some ways, Washington and Hanoi are talking past one another. The former is often oblivious to how its actions are perceived in Hanoi. The latter does not always understand how Washington formulates its policies. The result is frustration in both capitals at a time of rising tensions in the Pacific, as China seeks to expand its geographic footprint and Vietnam works to protect its interests.
Economically, Vietnam is a modern-day miracle with exciting plans for the future. Since Hanoi launched reforms in 1986 and scrapped its state-centered economic model, per capita gross domestic product has soared from $700 to $4,500 in 2024, in constant dollars. This year, Hanoi unveiled a comprehensive strategy to grow its economy by 10 percent a year for the next five years and become a high-income economy by 2045.
Geopolitically, Vietnam seeks peace and stability, and it views China as a threat to both. However, deterring Beijing is a complicated task, as China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and supplies much of the raw materials and intermediate goods for Vietnamese manufacturers. This gives China’s leaders leverage to limit trade and, in turn, weaken Vietnam’s economy.
Plotting its future, Hanoi is increasingly looking to the West, aligning itself more closely with Washington than with any other Southeast Asian government. These days, officials there speak less frequently about “bamboo diplomacy,” Hanoi’s long-standing strategy of balancing its relations with the United States and China.
This is so for good reason. The United States is now Vietnam’s second-largest trading partner and largest export market. U.S. exports to the country increased by 32 percent, and imports from Vietnam rose by 20 percent from 2023 to 2024, according to the U.S. Trade Representative. Vietnamese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States rose from $5 million in 2007 to $948 million in 2024. U.S. FDI in Vietnam, meanwhile, skyrocketed from $426 million to $4.4 billion over the same period. Other breakthroughs have followed; President Barack Obama, for instance, lifted the ban on arms sales to Hanoi in 2016, enabling the latter to depend less on Russian arms.
All this economic and military integration helps explain why Hanoi remains bewildered by President Trump’s tariffs on Vietnamese exports—initially a massive 46 percent, now reduced to a still substantial 20 percent—and why it has raised concerns that they signal a U.S. retreat from the bilateral relationship.
Exacerbating those worries, Hanoi interprets Washington’s actions through the prism of its own top-down rule, in which the Communist Party sets strategy, mandates implementation, and permits no dissent. Hanoi doesn’t seem to appreciate that, in Washington, power shifts frequently between two political parties, that Congress plays a vital and independent role in shaping foreign policy over the long term, and that U.S. strategies (e.g., tariffs) come and go while bilateral relationships endure.
So, what can Washington do to allay Hanoi’s concerns and focus the two countries more squarely on their shared goals?
First, American policymakers could better appreciate the doubts they plant in Hanoi (and elsewhere) about U.S. stability and staying power when they let policy disputes descend into a record-long government shutdown—which left Vietnamese officials more than a little perplexed—and avoid such mayhem in the future.
Second, both U.S. political parties could seize opportunities to promote their shared commitment to the U.S.-Vietnam relationship by hosting bipartisan events and issuing joint statements to that effect, thereby reassuring Hanoi that the U.S. commitment remains strong.
Third, both parties would do well to recognize that Hanoi (like other capitals) is closely watching the U.S. response to aggression elsewhere, particularly Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine, and drawing conclusions about how much to tie their fortunes to Washington.
At a time of rising regional tensions, Washington and Hanoi need to understand one another better. And they cannot permit short-term controversies to weaken a relationship that’s crucial to the well-being of both.
