The Iran war, it seems, isn’t over.
After the failed negotiations this weekend in Islamabad and the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas, the conflict appears poised to resume.
Yet Washington heads into the next phase with a clearer understanding of the stakes because the past six-plus weeks have offered a stark lesson about the insecurity of global energy and the vulnerability of maritime choke points.
In recent weeks, Iran’s threats to and disruptions of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and a quarter of all seaborne trade pass, have roiled markets, driven up oil prices and sent regional states scrambling.
Saudi Arabia sought to bypass the strait entirely via its East-West pipeline, which began bringing in some 7 million barrels daily to the Red Sea, thereby allowing the kingdom to more or less maintain its prewar output.
The United Arab Emirates used the 235-mile Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which transported up to 1.5 million barrels per day, the bulk of Emirati production, to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
These were important early steps, but they fell short of addressing the vulnerabilities exposed by the conflict with Iran. That will require deeper investment in alternative energy producers and transport corridors.
The conversation starts with the Caspian Sea. Although its share of global energy is relatively modest (roughly 2% to 3% of world oil and 8% to 9% of natural gas), the body of water is home to dynamic producers such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which together produce more than 2 million barrels of oil daily.
With the proper inducements, they could direct more of that flow to the West.
The region is also home to a key connectivity project. The Middle Corridor is a transport network linking East Asia to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. With rail, road and maritime segments, it is a strategic alternative to northern routes (via Russia) and southern routes vulnerable to choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz for delivering Caspian oil and gas and other commodities.
All that makes its further expansion a logical priority. So does the recent deterioration of Iran’s tense relations with neighboring Azerbaijan, which became a target of Iranian drones and missiles during the conflict.
These tensions lay the groundwork for Baku to further deepen its pro-Western tilt. Washington can encourage this by repealing Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, an outdated sanctions measure that, though routinely waived by successive administrations, remains an irritant in ties between Washington and Baku.
Repeal is logical because the Trump administration is seeking to nurture deeper relations with Azerbaijan through new strategic partnership agreements and projects such as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
Africa is another key alternative. Major energy producers in western and southern Africa, such as Nigeria and Angola, along with emerging players such as Mozambique, can supply crude and natural gas to global markets without relying on the Persian Gulf.
Moreover, Nigeria and Angola can increase their already sizable oil exports — 1.6 million barrels per day for Nigeria and roughly 1 million barrels per day for Angola — relatively quickly. Mozambique is on track for substantial natural gas expansion in the near future.
Infrastructure projects also matter. The flagship Lobito Corridor runs via rail and road from Angola on the Atlantic to Zambia and Congo in the continent’s center. Plans call for a further extension of Lobito farther east, something that should now receive serious global attention.
A third option is accelerating the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. First proposed in 2023 as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the corridor aims to create new sea, rail and road routes for trade and energy from India to Europe via the Persian Gulf and the Levant.
The project has gained traction in places such as India and Israel, but it hasn’t shown much tangible progress. Iran’s ongoing leverage over the Strait of Hormuz gives fresh urgency to fast-tracking the initiative.
Some of these solutions can deliver quick gains, while others will take sustained investment and diplomatic attention. Still, all of them are essential.
The recent Iran war made clear that Iran’s radical regime has entirely too much leverage over the health of the global economy. Reducing it should be a top priority for the Trump administration — and for everyone else.
About the Author: Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
