The European Union is at it again. Last month, its executive body, the European Commission, voted to accept ten new members over the next two years. The candidates include countries from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and even the Balkans. Conspicuously absent from the list was Turkey — a key NATO ally and a major partner in the war on terrorism.
Europe's very public snub could have far-reaching implications. Even before the latest flap, Turkey's relations with the EU had been drifting from bad to worse. Despite concerted efforts at domestic political liberalization, economic reforms, human rights, and social development that have been nothing short of spectacular, Ankara has precious little to show for its years of planning for full EU membership.
And since the 1999 Kosovo campaign, Turkey's inherent frictions with the European community have only deepened, as accelerating EU plans for a common security and defense policy have increasingly shut Ankara out of European defense planning. To boot, officials in Ankara have become increasingly frustrated at the continuing support being given to the radical Kurdish Worker's Party (KADEK) in some European countries.
It's no wonder, then, that some of Turkey's most-influential political figures have begun to publicly urge a major foreign-policy rethink. Turkish National Security Council Secretary General Tuncer Kilic is one of them; addressing Ankara's prestigious War Academy back in March, he publicly urged a reconsideration of the country's traditional pro-European outlook. According to him, "Turkey hasn't seen the slightest assistance from the EU," which has a "negative" view of Turkey's problems. Therefore, the General maintained, a new foreign policy "search" — one involving unconventional allies like Russia and Iran — is in order.
To be sure, Kilic's outlook is not universally held — the majority of Turks remain staunchly pro-European. Nonetheless, it reflects the beginnings of a notable internal reassessment of Ankara's relationship with the West.
In fact, concrete examples of this possible reorientation are already becoming visible. This summer, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer took a high-profile visit to Iran to boost economic and security relations. The two-day affair yielded an array of agreements on cultural, scientific and economic affairs — a testament to the new political warmth between Ankara and Tehran. In addition, over the past couple of years Turkey has emerged as a major consumer of Iranian natural gas. According to current figures, Turkey could be dependent on Iran for upwards of 20 percent of its total natural gas consumption by the end of the decade. The new Turkish-Iranian entente, therefore, reflects a significant change in the strategic equation between the two former regional competitors.
The rapprochement with Iran has been matched by a new level of closeness with Syria. Since they almost went to war over Syria's support of the Kurdish Worker's party in October 1998, Ankara and Damascus have taken some tentative steps toward normalizing relations. In June, such a reconciliation became a reality with the signing of an unprecedented pact on Turkish-Syrian military cooperation. As Turkish officials themselves make clear, the agreement signals nothing less than the start of a "new era" in relations with their main rival in the Middle East.
For American planners, this increasingly evident discontent is undoubtedly an ominous development. Turkey is a pivotal pro-Western, democratic ally in the Middle East, and an indispensable part of any campaign against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Reassuring Ankara, and reinforcing its alignment with Washington and with European capitals, should consequently be a top priority for the Bush administration.
Diplomatically, this means exerting even greater American influence among NATO partners to cement Turkey's status as an European nation. Projects like Washington's planned NATO missile defense architecture, in which Ankara figures prominently, should be bolstered and expanded. The U.S. should also use every means at its disposal to pressure the EU to reverse its stance on Turkish membership ahead of its upcoming December summit in Copenhagen — an event that is sure to be a defining moment in Turkey's relationship with Europe. And with regards to Iraq, Washington and its coalition allies must address Ankara's increasingly vocal misgivings about vulnerability to Iraqi missiles and Kurdish separatism as part of planning for any post-Saddam scenario.
Taken together, such measures will go much of the way toward anchoring Turkey decisively in Europe's camp. The alternative is a potentially profound transformation of Turkish foreign policy, one unlikely to benefit either Europe or the U.S.
If its latest decision is any indication, the European Union may be able to live with such a development. It is clear, however, that the United States cannot.
