The events of the past week in Suweyda, southern Syria, have shed new light on Israel’s emerging strategy toward its northern neighbor.
Early last week, a series of local disputes between Bedouin and Druze families in southern Syria escalated into an invasion of militias affiliated with the country’s new government, led by one-time jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, into the heart of Druze territory.
What followed were reports of murder, rape, plunder and destruction committed by regime-linked groups, and a desperate cry for help on the part of Syria’s Druze.
A Quick History
The Druze are a small minority spread between Lebanon, northern Israel, and northern Jordan, with their concentration in southern Syria. Persecuted over the centuries, they are known as fierce fighters that placed their communities on the more mountainous terrain of the Levant for defensive reasons. Another defining feature of the Druze is the principle of loyalty to land and regime. Indeed, so close is the bond between Israel and its small Druze population of approximately 150,000 that most Druze youth serve in the IDF, with many becoming high-ranking officers.
Aware of this, Israel did not resent Syrian Druze for taking part in Bashar Assad’s brutal regime in Damascus, or for letting Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia into some of their villages on the Golan Heights, on Israel’s border. Unfortunately, however, that forbearance is not shared by their Syrian neighbors. Now, concerns about the Druze in Syria have catapulted Israel into a new potential crisis.
Last December, Israel’s immediate reaction to the fall of Assad’s regime, and the rise to power of Al-Sharaa, was to capture a small strip of Syrian territory on to ensure that no jihadi presence could threaten its northern communities. There it has remained as a sort of insurance policy against Syrian militancy and policy backsliding. Israel has also declared southwestern Syria a demilitarized zone, forbidding organized militias from operating there.
Here, Israeli and Western perceptions diverge wildly. Al-Sharaa, backed by Turkey and embraced by the Saudis, the Europeans and the United States, is widely seen as the new hope for a sovereign and stable Syria. Israel, however, takes a much dimmer view. It sees Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as Islamist and staunchly anti-Israeli, and officials in Jerusalem worry that al-Sharaa’s fledgling government could effectively become a proxy for Ankara. Were that to happen, they suggest, Israel will simply have swapped a hostile Iranian-supported northern neighbor for a radical Turkish-backed one.
But Jerusalem has bowed to Western enthusiasm. The Trump administration in particular has been extremely optimistic about the potential for al-Sharaa’s rehabilitation, even painting his regime as a prime candidate to join the Abraham Accords. Israel, grateful to the White House for its role in the recent twelve-day war with Iran, is in no position to disagree, and so has steadily gravitated toward American optimism about the new Syria.
All of this has changed dramatically with the start of the Suweyda crisis. Hundreds of Israeli Druze, worried over the plight of their fellow tribesmen, went as far as crossing into Syria in a demand for Israel to take action. It did. For two days, the Israeli Air Force pounded regime-affiliated forces in Suwayda, some 70-90 kilometers from Israel’s border.
Two strikes were even conducted on Damascus, a clear signal to the al-Sharaa regime that Israel stands ready to defend the Druze by all means necessary. A fragile truce was declared on July 17, and regime forces have returned to Suweyda. Israel is monitoring the situation closely.
What Happens Next?
What comes next is unclear. Syria’s Druze are divided on the issue of the new regime and Israeli support. Some are desperate to protect themselves from a government that seems to be little more than a loose coalition of Islamist militias, many with clear eliminationist intentions. Others, however, understand they are located too far from the Israeli border to be sustainably protected by Israel.
Al-Sharaa himself seems torn on the issue, politically maneuvering between his prior jihadist political base and his efforts to curry favor with foreign governments. Ankara, meanwhile, is playing its hand cautiously, waiting for Syria’s reconstruction to commence in earnest before it fully backs the new regime in Damascus politically and militarily.
In this game, Israel is maneuvering between its moral obligation to the Druze and the domestic pressure being exerted by them, and Washington’s view of Al-Sharaa as a positive regional actor. Time will tell if the situation stabilizes or deteriorates further. It will also determine just how far Israel is willing to go to protect the Druze in Syria—and which view of al-Sharaa proves to be the correct one.
Regardless of how things evolve, though, Israel’s trial-and-error policy in southern Syria has clarified matters. Although Jerusalem isn’t in a position to determine who rules Damascus, it has demonstrated that it nevertheless has the capability and the will to dictate its vital interests there.
The Al-Sharaa regime stands so instructed.
About the Author:
Brigadier-General Eran Ortal (Israel Defense Forces, retired) is a Visiting Scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
