The following are two excerpts from the essay, which is currently only available to subscribers.
India is focusing heavily on naval capabilities because friction in the Sino-Indian relationship is not restricted to their disputed border. Indeed, the most contentious arena for China and India may not be their land border at all, but the Indian Ocean. A growing number of strategic commentators, not least Robert Kaplan in his new book on the Indian Ocean region, Monsoon, have acknowledged the nearly limitless strategic significance of the ocean, home to the globe’s principal oil shipping lanes. Indeed, nearly 70 percent of the global traffic of petroleum products traverses the Indian Ocean, so there are few countries on earth for whom the Indian Ocean does not have some significance.
Over the past decade or so, China has made a concerted effort to boost its profile in the Indian Ocean region, a policy designed to compensate for what Beijing sees as perhaps its greatest strategic weakness: the security of its energy imports. Eighty-five percent of the oil bound for China will pass through the Indian Ocean over the next decade, including through one of the “main navigational choke points of world commerce,” the Strait of Malacca. China has always feared that this narrow, 500-mile stretch of water between Indonesia and Malaysia could be used by a potential adversary to choke off its energy supply and starve its economy into submission (China’s leaders have watched closely as India has boosted its military profile in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Union Territories of India that sit near the mouth of the Strait of Malacca).
China has attempted to address this strategic liability and raise its profile in the Indian Ocean with its now-famous “string of pearls,” an elaborate network of investments in port facilities, listening posts, and infrastructure projects along the Indian Ocean rim in countries like Burma, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The strategy serves a dual purpose. Most obviously, it gives China a more vibrant presence in the Indian Ocean from which to monitor developments and ship movements. It is also likely to earn Chinese civilian and military ships privileged access at various port facilities; access that would be critical in any conflict in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, however, the string of pearls is designed to provide China with alternative, overland energy access routes that can bypass the naval chokepoints. Hence the construction of deep water ports, gas pipelines, and inland infrastructure projects such as roads and rail links in South and Central Asia....
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The effects of this game of brinksmanship being played by China, and to a lesser degree India, have so far been constrained by prudent and cautious political leaders in both capitals. However, the longer the aura of confrontation perpetuates, the more it generates a momentum of its own. Hawkish comments by officials and newspaper editors are easily dismissed; shifts in military doctrines and public opinion are much harder to reverse.
Nevertheless, it is critically important not to overstate the degree of animosity in Sino-Indian relations. The two countries enjoy booming economic ties, including US$60 billion in annual bilateral trade, projected to surge to US$100 billion by 2015. High-level governmental exchanges are frequent, and the official discourse often diplomatic and complimentary. Many on the Indian left, and within its powerful government bureaucracy, see China more as friend than foe. China, as it does with all its neighbors, frequently stresses the need for peaceful co-existence, mutual respect, and non-interference in each others’ affairs. Leaders in both capitals have committed to resolving their border disputes through peaceful means and diplomatic negotiations. However, actions speak louder than words and while the potential for conflict remains low in the short term, many Sino-Indian divisions are widening rather than narrowing.
It is hard not to view the rise in tensions over the past five years as a story of Chinese provocations against India. This perception is buttressed by several factors. One is that China’s provocations have been tangible, documentable policies, while Beijing’s complaints about India are more abstract. For instance, Beijing clearly harbors animosity toward India for hosting the Dalai Lama, who, it argues rather unconvincingly, is trying to incite unrest in Tibet. For many Chinese, India is a willing accomplice. China also appears uncomfortable with the budding Indo-US alliance, which Beijing sees as part of a larger design by the United States to encircle it with an anti-China coalition. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the spike in Sino-Indian tensions, beginning in 2006, came shortly after the United States and India signed the landmark US-India nuclear deal and entrenched their strategic alliance. Finally, as China works to curry influence in South Asia, India is itself pursuing a “Look East” policy, signing free trade deals and boosting military cooperation with countries in China’s “orbit,” like Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and South Korea.
Another explanation is that China has simply been more provocative. Of course, provocative need not be illegitimate. China is within its right to pursue greater influence in South Asia and modernize its military, and India is within its right to be concerned by these moves. But it is hard to view other policies—border incursions, challenges to India’s sovereignty over Kashmir, confrontation at international institutions, cyber-attacks—as benign and not specifically designed to provoke India.