International attention is now riveted on the crisis in Ukraine, but another beleaguered U.S. ally is rapidly approaching a critical crossroads as well. As the U.S. military prepares to exit Afghanistan after more than a decade of war, real questions remain about the country’s future. Perhaps most urgent, and of greatest significance to the United States, is the capacity of Afghanistan’s forces to successfully fight the Taliban and al-Qaida.
On June 18, 2013, the Afghan National Security Forces assumed lead responsibility for nationwide security in a milestone ceremony in Kabul. Yet in both form and substance, those security forces are still very much a work in progress.
The Afghan National Security Forces consist of approximately 344,500 personnel, now nearing the official end-strength goal of 352,000 members. Its forces are divided into three main branches: the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Air Force (under the control of the Ministry of Defense), and the Afghan National Police (overseen by the Ministry of the Interior). A fourth branch, the Afghan Public Protection Force, was dismantled last month by the government in Kabul because of financial constraints and poor management.
The capabilities of this force, however, remain rudimentary. With many Afghan provinces now at or near the final stage of transition from U.S. to Afghan control, one might expect the security forces' to be near completion. However, two problems continue to significantly undermine the training mission: attrition and insurgent subversion.
Attrition in the Afghan National Army last year stood at a whopping 34.4 percent. Those of the air force and police, though considerably lower, were still concerning, at 13.4 percent and 16.8 percent, respectively. Pay disparities and high casualty rates are among the principal causes for this hemorrhage of personnel.
Insurgent subversion, meanwhile, cripples the forces in several ways, including through insider attacks against Afghan forces. These have dropped significantly in number, from 35 in 2012 to less than a dozen last year. Yet the insurgency continues to co-opt, coerce, and bribe the security forces long after their recruitment. Taliban forces also have fairly easy access to both military and police uniforms via black market trafficking. The result is an unreliable force that might very well have traitors in its midst.
Compounding both of these problems are low rates of literacy, which may be as little as 50 percent for Afghan security personnel.
What can be done? Increases in pay, vacation time and an incentive-based promotion system are likely to increase retention and ameliorate attrition. Community-building exercises can also help to restore trust between civilians and local security, whether police or military. Mandatory literacy programs must be restructured, and agencies should place greater emphasis on education levels when considering promotions. Likewise, the Afghan government and police need to gain better control of uniform distribution.
Filling these voids will certainly help the aid the transformation of the Afghan National Security Forces into a self-sustaining and capable security force. And with the departure of the coalition now slated for late 2014, the proverbial clock is ticking loudly.