The Dangers of Donald Trump’s Ad Hoc Foreign Policy

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President Donald Trump has been busy on the world stage of late—toppling Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro in a precision strike by U.S. forces, warning Tehran not to turn its guns on Iran’s protestors, and pushing for Russia-Ukraine peace.

But his seemingly contradictory approaches to those three challenges will raise serious questions among allies and adversaries about U.S. intentions and future action, not just in those current hotspots but everywhere.

Such uncertainty, in turn, raises the risk of a miscalculation by China, Russia, Iran, or another adversary—a miscalculation that could heighten global tensions or even trigger a dangerous conflagration.

Questions about current U.S. foreign policy are numerous.

First Question: How Far Will Donald Trump Go to Enhance U.S. Security?

“[W]e’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after U.S. forces seized Maduro. On that basis, the case for U.S. action was strong. Along with his alleged drug trafficking, Maduro gave China, Russia, and Iran a foothold in Latin America while nourishing economic and military ties with them.

Trump’s territorial aspirations, however, extend not only across Latin America (as he and top aides have issued warnings to Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico) but also to the land of a close ally and founding NATO member.

“We need Greenland,” Trump says, expressing a desire to offset the growing Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic. But any forceful U.S. effort to acquire this self-governing territory of Denmark, where the United States already maintains a sizable military presence, would create a crisis for NATO if not destroy the alliance altogether.

With all parties recognizing the Russian and Chinese threat, however, U.S. negotiations with Denmark and Greenland—if conducted judiciously—could boost the U.S. military footprint in Greenland, increase Washington’s access to its natural resources, and bar Russian and Chinese companies from operating within its borders.

Second Question: How Long Will the U.S. Stay Engaged in a Country After Toppling Its Government?

After successful military action, presidents tend to proclaim victory prematurely. George W. Bush declared “mission accomplished” after toppling Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003. Yet, he left behind a bloody conflict that lasted about 20 years, and cost many U.S. lives and dollars. Libya, too, descended into chaos after President Barack Obama approved NATO military action, enabling rebel forces to capture and kill Muammar Gaddafi. In neither situation was Washington prepared for what might follow the end of absolute rule.

Trump is not known for patience, and, in fact, with his attention focused elsewhere, his recent plan for Gaza’s rebirth is withering on the vine. To date, neither the United States nor any other nation (besides Israel) seems willing to commit troops to enforce a central plank of Trump’s plan—Hamas’ disarmament and withdrawal from governing Gaza’s 2.1 million Palestinians.

Trump has said the United States will “run” Venezuela for now. Still, the challenges of rebuilding its economy and its oil infrastructure are enormous, raising the question of whether we’ll remain committed to the long-term task.

Third Question: Does the U.S. Really Care About Human Rights?

Amid another round of nationwide protests against the mismanagement and brutality of Iran’s theocracy, Trump threatened forceful action of some kind if Iran (as it already has) “violently kills peaceful protestors.”

But, under Trump, Washington’s concern about human rights has been episodic at best. The awful suffering of Venezuelans was hardly a driving force for action against Maduro. Moreover, Trump seems unmoved by the torture, deportations, and sexual violence that Russia has inflicted on Ukraine since its attempted conquest began in February 2022. In fact, he’s proposed a peace plan that would reward Russia for its depredations.

Protecting Iranians from a savage regime is a worthy cause. Yet, U.S. action vis-à-vis Venezuela and Ukraine suggests that human rights is more a convenient cudgel to pressure Tehran than a sincere concern.

Fourth Question: What Message Will America’s Adversaries Take from the Trump Administration’s Actions?

Optimists suggest that with Washington toppling Maduro, China, Russia, and other autocratic regimes will take U.S. threats more seriously and grow more reluctant to use force to seize land in their own regions.

The opposite, however, seems just as likely. With Trump’s Western Hemisphere-centered focus, Beijing may grow convinced that he won’t defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, and Moscow may grow convinced that (as he’s already suggested) he won’t put U.S. troops in harm’s way if Russia moves against Europe.

Moreover, Trump is taking or threatening military action against decidedly weaker opponents. The fact that he’s sided with Russia over Ukraine could signal he has no appetite for a stand-off with more powerful adversaries.

A world that wonders what the United States will do next beyond its shores is a world of less stability and greater risk.

Lawrence J. Haas is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is the author of, among other books, Harry and Arthur: Truman, Vandenberg, and the Partnership That Created the Free World.

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