President Barack Obama believed that reaching a deal with Iran over its nuclear weapons program would be a historic diplomatic breakthrough that could lead to a fundamental transformation in U.S.-Iranian relations and, more importantly, to significant changes in Iran's international behavior. But, nearly a year after the deal's implementation, there are no signs of change in Iran, and good reason to believe that the deal is in its final days.
The nuclear deal - formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - was officially implemented on Jan. 16, 2016. On that day, Obama said the deal guaranteed that "Iran will not get its hands on a nuclear bomb." He also opined that, while the agreement "was never intended to resolve all of our differences," the process of negotiation itself "has created a unique opportunity - a window - to try to resolve important issues." While noting that a number of major problems (such as Iran's missile program, threats to regional allies like Israel, support for terrorism and violent proxy regimes, and human rights violations) remained, the president waxed optimistic that the Iranian people "have the opportunity to begin building new ties with the world" and "pursue a new path - a different, better future that delivers progress for both our peoples and the wider world."
Sadly, there is no indication that Iran has taken the opportunity to pursue this new path. When the deal was implemented, Iran immediately achieved its primary strategic goal of sanctions relief, primarily through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which terminated previous U.N. resolutions that penalized Iran for its nuclear program. In exchange, Iran promised not to continue to pursue its nuclear program for about a decade.
However, sanctions relief wasn't contingent on Iran altering any other policies, or shifting its strategy in the Middle East or elsewhere. The president's notion that the deal might lead to positive changes in other spheres, therefore, was based on the erroneous assumption that the Islamic Republic in fact wanted to change those things. However, nothing in Tehran's statements or behavior since implementation day has indicated that it is planning to scale back its missile program, reduce its support for regional proxies, or moderate its hostility to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States itself.
Recent developments, moreover, have dimmed the outlook for the nuclear deal's survival. Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election puts the deal in immediate peril, since during the campaign he threatened to "rip it up" when he took office. Critics have noted the various structural difficulties in the U.S. abruptly withdrawing from the deal, especially the fact that it was signed by five other countries in addition to Iran, and that the implementation was done through the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Trump administration could take unilateral action against the deal with the expectation that a U.S. withdrawal would be so disruptive to the overall framework that it would collapse.
The Iranians are already bracing themselves for just such a possibility. In a speech at Tehran University on Dec. 6, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Trump "wants to do many things, but none of his actions would affect us. Do you think the he can rip up the JCPOA? Do you think we and our nation will let him do that?" He noted that "there is no doubt that the United States is our enemy."
Iran has also threatened to respond to any continued U.S. sanctions, even those unrelated to the nuclear program. On Dec. 1, the U.S. Senate voted 99-0 to extend the Iran Sanctions Act. The act, which was introduced in 1996, was intended to sanction Tehran not only for its nuclear program but also for support of terrorist groups in the region, which is not covered by the nuclear deal. In response, Rouhani told the parliament in Tehran that the extension would be "a blatant violation of the Iran deal" - suggesting that Tehran has a very different vision of the agreement than does Washington. Iran has also threatened to "respond in kind" to any new sanctions, or even the renewal of existing ones.
Thus, within a year of its implementation, the hope that the nuclear pact could usher in a new era of relations with Iran appears to be defunct. The only remaining question is whether the agreement will survive at all - and, if not, whether Iran or the United States is the one that delivers the fatal blow.
James S. Robbins is senior fellow for national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of "This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive."
