Back in 2023, when the Malian army, aided by Russian mercenary forces, recaptured the northern city of Kidal, it seemed like the start of a new order in the West African state. Mali’s ruling military junta claimed it had done what the previous government could not: retake the strategically vital town from separatist forces. Russia, in turn, was able to offer evidence that it could serve as an effective security partner for those disillusioned with the West.
Fast forward three years, and the situation is very different. On April 25, 2026, a series of coordinated attacks struck Bamako, Mali’s capital, and other cities throughout the nation. The country’s minister of defense was killed, and its northern military bases were overrun. The attacks were planned and carried out by the Al Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with ethnic Tuareg separatist fighters from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).
The FLA recently claimed responsibility for an attack on a convoy of 300 Russian and Malian troops on July 9, following more coordinated JNIM-FLA attacks on army bases and a prison the previous weekend.
The attacks demonstrated an ominous pooling of resources and intelligence between two separate but complementary militant groups. The result is a disturbing new tactical and operational threat to Mali’s junta. It also represents a serious blow to Russian credibility in Africa.
In recent years, the Kremlin had made major inroads on the African continent. Following their respective coups, the new juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso all turned away from partnership with Western nations and toward Moscow. The calculus was clear; instead of Europeans or Americans insisting on democratic elections and norms, Sahelian nations favored an ally who was willing to overlook democratic processes, embrace military governments, and rely on brute force even when those tactics resulted in atrocities against civilian populations.
But now the wisdom of that choice and the very presence of Russian forces on the continent are in doubt. Hundreds of members of Russia’s Africa Corps paramilitary group, the rebranded name of the infamous Wagner mercenary outfit that now operates under the control of the Russian Defense Ministry, have withdrawn from bases in Mali’s north since the attacks, challenging the Kremlin’s image as an effective security partner in Africa.
For Western observers alarmed by the growing instability in the Sahel, schadenfreude is a natural reaction. It is also a mistake.
The humiliation of the Africa Corps, who had to negotiate a safe-passage agreement past the jeering forces they had been brought in to dominate, highlighted Russia’s limitations. Unfortunately, the costs of this reversal will not be borne only in Moscow.
The most obvious is the human toll. The Sahel is one of the poorest regions on Earth, and life expectancy in Mali is only 61 years. The region’s youth demographic is expanding even as it faces a steep shortage of meaningful economic or political opportunities. In the absence of these, JNIM and other terrorist actors are making serious inroads.
Terrorist activity is on the rise in West Africa as well. As the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University has documented, the continent as a whole has become the most active global theater in terms of terrorist activity, and West Africa is increasingly at the epicenter. Mali provides only the latest case in point. Moreover, radical groups active there have expansionist ambitions and neighboring countries justifiably fear that what happens in Mali will not stay contained to the Sahel. Attacks that used to occur only in remote areas in the north are now multiplying throughout the region, and increasingly JNIM is launching attacks in coastal West African countries.
The Russian theory of the case—that such disorder could be suppressed given sufficient brutality—was wrong. But intellectual honesty demands that we acknowledge that prior Western involvement also failed. But so, too, has disengagement. The vacuum is the problem: when credible partners step back, governments take help from whoever offers it.
What is needed now is a new, proactive long-term plan for reengagement. Such an approach begins with a realization that, while military strikes are necessary, they are insufficient in and of themselves. Air strikes or special operations raids simply cannot address the economic, cultural, and governance shortfalls that allow extremists to operate and recruit successfully. Kinetic counterterrorism plays a critical role, but it is only one leg of a larger approach—one that blends military and economic support with revitalized diplomatic engagement to buttress vulnerable communities.
Here, Mali should serve as a cautionary tale. Weeks after the April attacks, the country still risks becoming a haven for those who wish America ill. Preventing it from becoming one requires Washington to swing the pendulum back toward meaningful engagement that promotes a critical national security function. Russia’s failure has made this possible. We should take advantage of it.
About the Author: Brendan Sanders
Brendan Sanders is a senior fellow for African Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. A former foreign service officer, he served at the US Embassy in Bamako from 2013–2016. He also worked on complex, multi-stakeholder projects in Kenya, Afghanistan, Mali, Benin, and Washington while serving in a variety of foreign policy, development, and humanitarian assistance roles. Sanders completed his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.