What comes next for Iran? The recent Israeli and American strikes on Iran’s nuclear program led many to speculate about the potential for fundamental political change in Iran. But weeks later, hopes for some sort of internal transformation have dimmed.
This may surprise some. At first glance, Iran has many traits of a liberal democracy. Its population of over 90 million is largely secular, urban, and educated. Over the past decade, the country has been swept by recurring pro-democracy protests, the most recent of which occurred in 2022. And recent pollingsuggests the majority of Iranians see the Islamic Republic as a bankrupt construct and seek a fundamentally different sort of government.
That may still happen. But, more than four-and-a-half decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and despite massive economic and political hardship, Iran’s clerical regime does not appear to be showing signs of fragmentation. The regime’s endurance, in turn, is a product of Iran’s long and troubled history.
That history is one of isolation, putting it at odds with the rest of its region. Iran is one of three Persian-speaking nations and one of only four Shia Muslim-majority countries. In nationalist terms, Iran’s Persian identity is distrusted by the Middle East’s majority Arab population. In sectarian ones, Iran’s minority Shia Islam is seen as antagonistic to the majority Sunni strain of the Muslim faith.
These differences run deep. Persia was one of the ancient world’s great civilizations, predating the rise of Islam by thousands of years. Over the span of two millennia, Iran suffered numerous invasions, from the Arabs to the Mongols and Tamerlane, but successfully resisted assimilation by drawing on its rich heritage.
This trend has continued into the modern era. For instance, Iraq’s 1980 surprise invasion of Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War united the country during a time of political upheaval following the Revolution, solidifying the clerical regime’s grip on power. The same dynamics are at play today.
During the recent Twelve-Day War, officials in the United States and Israel spoke, at least in passing, of the potential for democratic revolution in Iran, and even encouraged the Iranian people to rise up and oust the ayatollahs. But no active anti-regime protests materialized, and the top Iranian leaders who were eliminated by Israel were quickly replaced. Since then, the regime has sought new ways to solidify its rule, including by using nationalist imagery to foster greater solidarity among the population.
Diplomatic outreach is not a panacea. Due to its history, Iran remains deeply wary of the outside world. Iran can only ever see itself as a victim, even as it speaks of wiping Israel off the map and chants “Death to America.” At any time, the Iranian regime could stop funding its terror proxies, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and seek better ties with the West. It has not, because the export of its brand of revolutionary Islam is central to regime survival. Iran would much rather seek to be again an ascendant empire than capitulate to a hostile regional order.
If the United States can’t oust the Iranian regime or pacify it, though, it needs to craft a better strategy for Iran’s long-term containment.
Over the past two decades, policymakers in Washington have searched for the proper approach toward Tehran. As a result, American policy has oscillated wildly between engagement and hostility, from negotiations to crushing sanctions to the US assassination of one of Iran’s most prominent military figures, Qassem Soleimani, in 2020.
Now, in the aftermath of this summer’s conflict, the United States has a fresh opportunity to forge a containment policy that reassures America’s Middle Eastern allies, diminishes the power of Iran’s proxy network, and forges a serious regional security architecture.
Engagement also plays a role. The White House has signaled its desire for a new nuclear deal with the Iranian regime. If the administration plays its cards right and uses the proper mix of diplomatic carrots and strategic sticks, it may just secure a deal that is wider-ranging and better serves American interests than the one President Trump exited in 2018.
None of this means that Iran won’t have a democratic revolution at some point in the future. What is clear, however, is that change will not come on America’s timetable. Instead, a true transformation depends on the Iranian people themselves. And until one happens, the United States will need to mitigate the threat the Islamic Republic poses to its neighbors and the West.
Charlotte Krausz is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.