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Since 2008, Saudi Arabia has pushed the U.S. to help it develop a civil nuclear program, in recent years leveraging its nuclear ambitions as a bargaining chip in U.S. efforts to broker a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal. While Washington has entertained the trade-off, it has largely resisted, skeptical of Riyadh’s underlying motives and wary of sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Biden’s notional pact marks a shift from all that. The deal, if it passes congressional scrutiny, would see the U.S. increase security assurances for Saudi Arabia and help it develop a civil nuclear program in exchange for Riyadh limiting its growing ties with China. But amid Saudi Arabia’s current refusal to recognize Israel without a plan for Palestinian statehood, the deal falls short of achieving normalization. Instead, it merely seeks to butter Saudi Arabia up for a possible normalization deal down the road.
Washington’s willingness to appease Riyadh’s nuclear demands reflects a couple of key considerations. It highlights the Administration’s desperation to buy legitimacy in the Middle East, where Iran’s unchecked bellicosity and the regional outcry over Israel’s war in Gaza have helped undermine U.S. prestige. It also reflects a subtle yet growing perception in Washington that a Saudi nuclear program may be inevitable–– a consequence of Riyadh’s expanding ties with Beijing.
Indeed, although Saudi Arabia has long favored nuclear partnership with the U.S., Washington’s intransigence has increasingly led it to pursue nuclear projects with China instead. In recent years, China has helped Saudi Arabia build a yellowcake production facility, led initiatives to identify and extract uranium deposits, andpresented bids to erect a nuclear power plant in the Kingdom. Importantly, China has welcomed Saudi Arabia’s desire to enrich uranium domestically, long a sticking point in deliberations with the U.S.
Beijing’s support for Riyadh’s nuclear pursuits is coupled with investments in several other Saudi initiatives that Washington has either opposed or neglected –– including the development of an indigenous ballistic missile industry and solar power projects pursuant to the country’s sweeping Vision 2030 plan. For China, partnership with Riyadh fits neatly into its larger strategy of bolstering its influence in the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia, the deepening ties reflect mounting concerns that its traditional partner, the United States, may no longer be a reliable security ally.
Nevertheless, a U.S.-Saudi nuclear partnership isn’t a better alternative. Nor should officials conclude that a Saudi nuclear program is a worthwhile trade-off for Saudi-Israeli normalization – or a sustainable way to curb either Iranian belligerence or Chinese influence.
That’s because, although longstanding, the U.S.-Saudi partnership has never been based on shared values of democracy, human rights, and a norms-based world order. To the contrary, the Kingdom’s foreign policy track record of the past quarter-century has been decidedly spotty. And while the country’s internal politics are now trending in a positive direction – including a loosening of restrictive social norms and a real change in the way it interprets the Islamic faith – it’s not unreasonable to be concerned with the future trajectory of a nuclear Saudi Arabia. After all, Iran’s nuclear program was originally endowed by the U.S. in 1957 as part of President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative during the time of the Shah. But geopolitics can evolve quickly, and Iran – now a radical theocracy – today ranks among America’s greatest adversaries.
The Saudi interest in a nuclear program, moreover, has everything to do with regional security. On July 19th, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that Saudi Arabia’s longtime adversary Iran may be just “one or two weeks” away from having enough weapons-grade uranium to make a nuclear weapon, the shortest so-called “breakout time” ever reported for Iran. Although Riyadh contends that its nuclear interests are economic- and energy-driven, there can be little doubt that Iran’s latest nuclear advances (and years of failed U.S. efforts to contain Iran’s ambitions) have contributed to Riyadh’s desire for a nuclear deterrent of its own. For Saudi Arabia, a nuclear deal with the U.S. would reflect a renewed American commitment to Saudi security, as well as an insurance policy against Iran.
Regardless of whether it succeeds, Biden’s deal indicates that U.S. officials are increasingly open to the idea of a nuclear Kingdom. That trend, moreover, is bipartisan: former President (and current Republican contender) Donald Trumpalso sought to appease Riyadh’s nuclear demands covertly as part of his efforts to spur regional normalization in the Middle East. By contrast, likely Democratic nominee Vice President Kamala Harris has been less welcoming of Saudi Arabia’s demands than either her boss or Trump, voting to limit arm sales to Riyadh and calling on the U.S. to “fundamentally reevaluate [its] relationship with Saudi Arabia” while serving in the Senate.
But regardless of who claims the White House next year, both candidates’ approaches could further Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions albeit in different ways. Directly helping Saudi Arabia develop its nuclear program threatens to further inflame tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, and could easily prompt a regional arms race as nervous Gulf neighbors scramble to catch up. At the same time, restraining U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia may increase Riyadh’s doubts about U.S. commitment to its security, in turn fueling its pursuit of nuclear technology from China.
Fortunately, a Saudi nuclear program is not inevitable. Riyadh still places enormous value on its partnership with the U.S., and firmer guarantees of cooperation and coordination may help to blunt Riyadh’s current nuclear drive. That, however, requires Washington to step up and demonstrate concretely to Riyadh why it doesn’t need to go nuclear.
Grace Yetter is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
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