Western Military Intervention Is the Answer

Related Categories: Democracy and Governance; Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues; Middle East

The civil war in Syria is over two years old with no end in sight. As matters stand, the future holds either continued bloody stalemate or a successor regime dominated by anti-Western radicals. The time has come to force a more favorable decision.

Military intervention in Syria could be modeled on the interventions in Libya in 2011, Afghanistan in 2001, and the 1995 NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The humanitarian argument for intervention is strong. Somewhere over 1,200 civilians died in Libya’s 2011 civil war, when the White House declared a humanitarian crisis that triggered “responsibility to act” to prevent “violence on a horrific scale.” By contrast, 63,000 to 78,000 have died in Syria, and the refugee crisis is growing.

The strategic case is even stronger. Syria under the Assad family has been a solid Iranian ally, a terrorist safe haven and U.S. regional adversary. And while it is arguable that the regime will fall at some point, the opposition movement has become increasingly radicalized, and potential United States influence over the post-conflict situation is rapidly declining.

American credibility is also at stake. The Assad regime has apparently crossed the chemical weapons “line in the sand” but without even suffering a menacing statement from the administration, let alone the promised dire consequences.

Effective military intervention would not have to involve conventional ground troops. It could be modeled on the interventions in Libya in 2011, Afghanistan in 2001, and the 1995 NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rebel ground forces could be assisted with critical capabilities like air and intelligence support. Special operations forces and C.I.A. paramilitaries could be used to coordinate assets on the scene. Support could be limited to rebel groups with pro- (or at least not virulently anti-) Western sentiments, and insurgent groups with ties to known terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda could be treated as targets along with the Assad regime. It would be a low-cost, low-commitment operation designed to end the fighting in Syria, relieve the humanitarian crisis, and give the United States and its coalition partners a chance the shape the post-Assad environment.

James S. Robbins is the deputy editor of Rare and senior fellow for national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council.

View Publication