Iran’s Desperate Battle for Digital Control
When the Islamic Republic initiated an internet blackout on January 8th, millions of Iranians were plunged into digital darkness. Online banking failed. Messaging platforms disappeared. Businesses and e-commerce ground to a halt. For a regime that has spent two decades constructing a domestic internet system – the National Information Network (NIN) – the shutdown exposed an uncomfortable reality: the centerpiece of Iran’s cybersecurity strategy is incomplete, and Tehran’s solution is to escalate repression.
First conceptualized in 2005, the NIN was positioned by state officials as a way to protect Iranian digital sovereignty. In practice, it has been weaponized against Iranian citizens to restrict access to information and curb dissent. The system is intended to allow Iran to disconnect from the global internet during periods of crisis while maintaining access to essential services – banking, healthcare, and government communications – on the domestic network.
Yet the infrastructure underpinning the NIN remains unfinished. In late 2024, Iranian officials acknowledged that the system was only 60 percent operational. Recent internet blackouts have highlighted the limitations of the NIN and the costs of relying on it.
Its imperfections were evident during the July 2025 internet blackout, which coincided with Iran’s “twelve day war” with Israel. During that period, Iran was hit with over 20,000 cyberattacks, including against applications housed on the domestic network.
Even state-controlled banks operating on domestic platforms were breached, resulting in service outrages and massive data leaks. Rather than demonstrating resilience, the NIN exposed serious security vulnerabilities in Iran’s digital ecosystem.
The recent protests that erupted on December 28th further underscored these limitations. Beginning January 8th, authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown, disrupting not only international platforms but also services hosted on the NIN itself. While a handful of domestic applications flickered back online the following day, the NIN remains largely dysfunctional. Minister of Communications Sattar Hashemi acknowledged at a cabinet meeting on January 28th that domestic platforms can only function in the short term without a stable connection to the global internet. The economic toll is significant as well: each day of the shutdown cost the Iranian economy about $36 million – an extraordinary price for a system that fails to deliver complete digital control.
For Iranian civilians, connectivity remains scarce. According to internet freedom watchdog NetBlocks, most websites remain blocked or unreliable, with unrestricted access reserved only for a small number of individuals designated by the state. And yet, information about the demonstrations and the regime’s crackdown on protesters has been able to reach international audiences. While managing to cut off an estimated 92 million citizens from the internet during the shutdown, the NIN neither insulated Tehran from international attention nor extinguished calls for regime change. Instead, its limitations have driven the government to reach for aggressive countermeasures.
This is evident in the regime’s escalating campaign against Starlink. During previous protest movements, Iranian activists have relied on SpaceX’s satellite internet terminals to bypass state censorship and communicate beyond Iran’s borders, and it naturally took center stage in the most recent protests as well. Over the past month-and-a-half, Iranian authorities have intensified efforts to disrupt these signals, deploying military-grade mobile jammers to prevent communication via Starlink.
Security forces have reportedly been dispatched to locate and confiscate satellite dishes, while domestic firms such as Yaftar and the Doran Group are racing to design systems capable of detecting Starlink traffic. The implication is clear: the NIN is currently unable to control the flow of information, so Tehran has resorted to targeting censorship circumvention methods themselves.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic is increasing pressure on those disseminating information to international audiences. Journalists inside Iran have been threatened with detention and retaliation for reporting on the national protests. According to Iran International, some journalists were warned bluntly: “Do not do something you will regret; your family will mourn.”
This intimidation extends beyond Iranian borders. In July, the United States, Canada, and twelve European countries issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s growing state-sponsored threat activity abroad, including efforts by Iranian intelligence services – often in collaboration with international criminal networks – to target journalists living outside Iran. These actions point to a regime that is no longer relying solely on digital infrastructure to silence dissent; it is pursuing critics directly, wherever they operate.
What Happens Next? Iran’s Digital Cage Dilemma
The Islamic Republic is racing to build a digital cage that it can barely afford and may never fully complete.
Every internet blackout deepens economic damage. Each new restriction breeds new civilian workarounds. And each act of retaliation against citizens underscores the regime’s underlying insecurity.
Yet for a government desperate to retain power at all costs, the pursuit of total digital control is unavoidable – while the costs to Iranian citizens are vast.
About the Author:
Calla O’Neil is a Research Fellow and Program Officer at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
