Why Putin May Be Eyeing Another Mobilization

Related Categories: Arms Control and Proliferation; Democracy and Governance; Europe Military; Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues; Military Innovation; Public Diplomacy and Information Operations; Warfare; Russia; Ukraine

Is Russia on the cusp of another military draft? Just a few weeks ago, the idea was pretty much unthinkable, and for good reason.

Back in September of 2022, when the Kremlin launched its first “partial mobilization” with the goal of beefing up its front line forces in their assault on Ukraine, the results were nothing short of ruinous. Ordinary Russians voted with their feet, and the country experienced a historic exodus of some 800,000 to one million people—the largest outflow from the country since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, that out-migration didn’t just strip Russia of military manpower; according to various surveys and reports, it was disproportionately made up of young, urban, highly educated professionals, resulting in a serious brain drain in critical sectors like science, technology and higher education.

Given those results, it’s no wonder Russian officials have been loath to repeat the experience. Since then, the Kremlin has diligently avoided resorting to a general call-up of the Russian population to feed its war on Ukraine. Instead, it has relied on foreign troops from allies like North Korea and on contract soldiers from the “Global South,” including thousands of Africans (who are often recruited under false pretenses), to bolster the Ukrainian front.

These days, however, it’s becoming more and more difficult for Moscow to avoid the specter of another military call-up.

For one thing, Russia is burning through its fighting forces at an astounding clip. The Russian government is recruiting, on average, some 30,000 conscripts a month—largely because of outsized signing bonuses (ranging as high as $80,000 per recruit, by some estimates). But those soldiers-for-hire don’t survive long. The historian Peter Frankopan has estimated, based on his analysis of chatter from Russian military bloggers, that the average life expectancy of a conscript these days is approximately three weeks—and that, on average, those soldiers last just 20 to 35 minutes once contact with Ukrainian defenders and their drone swarms is made.

For another, Russia needs to muster some sort of response to Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. In recent weeks, Ukrainian drone attacks have wreaked havoc on Russian energy infrastructure, pipelines and refineries. As a result, a significant portion (40 percent or more) of Russia’s oil export capacity is now estimated to be offline, leading to domestic fuel shortages, rationing in many regions, and export restrictions (such as a ban on jet fuel export). The Russian government has responded by beefing up its air defenses around Moscow, but that alone is hardly the triumphalist signal that President Vladimir Putin and company are hoping to send to the world.

As a result, the Kremlin is increasingly thinking the previously unthinkable. “In October 2026, immediately after the elections to the State Duma, Russia may announce a new mobilization for war against Ukraine,” reported RFE/RL’s Current Time channel, citing Russian sources and opposition investigative outlets.

The issue is said to still be under consideration, and Putin himself hasn’t yet made a decision. Nevertheless, Russian authorities “are actively preparing” for the eventuality, Current Time details. Specifically, Russia’s Defense Ministry “says that they have training grounds where they are ready to train several tens of thousands of people at a time and do it in batches. And in general, the infrastructure for mobilization has already been created.” These measures ostensibly include a digital register for sending out electronic summons and a travel ban prohibiting those who are to be called up from leaving the country.

All of which is a testament to Russia’s current difficulties, as Ukraine increasingly gains the upper hand in Putin’s war of choice. But it is also a reflection of Russia’s ongoing resolve—and to the lengths the Kremlin will go to in order to persevere, no matter the cost to the country or the Russian people.

About the Author: Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

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