On Sunday, Iran reportedly test-fired a Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile from a test site near Semnan, 140 miles east of Tehran. Iran began production of what it calls the "high-precision" weapon in 2016. The missile flew 600 miles before detonating in what U.S. officials called a "failed test of a reentry vehicle."
Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif would not immediately confirm or deny the missile test. However, he did stress that any such missile systems are simply defensive and that, in any case, missiles are not covered by the 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, or the P5+1.
It was helpful for Zarif to point out the nuclear deal's major shortcoming - namely, the lack of linkage to Iran's missile program. He failed to note, however, that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented the nuclear deal, enjoins Iran from undertaking "any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology." Of course, Tehran denies that its missiles are designed to be nuclear capable. But it previously conducted secret research on nuclear warhead designs for the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, and the current test gives every indication of fielding nuclear-capable technology as well.
Some have asserted that Iran is not actually bound by U.N. strictures. A January status report by the International Crisis Group on the nuclear deal implementation maintains that the language in the U.N. resolution is nonbinding, since it only "calls upon" Iran to refrain from missile tests, and that "lack of an internationally-agreed definition of nuclear-capable missiles invites diverging views on the Iranian program." However, whether the Khorramshahr missile launched on Sunday is specifically designed to carry a nuclear weapon, or Iran was conducting a trial of capabilities that could later be used for this purpose, the test clearly falls under the intent of the U.N. resolution's ban. Tehran, in other words, is in potential - and quite probably - actual violation of U.N. edicts.
Sunday's test is also a timely reminder of the bankruptcy of the last administration's Iran policy. The Obama team banked heavily on the notion that the nuclear deal would mark a watershed in Iran's relations with the West and, as I wrote, "lead to a fundamental transformation in U.S.-Iranian relations, and prompt significant changes in the Islamic Republic's international behavior." But Iran's continued pursuit of advanced delivery systems shows that this hope was misguided at best.
The question, then, is what the Trump White House will do. The United States has already requested "urgent consultations of the Security Council," which met on Tuesday. Whether Sunday's missile test was enough evidence for Iran to be found in material breach of the U.N. resolution is questionable. The United States will also have to confront the soft, allegedly nonbinding language that some argue makes the missile ban practically unenforceable.
On the other hand, the U.N. is not the only means of expressing American concerns about Iran's growing missile threat. The U.S. is free to consider imposing a fresh round of missile-related sanctions on Iran unilaterally in the interests of American national security. Trump may take action under the recently renewed Iran Sanctions Act by re-imposing executive orders lifted under the Obama administration, and also by asking Congress to pass new laws enabling him to take further action. An Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act has already been submitted in the Senate, and, if passed, would expand the powers of the president to punish Iran.
Trump has called the nuclear agreement "the worst deal ever negotiated." Iran's ability to skirt the missile prohibition in the U.N. resolution is a timely example of why he is right. Since the Trump White House sees unilateral action as a virtue, it may not matter what the U.N. chooses to do - or more likely, not to do.
James S. Robbins is senior fellow for national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive.
