Eurasia Security Watch: No. 210

SOUNDING THE ALARM OVER AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN
Al-Qaeda may be nearly eradicated in Iraq and surrounded in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but analysts fear it has been gaining strength in another strategically located but unstable Muslim country: Yemen. With desperate poverty, weak governance, and a history of Islamist activity, Yemen, which straddles the Persian Gulf off Saudi Arabia’s southern coast, has become a focal point of al-Qaeda’s activities in the region. A plot hatched in Yemen over the summer nearly killed Saudi Arabia’s deputy interior minister in a failed suicide-bomb attack. Last year 16 Yemenis were killed when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – which recently announced a merger between the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al Qaeda – launched two suicide bombers against the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. The UN asserts that al-Qaeda figures in Yemen are assisting the Islamist insurgent group Al Shabab in Somalia. Some intelligence officials, meanwhile, worry that Yemen has become a destination for al-Qaeda fighters fleeing the AfPak conflict. (Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2009)

HAMAS RECONSIDERS STRATEGY
Hamas is engaged in a period of introspection following its brief war with Israel at the turn of the year; a war which exposed several of the terrorist group’s weaknesses and earned it criticism from enemies and allies alike. Hamas’ sole military “victory” in the short war was its ability to maintain constant rocket fire on Israel – a total of 558 rockets during the course of the three week conflict. However, only 6 IDF officers were killed in the entire war, as compared with 23 in a single battle during operation Defensive Shield in 2002. Hamas, meanwhile, was helpless to stop Israel’s incursion into Gaza City and there was widespread desertion among its fighters. As a result of its internal assessment, Hamas is said to have declined to take a more aggressive and casualty-heavy approach to its “resistance” in favor of a new tactical doctrine emphasizing striking at the rear of invading Israeli forces, a new training regime at a military academy in the Nuseirat refugee camp, and the construction of new underground tunnel routes. (Jerusalem Post, September 10, 2000)

ALL EYES ON TURKEY AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Turkey is assuming a central role in the international debate over missile defense as the U.S. seeks alternatives to its now defunct plan to install a BMD architecture in Eastern Europe, and Turkey intensifies its own attempts to acquire anti-missile capabilities of its own. Despite a significant improvement in Turkish-Iranian ties and a surge in bilateral trade in recent years, parts of Turkey's political establishment remain deeply skeptical of Iran and its nuclear program. Their concerns can be seen in the country's recent decision to spend spend close to $1 billion on missile defense systems – either American-made Patriot batteries or similar Russian and Chinese systems – a move which raises questions in Tehran and Washington about whether or not Turkey will play a critical role in America’s future missile defense architecture. (Eurasianet.org, September 25, 2009)

IRAQ'S POLITICAL MAP TAKES SHAPE
Some three months before critical national elections, Iraqi politics appear to be taking a dramatic turn – for the better. Political and parliamentary alliances have begun to crystallize in preparation for the campaign season and the dominant political theme across party lines has been unity and nationalism. The explicitly Islamist parties that dominated the Iraqi political scene as recently as a few years ago have been marginalized, particularly after their poor showing in provincial elections last January. As a result, all 296 of Iraq’s parties are seeking the broadest, most inclusive coalitions and platforms possible.

So far, most of the major players in Iraqi politics have broken into two coalitions. The first, the Iraqi National Alliance, includes most of the large Shi’ite parties that formed the former United Iraqi Alliance – such as ISCI and Muqtada al Sadr’s allies -- which dominated national elections in 2005. The notable exclusion is Prime Minister Maliki and his Da’wa party, which recently announced its own coalition, the State of Law, which will include Sunni, Kurdish, and secular politicians from over 40 political parties. (New York Times, September 30, 2009; USA Today, October 2, 2009)