South Asia Security Monitor: No. 251

LET IN AMERICA'S SIGHTS
[Editor’s note: The Pakistani militant group Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) has been featured prominently in the Washington debate over South Asia as of late, appearing in several congressional hearings, opeds and policy papers in the first quarter of 2010. The LeT was originally viewed in the U.S. as a “domestic” terrorist group focused on Pakistan’s struggle with India over Kashmir. However, despite labeling the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2001, the U.S. began to view LeT as an international jihadist organization of the al Qaeda ilk only recently. The group is suspected of deep and long-running ties with Pakistan’s intelligence services and was fingered for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed over 173. After Mumbai, Pakistan nominally cracked down on the organization, though it still maintains a network of training camps and charities throughout the country.]

Director of National Intelligence A. Dennis Blair testified February 2nd that LeT enjoyed “global capabilities” and was “becoming more of a direct threat” to U.S. interests. An OpEd by Stephen Tankel, author of Storming the World Stage: the Story of Lashkar e Taiba, warned that Pakistan’s security services “have always sought to control rather than dismantle the group, viewing it as a reliable strategic asset against India.” Unlike other Pakistani militant groups LeT has not directed attacks against the Pakistani state. Tankel argues that LeT uses the Gulf “as a logistical and recruiting hub” and “boasts operatives.. [in] Britain and the United States.” (RealClearWorld February 18, 2010)

MAOISTS RESPOND TO OPERATION GREEN HUNT
India’s war against Maoist insurgents known as Naxalites is intensifying. Over the past six years the conflict has killed roughly 600 people per year but in 2009 that number surged to 1,134. Earlier this year, India launched Operation Green Hunt in seven states, its largest-ever operation against the Maoists. The group is present in 20 of India’s 28 states but is most active in India’s central and eastern states. The Maoists have responded to that operation by alternating offers of ceasefire (which New Delhi has refused) with brazen attacks, such as gunning down 24 police officers in West Bengal on February 16 in broad daylight. (In a similar incident, last October 17 policemen in Maharashtra were also shot dead in broad daylight). Most recently, the Maoists called for a 48-hour strike March 23rd and immediately afterward blew up a bridge in Jharkand, rail tracks in West Bengal and Orissa, and derailed a train in Bihar. (UPI March 23, 2010; Economic Times March 24)

CIA AND ISI DRAW CLOSER
The New York Times has revealed that the extent of counterterrorism cooperation between the CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, is far greater than publicly acknowledged despite tangible levels of mistrust. Most significantly, the two agencies have together “carried out dozens of raids throughout Pakistan over the past year, working from bases in the cities of Quetta, Peshawar and elsewhere” say Pakistani officials. Relations between the two bodies hit a low point in 2008, when CIA officials confronted Pakistan over intercepted communications between the ISI and jihadi groups conducting attacks in Afghanistan. However, relations improved significantly since that summer, when the CIA killed the head of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, in a drone strike in South Waziristan. Spies from both agencies now jointly conduct ground operations and lengthy reconnaissance missions. That the two bodies shared intelligence was widely acknowledged by both sides but the involvement of CIA officials in operations on the ground is a stark revelation. (New York Times, February 24, 2010)

[Editor’s Note: Since 2008 the U.S. has targeted dozens of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas with unmanned aerial drones. The string of successes come partly as a result of enhanced intelligence-sharing with the ISI. In turn, Islamabad beginning in late February has launched its most significant crackdown of Afghan Taliban figures since the Afghan war began.]

IN ARMS SALES, U.S. DOESN'T DISCRIMINATE
India and Pakistan may be archrivals but they have one important geopolitical policy in common: they are both allied to the United States. Washington is often forced to play a delicate game, ensuring that progress in one relationship is not perceived to come at the expense of the other. Nowhere is this balancing act more pronounced than in the arena of arms sales; yet the volatility involved in the South Asian arms market has not dissuaded the U.S. from aggressively pursuing deals with both countries.

With regards to India, American companies are currently bidding for a massive, $10 billion contract for 126 multi-role combat aircraft. In January, the Obama administration signed off on a $647 million deal to sell India 145 howitzers. Around the same time India announced its intent to purchase 10 transport aircraft from Boeing to complement a $2.1 billion deal last year for eight Boeing long-range Poseiden aircraft for the Indian navy. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials in Washington for two days of a high-level strategic dialogue at the end of March secured pledges to get swifter delivery of F-16 fighter jets, naval frigates, helicopter gunships, and unmanned surveillance drones. One big difference between arms sales to the two Asian rivals, however: “[America does] straight commercial deals with India, while Pakistan effectively uses the money we give them to buy our equipment.” (New York Times, March 25, 2010; Wall St. Journal February 25, 2010)