On March 26, 2025, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) hosted a closed-door Capitol Hill briefing for congressional staff on the evolving China-Russia relationship and its implications for U.S. national security and global strategy. The session was moderated by AFPC Senior Vice President Ilan Berman and featured expert insights from Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Miles Yu of the Hudson Institute, two leading experts on Russia and China, respectively. A summary of their remarks follows.
RUSSIA’S SHIFTING STRATEGY
In his remarks, Kofman outlined the evolution of Russia's relationship with the People’s Republic of China. In his description, the current “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing has evolved in several distinct phases. In the immediate post-Soviet period, Russia enjoyed only minimal engagement and coordination with China. Over time, however, a "marriage of convenience” emerged between the two countries, with each recognizing the concrete dividends of cooperation. From there, the two countries developed substantive cooperation in areas like energy and defense – culminating in the current, deep ties between the two countries, which are buoyed by the close personal relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping. However, Kofman noted, the trajectory of this partnership is uncertain. Despite the current, close coordination between Moscow and Beijing, whether their ties will deepen or diverge remains an open question. Kofman counseled that Western attempts to drive a wedge between the two powers need to be adroit enough exploit historical grievances, divergent ambitions, and mutual suspicions. For instance, he noted, Russia remains wary of becoming subordinate (and subservient) to China in the strategic partnership. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, has reinforced Russia’s dependence on China for its economic survival. Kofman also expressed skepticism regarding the feasibility of a “Reverse Nixon,” in which the United States would peel Russia away from China. In his view, such a prospect remains remote, both because the historic Sino-Soviet split was made possible by different strategic factors and because, at least for the moment, for Russia the benefits of cooperation with the PRC outweigh the potential dividends of rapprochement with Europe and the United States.
CHINA’S VIEWS OF RUSSIA
Yu argued that China sees Russia as a useful — but ultimately limited — partner in a broader confrontation with the West. While the two nations share an anti-Western ideological bent, their civilizational self-perceptions diverge significantly; Russia seeks prestige and relevance, while China seeks global dominance. These differing objectives, Yu argued, create tensions over regions like Central Asia, the Arctic, and Siberia. Both regimes view themselves as inheritors of distinct civilizational legacies —
Confucian for China and Slavic Orthodox for Russia — making long-term harmony unlikely. And despite the public rhetoric, China’s Belt and Road Initiative often conflicts with Russia’s regional ambitions in the ”post-Soviet space,” and the constructs Moscow has erected there (such as the Eurasian Economic Union). China has also made
inroads in countries like Kazakhstan at Russia’s expense. Yu also argued that China views the Russia-Ukraine war not as a burden and liability, as some have argued, but as a strategic distraction that helps to divert U.S. focus and resources away from the Indo-Pacific. Neither, however, is the PRC committed to propping it up Putin’s regime indefinitely. In aggregate, Yu outlined, China's goal in the partnership is to maximize its geopolitical advantage without inheriting Russia’s liabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In response to the current, robust state of the Sino-Russian relationship, Kofman and Yu suggested a series of policy options available to the United States and its international partners.
To exploit the underlying tensions between Moscow and Beijing by highlighting their divergent interests in geographic areas such as Central Asia, as well as on topics like energy and technology;
- To reinvigorate U.S.-Russia arms control as a way of isolating China and reframing strategic competition;
- To strengthen partnerships with Central Asian nations in order to counterbalance both Russian and Chinese ambitions in the “post-Soviet space”;
- To expose the inherent contradictions in the Russia-China relationship through public diplomacy and classified briefings; and
- Levy sanctions on Chinese entities that aid the Russian war effort while bolstering U.S. trade with nations that are wary of Chinese domination.
