The battle for Iraq may still be far from over, but its impact is already sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Militarily, Washington's early successes have put to rest any lingering doubts about U.S. capabilities or American resolve. But more significant still is the example set by Iraq's impending liberation, and the accompanying realization that is taking root in the region — that Baghdad's fall could foreshadow even greater change.
A silver lining in the trans-Atlantic storm clouds over Iraq is the damage done to NATO. This costly foreign entanglement was long overdue for a body blow. NATO was not intended, by Americans at least, to be a permanent commitment, but an interim measure while Western Europe recovered from the War. When the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, obtained congressional consent to station U.S. divisions in Europe, he promised and believed they would be there only a few years. But, like Marx's "withering away of the state," Europe proved resilient in allowing America to shoulder Europe's burden long after its prosperity dwarfed the laggard socialist economies and even after the Soviet collapse. The European Union today integrates everything except defense, lest it make too obvious that Europe is more than able to look after itself.
Even as it girds for war in the Persian Gulf, the Bush Administration faces a major challenge in East Asia – that of a nuclear North Korea. The conflict emerged quite suddenly. Back in October, Pyongyang stunned the White House with its unexpected admission of an active clandestine nuclear program. The disclosure was followed, in rapid succession, by the DPRK’s December decision to restart its Yongbyon nuclear facility and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. A month later, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and rolled back its self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile testing. Together, these moves have presented Washington with an unprecedented – and escalating – problem on the Korean Peninsula.
What a difference a year makes. Twelve months ago, the coalition government of Bulent Ecevit in Turkey had risen to the forefront of U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, contributing heavily to America's Afghan campaign. Today, Washington is deadlocked with Ankara, now led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), over the next phase in its war on terrorism: military action against Iraq.
The Soviet Union’s demise spelled the end of Russia as a European Great Power, although post-Soviet Russia remains a major European state and a power among others. Less obvious, but equally important, is Russia’s decline as an Asian Great Power. Moscow enjoyed this status for a relatively brief period and in large measure due to the weakness of China, Asia's historic continental hegemon. China’s recovery from external domination set the stage, despite the disasters of Mao’s policies, for its expansion as a major economic and regional political force. Today, China is reclaiming from Russia its place as the leading land power in Asia—the country others must always take into account. This is a momentous transformation in Asian affairs and of great importance to the United States.