Canadian prime minister Mark Carney has charted a realist course for Canada. Can he put it to use and help strike a US-Denmark deal over Greenland?
Canadian and European political leaders of various stripes seem to be tripping over themselves to articulate a sensible position on the escalating conflict between NATO allies over Greenland, a Danish colonial possession until 1953 that is now an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, and a territory the United States now seeks. However, this collective incoherence does nothing to reduce tensions, much less help overcome the danger we all face. As a Canadian, I propose an outside-the-box compromise solution that puts Canada First.
By way of context, two things should be noted:
First, many in Canada and other parts of the West are expressing outrage at the idea of a public discussion about territory changing hands between sovereign states. But they are being disingenuous and, indeed, ahistorical. The ceding and acquiring of territory by treaty or conquest is an ongoing reality in world affairs. More importantly, the buying and selling of territory is historically not unfamiliar to Denmark, the United States, and Canada. We needn’t hide behind Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter here, which no one reasonable actually believes could be invoked in an intra-Alliance territorial dispute without wrecking NATO.
Second, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney, stating that “we take the world as it is, not as we wish it to be,” had advised from Beijing last week that a “new world order” has descended upon us. His language raised many eyebrows, but whatever one reads into it, the formulation is, at the very least, a tacit repudiation of the “rules-based liberal international order” that has guided Canadian (and Western) strategic thinking for decades. This is a definitive change—one that opens the door to a new approach.
With that context in mind, we come to the challenge: Carney’s “new world order,” for better or worse, is one in which the president of the United States has stated unequivocally that owning Greenland is a national security imperative. Going further, he has advised that, if he chooses, America could take Greenland by force in very short order. Most other Western countries, led by Denmark, unsurprisingly object strenuously to this threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an ally and insist that Greenland must remain Danish.
Enter Canada.
It is not in Ottawa’s interest to allow Copenhagen and Washington to remain intransigent in their maximalist positions. This could lead to a serious confrontation between NATO allies and the true “brain death” of the alliance, as the French president memorably put it a few years ago. Such an outcome would harm us in many ways.
Carney, in the tradition of Canadian prime ministers who understand how to succeed in Washington, has become a respected Trump whisperer. He is also beloved by Europeans for his time as Bank of England governor, his normative alignment on various issues, and his possession of several passports.
This means Carney has the chance to position Canada to play a key role in resolving the Greenland issue. This isn’t about acting as an honest broker or constantly referencing NATO norms and values. Instead, it’s about tackling a major intra-West challenge within the framework of the “new world order,” and, in doing so, restoring Canada’s reputation as a respected geopolitical player on the global stage.
Last week’s China visit shows a new level of international positioning by Carney. As even President Trump publicly acknowledged, getting a trade deal with China is an achievement. It speaks to the prime minister’s willingness to set aside his predecessor’s legacy of geopolitical malpractice by pursuing his own “world as it is” path on the international stage.
Why not keep forging that path? Why not define a path for Greenland, led by Canada? I was hoping that he would do something like this at Davos, where he addressed the World Economic Forum yesterday. I was disappointed, because in my judgment, his remarks were effectually too clever by half.
What follows is the contour of the proposal he should have put forward:
Canada should negotiate terms with Denmark to acquire Greenland. Ottawa should then reach out to Washington and advise that we have a path forward to advance American national interests, which is Donald Trump’s core objective. We should offer the Americans terms for expanding NORAD to cover Greenland and invite them to join the Golden Dome project to deepen and strengthen US-Canadian defense. Further, we should set out a strategy for the cooperative development of resources, such as critical minerals and hydrocarbons, in the Canadian Arctic (including Greenland).
As part of that arrangement, we should offer the Danes special access and treatment for returns from any of those resources developed in Greenland for a fixed period of time, and we should ensure that, as part of this whole deal, tariffs are eliminated among NATO allies, starting with those Trump has imposed on Canada.
Adopting this proposal would achieve six critically important outcomes:
1. For the United States, a clear path to effective defense of the North American landmass against intrusions by countries like Russia and China from the North, and a path to significant critical resource development.
2. For Denmark (and other European allies), a face-saving path out of confrontation with the United States that also absolves Copenhagen (and friendly governments in Paris, Berlin, and London) from the grief and cost of underwriting an otherwise economically unachievable defense of Greenland;
3. For Canada, a clear Arctic defense and development strategy, and the establishment of a new and more definitive role in NATO, to our benefit in our bilateral relations with the United States, as well as vis-à-vis our European allies.
4. For NATO, the definitive end to a spiraling crisis that could turn into an alliance-threatening breach. This should not be taken lightly. The escalation brewing, due to the strategic malpractice of several NATO leaders, is real.
5. For the EU and its member states, a mitigation of the anger they have created in the Trump administration over their recent signing of a trade deal with MERCOSUR and their dithering over the ratification of last year’s EU-US trade and tariff deal. A Canada-Denmark deal on Greenland can and should include a Transatlantic deal to permanently remove all tariffs imposed by NATO allies against one another.
6. For the West in general, a demonstration to our opponents that we are prepared to defend our sphere of interest and step up when they threaten incursions into our backyard.
Whether the Danes and the Europeans like it or not, President Trump clearly prioritizes Hemispheric security, an integral part of which requires making a deal to address a challenge in Northern defense, including Greenland. Carney still has an opportunity to show Trump how Canada can help deliver a Greenland deal that makes sense for the United States, Canada, and our NATO allies in Europe.
Too often, Canadian and European political leaders of all stripes have fallen into the trap of reacting to Donald Trump’s messaging instead of—paraphrasing Wayne Gretzky—thinking about where he wants to take the puck. I would like to believe that Carney can think ahead and work on a deal that helps the Transatlantic community move forward in a “new world order” increasingly characterized by strategic transactionalism, even among stalwart allies.
The above proposal—as unorthodox as it may seem at first blush—is a Canada First solution that should be acceptable to all our NATO allies. It’s not what the Europeans would like or what Trump says he needs, but it’s a solution that can serve as the basis for bringing the West back onto the same geopolitical page.
About the Author: Damjan Krnjević Mišković
Damjan Krnjević Mišković is a visiting scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council. A former senior Serbian and UN official (2004-2013), he has been based in Baku since 2020, serving as a professor of practice at ADA University, director for policy research, analysis, and publications at its Institute for Development and Diplomacy (IDD), and co-editor of the quarterly policy journal Baku Dialogues. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
