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Big changes are afoot in Eurasia. Over the past several months, the region has undergone a series of tectonic shifts, as countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus have recalibrated their respective foreign policies and expanded ties with the West.
This shift is being propelled by real-world worries. Russia's war on Ukraine has sent economic shock waves across the region and underscored the risk of overreliance on Moscow, and the resulting Western sanctions have narrowed the economic and political options available to regional states.
At the same time, China's expanding economic footprint has heightened concerns about long-term sovereignty in those places. As a result, regional governments are increasingly seeking to diversify their external partnerships and reduce their geopolitical vulnerability. (These considerations have been amplified in recent days by the unrest roiling nearby Iran.)
The effects have been dramatic. In August, longtime regional rivals Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a landmark accord normalizing bilateral relations and paving the way for an expanded zone of economic prosperity underwritten by the United States. Then, in November, Kazakhstan's government officially joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first post-Soviet state to sign on to the landmark 2020 normalization framework between Israel and the Muslim world.
That same month, the inaugural C5+1 summit in Washington elevated America's engagement with Central Asia and aligned U.S. policy more closely with the growing local cooperation visible in the region.
At present, however, this dynamism still isn't adequately reflected in the Trump administration's foreign policy. The administration's National Security Strategy, released publicly in early December, is conspicuously silent on American interests in Eurasia. Also missing is a clear vision of how Washington can cement these early gains in the region.
One such step would be to remove outdated restrictions affecting key regional players. Prominent among them is Section 907 of the 1992 U.S. Freedom Support Act, which limits U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan. That provision was enacted more than three decades ago as part of an effort by political opponents of Azerbaijan and allied voices in Congress to limit Baku's freedom of action in relation to then-hostile Armenia and the contested enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The provision has since been waived routinely by successive administrations. Even so, it remains a perennial irritant in ties between the U.S. and Azerbaijan and a latent political lever for the country's critics. Working with Congress to formally repeal Section 907 would help the White House send a powerful signal to the government of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev that closer alignment with U.S. priorities, including its current rapprochement with Yerevan, carries tangible benefits.
Another priority should be integrating Eurasian partners more closely into American objectives in other regions. In the Middle East, for instance, Azerbaijan's close strategic ties to Israel make it a natural partner for the administration's current regional initiatives — and the Abraham Accords.
Other regional states likewise have the capacity to contribute constructively to U.S. security and foreign policy goals. Uzbekistan, for instance, has been forging new ties to the Taliban regime in Kabul, seeking to moderate Afghanistan's Islamist government through trade.
Kazakhstan, meanwhile, is tightening re-export controls to give Western sanctions against Russia more bite.
Most important, however, is the need for a deeper and more sustained American commitment to Eurasia. Last year, my colleagues at the American Foreign Policy Council issued a thoughtful paper outlining what an American strategy toward "Greater Central Asia" (Central Asia plus Azerbaijan) should entail.
They argue persuasively that only expanded American engagement can enable the United States to counter an Iranian nuclear breakout (or, these days, instability) while maximizing opportunities for U.S. investment, effective competition with China and Russia and opportunities to address the persistent threat of Islamic terrorism.
That assessment remains valid. America's principal geopolitical competitors have long coveted the region. Russia sees it as its natural patrimony and geopolitical backyard, while China increasingly treats it as an extension of the global dependency network it is erecting through its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative.
What's different today is that Eurasian states appear to have a different direction in mind. The U.S. should help them pursue it.
Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington.
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