The US returns to region between Russia, China and Iran

Related Categories: Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare; International Economics and Trade; Resource Security; CAMCA; Central Asia; China; Iran; Russia; Turkey; South Caucasus

In recent months, the Trump Administration has intensified its diplomacy in the strategically important greater Central Asia region, sandwiched between Russia, China and Iran. The Administration brokered a peace declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan, bringing an end to almost four decades of hostility. Part of that deal included the establishment of a major transit route that U.S. companies will operate. More recently, President Trump hosted the presidents of the five Central Asian states at the White House and took the initiative to include Kazakhstan in the Abraham Accords.

Put together, these moves represent an American return to greater Central Asia. This return has, in turn, been assisted by the recent rise of Turkish influence in the region, the most notable counterweight to Russian and Chinese domination in a long time. The weakening of Iran also creates an opportunity for Washington.

However, Russia and Iran will not bow out meekly. While Moscow and Tehran have little to offer the states of the region, they still possess tools to wreck what the U.S. is working to build. If America's initiatives are going to succeed, Washington will need to counter the threats from Russia and Iran. The prospects of Washington's success in the region will increase through treating the states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan as one alliance, versus separate policies due to irrelevant geographic distinctions.

The Trump administration's initiatives bring about a return of American influence in this geopolitically important region, which includes Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. The U.S. played a key role in helping to consolidate the independence of the countries of the region in the 1990s, but over the past two decades, Washington has not played a meaningful role in the region. America's neglect of greater Central Asia was puzzling, given the region's status as a meeting ground of powers including Russia, Iran, Turkey and China as well as its abundant energy and critical mineral resources.

Parting with this neglect, the recent agreements indicate that U.S. companies will now operate a critical transit route in the region -- the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), ensuring that Washington will be engaged in security developments in the region. The road is likely to begin operations in 2026 and includes rail and road links. The railroad will enable an increase in cargo traffic from the Black Sea to the border with China. Energy trade in the region will increase too, with new routes likely to be established in 2026.

Washington's return to the region was facilitated by several recent geopolitical developments. Perhaps the most crucial is the rise of an alliance of Turkic states, which unites Turkey with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. The states of Central Asia recently included Azerbaijan as a full member of the formal Central Asian cooperation mechanisms, further strengthening regional cooperation.

This alliance, for the first time, provides a counterweight to Russia and China in the region, and as such provides a certain amount of deterrence against Moscow's meddling in the internal affairs of regional states -- including its efforts to keep America out. Through increasing cooperation with Central Asia, Washington limits China's expansion in the region, without the U.S. having to directly confront Beijing.

The Trump administration recognized early on that Turkey has emerged (alongside Israel) as the dominant actor in the Middle East. Now, Ankara's role is visibly rising in greater Central Asia as well. Given the alignment of interests between the U.S. and Turkey in this region, Washington is able to leverage Turkey's rise in greater Central Asia.

Iran's declining power has also facilitated America's return. After Iran's 12-Day War with Israel, Armenia -- which was tightly linked with Iran -- recognized that it could no longer rely on Tehran for its security. Following the war, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan decided that it was preferable to cooperate with the U.S. and seek peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, rather than to remain dependent on Iran.

America's recent moves in greater Central Asia are part of a broader picture in which Turkish and American influence is on the rise, while Iran and Russia's clout is weakening. However, Tehran and Moscow are too invested to be counted out, and the region is located on their doorsteps. Both are likely to take steps to attempt to halt this seismic change.

For example, Georgia used to be America's closest partner in the region. But Moscow used Bidzina Ivanishvili, the oligarch ruling Georgia, to pry that country away from the West.

In Armenia, Russia still has two military bases and controls almost all the country's strategic infrastructure, including its energy sector. Moscow has already dispatched an oligarch, Samvel Karapetyan, to challenge Armenia's pro-American government and is boosting the pro-Russian forces in the country, particularly elements in the Armenian Church.

Russia's recent Iskander missile attack on Azerbaijan's embassy in Kyiv likely did not happen by chance, and represents Moscow's attempt at intimidating Baku. Iran has repeatedly threatened Azerbaijan and has announced its opposition to the TRIPP. Russia and Iran maintain networks in almost all the regional states that can be activated to undermine security.

American success in greater Central Asia requires continued focus to thwart Russian and Iranian threats. President Trump's outreach to Central Asian states as a group is promising. Together, the states of the region are more confident to stand up to Russia and Iran.

The American outreach should encompass Central Asia together with Azerbaijan. Too often, Washington separates its policies toward the states, only because of bureaucratic delimitations between Europe and Asia at the Department of State as well as between the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) at the Pentagon.

President Trump should also articulate clear red lines to Iran. It is imperative that Tehran not be allowed to disrupt the establishment of rail and road links along the TRIPP, which will link Turkey and the West through the South Caucasus to Central Asia. This corridor's realization will help Central Asian states break out of their landlocked status and connect with world markets, and should be a key American priority in the years to come. The corridor will also give the U.S. greater access and influence in the geopolitically important greater Central Asia region, and keep Russia, China and Iran in check.

There is a single and most important symbolic action the U.S. could take to indicate its commitment to this crucial region. Central Asia remains the only major world region never visited by a U.S. President. During the recent summit in Washington, Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev extended an invitation for President Trump to visit the historic city of Samarkand. Should President Trump accept this invitation, it would send a clear signal that America is in greater Central Asia to stay.

About the Authors: Svante Cornell is the research director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

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