In announcing the recent “Liberation Day” tariffs, the Trump administration has offered several explanations for returning the United States to its highest cumulative tariff rates since the first decade of the twentieth century. The president, in imposing a 10 percent universal tariff and additional reciprocal tariffs on numerous countries, spoke to the fundamental American desire for fairness. The universal tariffs, now paused, have already successfully driven dozens of countries to the negotiating table, seeking to make a fair deal with the United States. The restoration of a vibrant manufacturing sector, protected by sound trade policies, will have salutary socioeconomic effects on communities across the United States.
These arguments are valid and important, and Americans of all political persuasions have a vested interest in the success of President Donald Trump’s trade agenda. Yet the most critical argument in favor of the Trump tariffs is one of national security: without a tariff policy that fundamentally reorients manufacturing capacity to the United States, the American military will be unable to sustain a protracted conflict with its greatest likely adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Trump’s tariff agenda is not simply a policy preference; it is essential for the security and safety of the United States in the decades to come.
The numbers tell a stark story. From 1997 to 2024, the United States lost approximately 5 million manufacturing jobs, a decline of roughly 30 percent in employment in this sector. This hollowing out of America’s industrial capacity has directly undermined our defense industrial base. In the steel industry, vital for everything from ships to tanks, domestic capacity utilization dropped to 75.3 percent in 2023, down from a brief high of 80 percent in 2021. Aluminum, another key material, saw its capacity utilization fall from 61 percent in 2019 to 55 percent in 2023. These declines reflect a broader trend; the United States has become increasingly reliant on foreign supply chains, leaving it vulnerable to geopolitical shocks and adversaries who control critical inputs.
The Ukraine war has exposed these weaknesses with brutal clarity. Since 2022, the United States has provided $182 billion in aid to Ukraine, including artillery shells, missiles, and advanced systems like the Patriot air defense. This effort has strained our defense industrial base to the breaking point. Production lines for 155mm artillery shells, for instance, have struggled to keep pace, with the U.S. Army ramping up output from 14,000 shells per month in 2022 to a projected 100,000 by late 2025, a number that is still insufficient to meet Ukraine’s needs while replenishing our own stocks. The Pentagon has admitted that replenishing depleted inventories could take years, a luxury we won’t have in a larger conflict.
Now consider the situation in Taiwan. The island is the linchpin of the U.S. Indo-Pacific first island chain strategy and relies heavily on American weapons to deter a CCP invasion. In 2024 alone, Taiwan purchased $19 billion in U.S. arms, including F-16 jets and HIMARS rocket systems. Yet, the same industrial base supporting Ukraine is tasked with fulfilling these orders. Delays are already piling up. Taiwan’s F-16 deliveries, for example, have been pushed back due to production bottlenecks. If the United States can’t simultaneously arm Ukraine and Taiwan, what happens when the CCP moves on Taipei? A real conflict with China would dwarf current demands, requiring not just munitions but ships, submarines, and advanced electronics, all of which are dependent on a robust manufacturing base that we no longer possess.
The USS Connecticut offers a chilling case study. In October 2021, this attack submarine struck an undersea mountain in the South China Sea, sidelining one of our most advanced naval assets. Repairs, initially estimated at eighteen months, have stretched into 2026 due to shortages of skilled labor and specialized components, many of which rely on foreign suppliers. The submarine was forced to sail, on the surface, across the Pacific to the only remaining ship repair yard capable of such work. In a war with China, where naval supremacy in the Pacific would be decisive, losing submarines, a key U.S. maritime advantage, to long repair lines could tip the balance. Multiply this across a fleet stretched thin, and the stakes become existential.
Trump’s tariff negotiations can reverse this decline by bringing manufacturing back to U.S. soil. The goal is to incentivize domestic production and reduce reliance on foreign inputs that could be cut off in a crisis. Critics argue this will raise costs, and perhaps they are right in the short term. But the long-term payoff of restoring our defense industrial base capacity is worth every penny. These are costs that will be offset by lives saved in a conflict.
Deterring China requires more than rhetoric; it demands the hard power of a revitalized defense industrial base. The CCP’s military buildup relies on a manufacturing juggernaut we’ve helped fuel through decades of offshoring. Trump’s tariffs, by reshoring production, aim to claw back that advantage. The alternative of facing a CCP-led conflict with a depleted industrial base is unthinkable. The Ukraine war and Taiwan’s needs are clear a warning. Tariffs are the necessary response to ensure America is ready to deter our adversaries and defend our interests.
Alexander B. Gray, a Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the White House National Security Council, 2019-21.
