Late last week, without public fanfare, the Trump administration released its long-awaited National Security Strategy. Since then, the particulars of that document (colloquially known as the NSS) have gradually filtered into the public consciousness – and the Beltway foreign policy debate. They're worth examining, because they amount to a radical re-conception of U.S. foreign policy, and a foreshadowing of big changes to come.
A new focus on Latin America. Over the last several weeks, the Trump administration's campaign against the regime of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro has drawn no shortage of international attention – and criticism. The new NSS makes clear that this isn't an aberration. It lays out a "Trump corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States will work "to restore [its] preeminence in the Western Hemisphere." The idea is, at its core, a defensive one: forward engagement as a hedge against uncontrolled migration, and to prevent "non-Hemispheric competitors" (that is, China, Russia and Iran) from scooping up vital regional assets or positioning capabilities that could threaten the U.S. homeland.
All that is a marked change from how America has approached the region since 2013, when then-Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the "era of the Monroe doctrine is over." Back then, Kerry's announcement signaled to Beijing, Moscow and Tehran that Washington wouldn't contest their activities in the Americas. The Trump administration now seems committed to reversing this drift by "enlisting" regional allies to assist with controlling migration, interdicting narcotics and securing borders, and by "expanding" America's political footprint in the historically inhospitable region.
A different approach to Asia. During its first term in office, the Trump administration championed the idea of "Great Power Competition" with China across a range of political, military and economic domains – and the marshalling of grand alliances in the service of that goal. But President Trump's second term approach to the PRC is turning out to be substantially different, much to the chagrin of American allies in Asia.
In this vein, the new NSS leans heavily on the region's economic potential, emphasizing plans to "rebalance" economic relations with the PRC and to "improve commercial (and other)" ties with regional powers like India. It also lays out plans to "build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain" (the arc from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines) but only with stepped-up burden-sharing from regional states. This formulation, in turn, hints that a Chinese sphere of influence, if it isn't too expansive, might be acceptable in Washington. That's bound to be music to Beijing's ears – and deeply worrisome to everyone else.
Thinking beyond Europe. Perhaps the most striking portion of the new NSS is its depiction of Europe as a continent in terminal decline. It paints an apocalyptic picture of prosperity and cohesion undermined by transnational organizations, unfettered migration, and cultural drift. Such critiques are indeed apt; Europe has real and serious problems with extremism and assimilation, and a runaway administrative state that has left the continent over-regulated and under-defended. But the resulting framing of the NSS suggests that Europe simply can't be a real partner for America – something people who count NATO as a cornerstone of global security undoubtedly will find doubtless find alarming.
Worrisome, too, is the document's call for the United States to "cultivate resistance" to the continent's current direction – an exhortation that sounds an awful lot like Washington plans to get involved in Europe's assorted culture wars. And when it comes to Russia's war on Ukraine, the NSS emphasizes the need to end hostilities as quickly as possible, effectively separating peace from justice in favor of some sort of "strategic stability." Understandably, that's not a sentiment that's sitting well in European capitals now preoccupied with preventing further Russian aggression.
Banking on a new Middle East. Meanwhile, the Administration is clearly eager to turn the page on the Middle East. Iran is mostly degraded, the NSS lays out, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is managed – or at least sufficiently so. All of which makes the region primarily a zone of economic, rather than strategic, interest. The Middle East "will increasingly become a source and destination of international investment, AI, and defense technologies," the NSS argues.
That's a nice sentiment, to be sure. But it glosses over a series of troubling strategic dynamics. They include things like the resilience of Hamas in the Gaza strip, ongoing instability in the new Syria, and clear signs that Iran's radical regime is seeking to reconstitute its strategic capabilities (and setting the stage for a new war with Israel in the process). Given those trends, the document's depiction of a region drifting toward stability seems decidedly premature.
If there is a through-line in the Administration's new vision, though, it is that Team Trump views the world through a thoroughly transactional lens – and expects others to do the same. It therefore grossly underestimates the power of ideology as a strategic driver more important than profit. Because it does, chances are high that the White House will soon find itself challenged by forces that don't fit its preferred worldview: like China's quest to dominate Asia, Russia's persistent imperialism, and Iran's revolutionary brand of revisionist Islam.
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