President Donald Trump has now set out a June deadline for the end of the war, and the White House expects Moscow and Kyiv to reach some sort of settlement. The operative question is whether Russia’s economic calculus can truly be changed by then.
In February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Budapest to herald a “new golden age” of relations, signing a major civilian nuclear deal and pledging a “financial protective shield” for Hungary. This visit followed President Trump’s “complete and total” endorsement of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who currently trails challenger Péter Magyar in the polls ahead of the April 12 election. Critics warn that making bilateral relations contingent on individual leaders turns long-term alliances into fragile transactional affairs. Furthermore, Orbán’s continued energy dependence on Russia and his security ties to China present a significant paradox for the administration’s broader “Great Power” strategy.
After years of military involvement in the Syrian theater, America is understandably eager to turn the page. But doing so prematurely risks abandoning a known and capable counterterrorism partner for a still-untested arrangement. That is hardly a recipe for lasting stability.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has produced a paradox for US strategy: it has significantly reduced Russia’s strategic long-term power while hardening Moscow into a more dangerous, risk-tolerant adversary for the United States and its allies and partners in Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The challenge for policymakers is to lock in the strategic setbacks Russia has incurred—geopolitical, economic, demographic, and technological—while managing escalation risks and preparing for a prolonged confrontation in the Russian neighborhood.
The January 2026 internet blackout in Iran, following protests that erupted on December 28, has exposed the deep failures of the National Information Network (NIN).