Global Islamism Monitor No. 141

ANKARA MOVES AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE
In late April, Turkish authorities carried out raids across 24 provinces, arresting 90 individuals suspected of ties to the Islamic State, including alleged operatives, financiers, and propaganda distributors. The sweep came roughly two weeks after a confrontation outside the Israeli consulate in Istanbul on April 7th, in which two police officers were wounded and one of the three attackers was killed. While officials have not formally linked the mass arrests to that incident, one of the attackers was described as connected to a group that exploits religion for violent purposes, language usually understood as a reference to IS.

The arrests are the latest in a series of counterterrorism actions that Turkey has taken against the Islamic State in recent months, following a December operation in the province of Yalova that left three police officers and six suspects dead. IS has a history of carrying out mass casualty attacks on Turkish soil, most notably the 2015 Ankara bombing and the 2017 Istanbul nightclub attack. (Euronews, April 20, 2026)

SHIFTING PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION
Hamas may still be in power in the Gaza Strip, but the Islamist group is now increasingly unpopular. According to Western intelligence sources, a majority of Gaza's civilian population has turned against Hamas and now favors the group laying down its arms. Gazans appear increasingly motivated by the prospect of ending the conflict with Israel and rebuilding the territory, with support for armed resistance dropping considerably. Most residents are also said to prefer new civilian leadership over continued Hamas rule. Despite this shift in public sentiment, Hamas has refused to disarm as required under the October 2025 ceasefire agreement brokered by the Trump administration. Talks between Hamas and the Gaza Board of Peace have stalled as well, with disarmament remaining the central sticking point between the two sides. (Jerusalem Post, May 9, 2026)

IRAQ'S MILITIAS DIG IN...
Amid the ongoing U.S. conflict with Iran, Iranian-supported militias in neighboring Iraq are striking a defiant stance. Against the backdrop of the conflict, Washington has exerted major political pressure on Baghdad in recent weeks. The Trump administration famously frustrated former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's bid to stand again for office in the country's recent elections, and the person that ended up becoming prime minister – Ali al-Zaidi – pledged to rein in the country's previously unaccountable Shi'a militias, many of which are controlled and directed by the Islamic Republic. But those groups are proving more difficult to control than previously envisioned.

Specifically, Arab newspaper Al-Hadath reports that one Iranian-linked militia, Kataib Hezbollah, has vowed to retain its weapons as long as foreign forces continue to be deployed in Iraq's Kurdistan region. That runs counter to American demands that the group, which is designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law, be disarmed by the Iraqi government. (Al-Hadath, May 30, 2026)

...AS IRAN'S PROXIES COLLABORATE
Over the past two decades, two key nodes in what the U.S. military terms the Iran Threat Network have worked intimately together, with one enhancing the sophistication and lethality of the other. In a new article for New Lines Magazine, Chatham House expert Farea Al-Muslimi details how, since the mid-2000s, Lebanon's powerful Hezbollah militia has worked gradually to enhance the political cohesion, operational lethality and technical proficiency of Yemen's Houthi rebels. That role expanded with the 2011 uprisings in Yemen, Al-Muslimi details, because "[a]s the state weakened and authority fragmented, the constraints on external involvement receded." Thereafter, Hezbollah reportedly triangulated its contacts with the Houthis with Iran's IRGC, even as the Lebanese militia helped to establish the Houthis' primary media outlet, known as Al-Masirah, back in Lebanon. And when the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital of Sana'a in 2014-2015, it "marked the high point of Hezbollah’s trajectory in Yemen."

Thereafter, ongoing Hezbollah support helped to broaden the geopolitical ambitions of the Houthis, expanding them beyond the confines of Yemeni politics to a broader regional – indeed global role, as manifested in the group's targeting of maritime shipping in the Red Sea in recent years. The trajectory is significant – and ominous. "The relationship between Hezbollah and the Houthis is not simply a case of proxy support," Al-Muslimi concludes. "It reflects a sustained process of construction — militarily, politically and institutionally — that produced an actor with its own strategic direction." (New Lines Magazine, May 28, 2026)